THE CHOICE BEFORE US

G. LOWES DICKINSON

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AFTER THE WAR
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BY

G. LOWES DICKINSON

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PREFACE

It is so difficult in war-time, for any one who does not deal with immediate exigencies, to gain a fair hearing, that I think it necessary to say in a preface some things which otherwise I might safely have left to the reader's own perception. I am not, in this book, discussing the origin or justification of the present war, nor the participation in it of this country. As a matter of fact, I agree with the general view that, after the invasion of Belgium, it would have been neither right nor wise for us to abstain. But the arguments of this book should be equally cogent to readers who take the most different views on these matters. For, whatever may be thought of the immediate origin of the war, it cannot be dissociated from all the deeper causes which have led to wars in the past and may lead to them in the future; and it is these with which I deal. I argue that war proceeds from wrong ideas and wrong policies; that in these ideas and policies all nations have been implicated; and that this war will have been fought in vain unless it leads to a change of attitude in all governments and all peoples. This change, I agree, is most required in Germany, and may be most difficult to effect there. But there are, in all countries, traditions, interests, prejudices and illusions making for war, and it is these that I endeavour to expose.

In the first part of the book I set forth the system of ideas and facts which I call Militarism. I have given no

definition of that term because it signifies something too complex for definition. But I will so far summarize my meaning as to say that Militarism is at once a state of mind and a military and political system. On the one hand, it is a belief that war is both inevitable and wholesome—the notion that it is wholesome fostering the notion that it is inevitable, and vice versa. On the other hand, it is a system whereby every citizen is compelled to military service, whereby a large and powerful class of military officers influences or dominates policy, and whereby education is directed by the State to a glorification of war. So conceived, it is clear that Militarism is more perfectly developed in Germany than anywhere else. But in other countries, too, it is both partially a fact and potentially a danger. And I argue that nothing but a complete and radical reform in international relations can prevent the danger from becoming a reality.

For Militarism does not arise without cause. Its main cause is the menace of war. And that menace grows continually more terrible as preparation for war, in all States, becomes more effective. Nations do not choose Militarism. It is forced upon them. And if, when this war is over, the conditions that led up to it are to be perpetuated, Militarism is likely not only to be maintained and exasperated on the Continent, but to be introduced into the United Kingdom, the United States, and China. In Japan it already prevails. The fact that men have died by millions to destroy it will have no effect on this result, unless, in all countries, those who have leisure and knowledge deliberately plan and work for a durable peace. It is as a contribution to such work that the second part of this book was written. But the second part is intimately connected with the first, and should not be considered apart from it.

It will not, I hope, be inferred that, because I condemn war uncompromisingly, I therefore condemn those who take part in it. Nothing can be further from my thought. Too many of my own friends have fought and died, or are yet to die, in this war. I do not praise them, for I have no right to praise what is above praise. I have wished to do better than praise. I have wished to contribute to a future in which such sacrifices as theirs shall never again be required. I have wished to destroy the errors which perpetuate war. And if I have succeeded, in any smallest measure, in that, I shall have helped the young men I have loved and admired to the purpose for which they have fought and died.

I have profited throughout by the sympathy and criticism of my friend Miss F. M. Stawell. I do not claim to associate her, more than she would choose to be associated, with the result. But I know that, whatever be the defects of the book, in matter or manner, they would have been far greater but for her judgment and tact.

POSTSCRIPT

The two greatest events of the war, the Russian revolution and the declaration of war by the United States, occurred after this book was in type. Both enhance, beyond all reckoning, the good prospects of civilization. The party at present in power in Russia appears to be opposed to schemes of imperialistic aggrandizement and inclined to international solutions. And the United States, which have entered the war with no other purpose than to secure the rule of right, will now have an undisputed place at the conference which is to settle the future. The outlook for a new international organization, based upon a new will for creative peace, has never been so bright. All that remains to make a certainty of hope is a change of

government in Germany. That change seems now to be probable, if not during, then immediately after the war. And if, and when, it takes place, there can be no further scruples about including the German people in the League of Nations. The best of all guarantees for the future, the good will of the peoples, seems now to be almost assured. May their leaders know how to elicit and interpret that will in all countries!

April 6, 1917.

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PART I

MILITARISM

It is quite true that in the past, many, probably the majority of wars have been unjustifiable, and that, had the world been governed with greater wisdom, they might have been avoided.

LORD CROMER.

Many wars have been unjust, most have been unnecessary.

LORD BRYCE.

There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict between States.

T. H. GREEN.

CHAPTER I

THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM

THE political relations of the European States have consisted for centuries past of war and preparation for war. In the present war, this practice has culminated in a catastrophe which, it might seem, must lead to a reaction. Perhaps it may. But it certainly will not do so, unless it be by a deliberate and conscious change in the ideas and the wills of men. Meantime people already talk of the "next war." It is therefore important to make some forecast of what kind of a war that is likely to be, and, more generally, what kind of a future the continuation and extension of militarism would prepare for mankind.

A Russian general, Skugarewski, has recently attempted a forecast of the next war,[1] which he anticipates in ten or twenty years, if Germany is not "conclusively conquered." He starts by remarking that every war he can remember, beginning from the Crimean War, was an "unprecedented" war; and his moral is that "humanity must at last learn how to prepare for war." "In the future struggle of nations all men capable of bearing arms will be taken into the ranks of the nations' armies, and for them everything will be ready in peace-time." This

[1] See the Russian Supplement to *The Times* of July 29, 1916, which reproduces the general's contribution to the *Russkoe Slovo*.

will mean that Russia will have an army of forty millions and Germany of twenty millions. For an army of forty million men three hundred thousand officers will be required. To secure them "it will be necessary to introduce conscription for officers: all young men who have received not even complete middle-school education will be obliged to serve as officers." Further, it will be necessary to replace, so far as possible, by women the men who under existing arrangements are kept in the rear by non-combatant duties. Perhaps therefore "it will be necessary to introduce conscription for girls and childless widows, so that more men can be sent to the front." As to armaments, "there will be required for such an army one hundred thousand guns, a million maxims, tens of thousands of motor-cars, armoured, freight, and light cars. By the beginning of the war at least fifty million gun-projectiles must be prepared, and five thousand million rifle cartridges. Besides machine-gun detachments, each company of a regiment will have its portable machine guns on light stands." Aviation, of course, "will receive special development." "It is clear that in ten to twenty years every State will reckon the numbers of its dirigibles in thousands and the number of its aeroplanes in tens, if not hundreds of thousands. The dropping of shells from above on to large stretches of country will be extensively practised. And if the laws of war permit the application of inflammable materials and substances for the development of poisonous gases, then the raids of aerial flotillas will instantly convert large districts of several square versts[1] into complete deserts where every vestige of animal and vegetable life will be slain and where large units of armies will be annihilated to a single man." The range of guns will

[1] Such as London or Berlin.—AUTHOR.

be enormously increased and "perhaps Dover will be shelled from Calais." The general proceeds to estimate the cost of such a war at twenty millions a day. The peace establishment of Russia will cost a hundred millions a year.

"Besides the existing material conscriptions, it may perhaps be necessary to introduce conscription for grain, meat, and fodder. All industrial establishments—mills, factories, workshops, even handicraftsmen—on declaration of war will have to work for the army in accordance with a special plan of mobilization." In short, "expedients for the extermination of humanity will be of such a nature that everything of which we hear nowadays will pale in comparison. The number of killed will be reckoned by millions, of wounded by tens of millions."

This is not a romance by Mr. Wells. It is a very sober description, certainly not overdrawn, of what is likely to occur in that "next war" to which so many people are already looking forward.[1] Let us carry the description a little further.

And, first, as to methods of war. It is as probable as anything can be that these will be of a kind which will make the worst that has been done in this war seem by comparison like humanity and kindness. Not only will every weapon that has been used in this war be employed in the next, except those that have been rendered obsolete by the invention of worse ones, but science will have discovered new and far more destructive means of murder. We have long applied chemistry to war; but we have

[1] "I believe it to be a fact that there are some people going about even now saying, and trying to induce other people to believe, that we should never have another war. All I can say is that in my humble opinion the people who say it either wittingly or unwittingly are nothing more or less than traitors to their country" (Lord Lilford, at Thrapston. Quoted in *Labour Leader*, August 12, 1915).

not begun to apply bacteriology. In the future, the deliberate spread of lethal diseases among the enemy is likely to be a principal and recognized method of destruction. Further, the war will be waged, without any restriction, on non-combatants. Already a German professor[1] has written a book to show that this is permitted by the "new" law of nations, created by the experiences of this war. And, of course, the logic of war is in favour of it. For a munition-worker, or a producer of any kind, is just as much helping the enemy to win the war as a soldier at the front.

We must therefore expect that in any future war any and every weapon of extermination will be used freely against non-combatants as well as combatants. Rules of war may be drawn up to prevent this. But the issues of a modern war are so tremendous, that such rules are likely to break at the first tension put upon them. One combatant succumbs to one temptation, another to another. Each breach of the law by one is followed by breaches by the others, under guise of reprisals. Neither religion, morals, nor humanity have availed to arrest this process in the present war. Why should we suppose they will be more potent in the future?

But destruction by war does not end with the lives of the immediate sufferers. Every man of sound stock who is killed childless extinguishes with himself whole generations. But it is the sound that are killed in war, and the unsound preserved, for it is the sound that are selected to go to the front. Further, among those that survive, men and women, the conditions of war tend to

[1] Dr. Paul Eltzbacher, formerly rector of the Hochschule at Berlin, in his book *Totes und Lebendiges Völkerrecht*. München and Leipzig: Duncker u. Humblot. See *Blätter für Zwischenstaatliche Organisation*, July 1916, p. 210.

disseminate over wider and wider areas venereal and other diseases, and this again reacts upon the stock. So that, whoever wins or loses the war, winners and losers alike have impaired irremediably the strength of their nation. War may preserve liberty for posterity, but it is a posterity weakened and enfeebled that will enjoy it.

War, then, means not merely the destruction of the best among the living, but an irreparable impoverishment of the race; and that on a scale proportional to the scale of the war. But the scale of modern wars is world-wide. So, therefore, is the impoverishment. War is a way of racial suicide. Soldiers and statesmen do not think of such remote effects; but they do not cease to happen because they are not thought of. And in comparison with them victory or defeat, and the other results of war, are negligible in the balance.

Let us turn now from the biological to the social effects of war. War implies preparation for war. And if the international anarchy is to continue, so that States are compelled to arm against one another, each driving on each to ever more tremendous efforts, there can be no pause in the process and no limit to it. We have no right to dismiss as improbable, still less as impossible, any extremity that lies in the logic of the movement. Let us therefore without shrinking develop that logic to the full.

First, universal service will be introduced as a permanent institution into the countries that have hitherto escaped it; and it is probable that it will be organized on the complete Prussian model. There are, I am aware, some who look forward to what they call a "popular" army, such as is maintained in Switzerland and was proposed for France by Jaurès. Their idea is, first, that an army may be organized for defence only, and not for offence. Secondly,

that it may be so organized that it cannot become the instrument of a military caste. A full discussion of these points is not possible here; but there are one or two obvious considerations which must be borne in mind. In the first place, there is not, and cannot be, any clear and universally accepted distinction between offence and defence, until there is an international agreement as to what shall constitute offence. Every nation in every war that I have ever heard of has claimed to be on the defensive. The mere act of declaring war, or of taking the first step in war, cannot be accepted as proof of aggression, for it may be merely a reasonable precaution of defence. It may be urged that the act of invasion should be the test of offence, and that an army of defence must never cross the frontier. But would any military authority accept that view? And, in particular, is it applicable to this country, where in any future war the transport of an army to the Continent will be the first necessity, if any of our continental allies are also involved? The Territorials were enlisted for home defence; and we see what has come of that, under the first pressure of war. The distinction, then, between an army for offence and an army for defence is unreal and must remain unreal, unless and until we have a system of international agreements and guarantees which would transform the whole situation out of which wars arise.

Secondly, whatever organization be adopted for an army, however short the period to be spent in barracks, however democratic the method of recruiting and promotion, it does not seem possible that a force on the modern scale of numbers and efficiency could be maintained without the aid of a very large class of professional officers, and without giving to these a large measure of social prestige and political influence. The British tradition, whereby the

officer rarely appears in uniform, and is not felt in time of peace as an element in society or in politics, must disappear, it would seem, with the permanent adoption of universal service. The more numerous, highly-trained, and intelligent the officer caste, the more influential they will become. And as they will be trained exclusively for war, and will regard war both as their own sole business and as the sole business of the nation, they are not likely to abstain from bringing their influence to bear upon foreign policy. But such political influence of an officer caste is precisely one of the most important elements in militarism. And the moment officers begin to wear their uniforms in time of peace will be the moment when militarism starts to run its course in England.

In any case, whatever form of military organization be adopted, we shall have everywhere universal service; and that, as General Skugarewski foresees, on a scale hitherto unknown in history. Every man between the ages, let us say, of 17 and 50 will be liable to military service. Boys under 17 will have compulsory "preliminary training" as boy scouts, in officers' training corps, and the like. Women and girls will be enrolled for the various non-combatant services—unless indeed, which is quite possible, it be decided to raise combatant corps of amazons. In any case, the question of the fitness of people for military service, in character or temperament or conviction, will not enter into consideration. In the past, in pagan societies—ancient India, for example, or Japan—men were selected as soldiers by their own choice or by hereditary aptitude. In the twentieth century of Him who came to bring peace among mankind, we do not hesitate to compel all men into the army without reference to their aptitude or choice, and in defiance of their moral, religious, or political scruples. Thus, as conscription extends, so does

the necessity of persecution. And if international war is to continue, persecution will be established as an institution in all countries.

Having forced the men (and the women it may be) into the army, the next thing will be to train them. What the object of military training is was once summed up as follows by a military officer. "The one object," he said, "of a military system is to overcome a man's natural reluctance to kill and to be killed. To accomplish this we have three devices. The first is to make the soldier more afraid of his own officers than he is of the enemy. The second is to convert him into an automaton by perpetual drill, so that he obeys instinctively every order given without any intervention of his own choice or will. The third device is a just cause." This last device is rather the business of the politicians than the soldiers, and it is one they very well understand. As to the others, there seems to be some question, in modern warfare, as to the extent to which it is necessary to destroy the soldier's individuality. But it can hardly be doubtful that the more it is possible to overcome beforehand, not only his reluctance to kill and to be killed, but his squeamishness as to methods of killing, the better soldier he will be. And we may expect developments in this direction which would surprise and shock our present susceptibilities, formed, as they have been, in and for peace.

But to make a nation efficient for war it will not be enough to conscript the whole population, to train them in the use of any and every weapon, and to counteract their humane instincts. Much more important will be the religious and moral training. The soul as well as the body of a good soldier must be militarized; and for this purpose a new direction must be given to the State religion. Exactly how revolutionary the change must

be it is not easy to say. The attitude of the clergy in the present war has shown that the apparent teaching of the Gospels need not interfere with an enthusiastic support of war by ministers of a Christian Church; and that, in the view of many, the dispensation of Jesus left standing in full authority that of the God of the Jews. The Sermon on the Mount, we have been told in effect, was merely a string of amiable metaphors. The real Jesus Whom we are to treat as our Master was the one Who used the scourge of small cords in the Temple, not the one who bade us turn the other cheek. When He said, "Greater love hath no man than this, that he give his life for his friend," what He meant was that we are to kill our enemies. And when He said, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," He already by anticipation condemned those who, in the future, in His name, might refuse military service. This adaptability of Christianity, as professed by the Churches, suggests that its forms might still be preserved even in an era of universal militarism. Nor need we be troubled by the fact that Christianity is a universal religion, and that all Christians are supposed to worship the same God. For we have seen also, in this war, that each nation can claim, with the full support of its Church, that its national god is really the universal god; so that Christian nations may not only fight against one another with a good conscience, but each may be sure, in so doing, that it is fighting for the true God, Who is being denied by its enemies.

There seems, then, on the whole, good reason to think that the forms of Christianity may still continue to direct the militaristic societies of the future. At the same time we must make no mistake about the reality. The real religion of the future, if war is to continue, will be the religion of

the God-State; for the essential requirement will be an unquestioning submission to the will of the State. It is this that has given such moral strength to the Germans in the present war; and the fact will be noted and its lesson applied by other nations.

The essence of this religion, stated without compromise or qualification, is as follows: The State is the purpose and end for which individuals come into existence. It is a god; and, like other gods, it is mysterious. Its nature is unknowable and undefinable. This does not prevent the existence of whole libraries of "Statology" about It or Him. But these volumes do not really serve, and are not intended to serve, to dispel the darkness. The State is something supernatural. It is not the sum of its members. It is not their trend, their purpose, or their impulse. It works through governmental agents, who may be called its priests. But it is not they. It works upon the people, but it is not they. Neither their happiness nor their well-being, nor even the well-being of the Government, is its purpose. Its purpose is Its own Being and Power. It has, in fact, only one point of contact with its worshippers: it demands their sacrifice to itself. A sacrifice complete, unreserved, unquestioning; a sacrifice not only of their lives (that is little) but of their most profound instincts, their most passionate feelings, their deepest convictions. They must have no conscience but its, no belief but its, no cause but its. They must be its slaves, not body only, but mind and soul. They are nothing; It is all.

I am aware that this expression of the militarist theory of the State will be repudiated, even by Germans. Of course they do not so express it. But they imply all that has been here expressed, though no doubt they may be unaware of the implications. Not only so, but much

that is said and thought in other countries, not excluding England, really involves the same presuppositions. I shall have occasion later to return to this point, when I consider the theory of foreign policy. At present, what interests me is the connexion of the theory with war. The unquestioning and uncritical sacrifice demanded in the name of the State is for the purpose of extending its power by war. The State is a god of war, as once the God of the Jews was. And that is why the religion of the State will more and more drive out every other, if the process of militarizing the world continues. Other countries, in this respect, will follow the lead of Germany. And the philosophy we have been repudiating as devilish because Germany was our enemy, we shall end by adopting ourselves in order to be the better prepared to fight her. We may expect that, in a militarist future, this doctrine of the God-State, in essence if not in set terms, will be taught in every school, college, university, and pulpit. Thus, both before and after the period of actual military training, the citizen will be prepared and confirmed for his main business in life by every form of spiritual exhortation. Education will mean training for war. The effort to teach men to think and judge for themselves will be eliminated. For nothing could be more directly opposed than this to the cult of the State and of war. That cult requires what is rather a discipline than an education. The student must be taught dogmatically what the purposes of life are; not permitted, still less encouraged, to examine the question for himself. He must be taught from infancy up, that he came into the world to sacrifice himself in war; that the reason of this is a mystery; and that into that mystery it is blasphemy and pride for the human reason to pry.

We have spoken so far of that part of education (the

most important part) which is concerned with the purposes of life and which (as we shall doubtless be told) in all well-organized States has always rested on revelation. Upon this depends all the rest. The teaching of morals must of course conform to that of religion; and the religion of the God-State will require a different code to that which has hitherto been professed by Christians. The old profession must now be brought into accord with the new practice required by the age of war. Pity, gentleness, charity, must not merely not be practised, they must be branded as crimes against the social order; the practical lessons in brutality which will form the main part of military training must be reinforced by preaching, teaching, and example at every stage of life; and for the cult of humanity which has increasingly prevailed in democratic societies we must substitute the Nietzschean formula "Be hard."

The new religion and the new ethics will be accompanied by a new development of scientific teaching. For science will be more necessary than ever in the strenuous competition that lies before us. It will be necessary for industry. On that I need not dwell. But above all it will be necessary for war. The nation, we shall be told, that is most successful in inventing new methods of destruction will be the nation that will "survive"; and we shall be urged no longer to hamper our efforts by the scruples and limitations of a romantic tradition and a system of pseudo-law. What this may imply in the actual invention of lethal weapons it would be idle to try to forecast. But to one thing we must make up our minds. Whenever there emerges, in any generous young soul, the passion for truth and the genius for discovery, he will be seized upon by society and urged, nay compelled, to devote his idealism not to the perfecting but to the destruction of human life.

The perversion of the intellect will follow from the perversion of the soul. And reason, distorted from its trend to comprehend truth and serve mankind, will become more devilish than ever mere bestiality could be, and make of man something as infinitely lower than the brutes as he had it in him to be infinitely higher. Germany boasts that she has introduced into the world the new gospel of "organization." Perhaps she has. But if war is to continue, and to govern all the effort of men, the gospel of organization is the gospel of Satanism.

The development of religion and education which I have thus sketched is likely to be accompanied by a transformation of political institutions. Democracy is a bad medium for war. For democracy, in the first place, is hard to discipline. That goes without saying. And for that reason alone lovers of discipline look upon it with mistrust. In the second place, democracy is averse from, and perhaps incapable of, policies looking far ahead. Its essence is responsiveness to the movements of public opinion; and public opinion, in a free democracy, is always in movement. But war, and the policies war subserves, require long views. It is not without reason that, even in democratic countries, foreign policy, and the military and naval policy which is its handmaid, has been withdrawn as far as possible from popular control. But that withdrawal has not been sufficient. The democracies have not been able to prepare with the deliberation and thoroughness of the autocracies. This is true both of England and of France. As to England, it would be superfluous to repeat here the condemnation that has been dealt out to our government, both from militarists and from pacifists. As to France, we have the interesting record of M. Sembat's book: "Faites un roi. Sinon faites la paix." M. Sembat is (or was) a democrat and a socialist. But he deliberately

affirmed, before the war, and it is hardly likely that he has changed his view since, that a Republic was incompetent to prepare adequately for war against an autocracy, and that either France must make up her quarrel with Germany, or she must convert herself into a monarchy. By dint of an unexampled coalition of forces, the inadequacy of preparation in the two democracies has been counterbalanced by their greater resources. But how near a thing it has been! How immense has been and is the technical superiority of the autocracy! The "militarism" we condemn in Germany is a condition of efficiency for war. And if war is to continue, other nations must adopt it, in its political as well as its other manifestations. The franker organs of our militarists at home, like the *Morning Post*, have recognized that from the beginning of the war. And even before the war the same view was set forth in militarist publications with a candour and a force which opponents of militarism should be the first to recognize.

I may refer, in this connexion, to a remarkable book by Captain Ross, entitled *Representative Government and War*, published in 1903, and based in part upon the experience acquired in the Boer War. This book, had it had the good fortune to become known in Germany, would doubtless have aroused as much attention there as the book of General Bernhardi did in England. Its philosophy is the same, its frankness is as complete, its brutality as uncompromising. It justifies beforehand, in principle if not in set terms, everything the Germans have done; their declaration of war, their invasion of Belgium, their methods of conducting war. It is not, however, on that aspect of the matter that I desire now to dwell. It is the political views of the author to which I would call attention. The form of government which he admires is that of Germany; and he desires, by a *coup d'état* or otherwise, to convert

the government of England into that form. He points out that the preparation for war is not only military but political; that the publicity, or comparative publicity, of parliamentary government not only makes more difficult the appropriation of enormous funds to armaments and secret service, but also hampers that preparation for war by diplomacy which is essential if war is to be made at the right moment against the right enemy. For the only business of diplomacy is to make war; not defensive, but aggressive war. The gallant captain perceives that such objects cannot be avowed by governments and would hardly be tolerated by peoples. His remedy for this disastrous state of things is to remove from even the shadow of popular control not only the administration of the armed forces and the conduct of war, but the whole of foreign policy. He would make the King commander-in-chief, and allow him to govern through three military chiefs, who should direct not only the forces but the diplomacy of the country. He sees no hope of achieving this purpose (short of a *coup d'état*) until the country has accepted conscription. For only a conscript people will tolerate military rule. Thus he definitely desires universal service, not only for military but also, and mainly, for political purposes; he desires it as a means to destroy free government and put the country under the heel of a military dictatorship. For his grudging admission—"it is too much to expect of the British race that it shall make matters of internal administration in any way subject to the will of an autocrat, and it is unnecessary"—still leaves the people without any say in what is most important to their welfare, crushed under an ever increasing burden of armaments, and subject, at least once in a generation, to wars becoming ever more destructive not only of life but of humanity itself.

Some readers may be inclined to set aside a book of this

kind as the raving of a madman. But to do so would be to do injustice to the author and to his position. Granted certain assumptions—the struggle for existence between States, the consequent necessity of war, the subordination of home to foreign policy, the conception that the main aim of the latter is to prepare aggressive war—granted, in fact, the philosophy of militarism, and all the contentions of the author follow. And unless we root militarism out of our minds and souls (its real dwelling-place) and in consequence out of our institutions, national and international, we have no defence against that logic and therefore none against the policies it engenders. Let the international anarchy and international war continue, and there is an end of political liberty. What those who hate this prospect have most to fear is that they should be dupes of their own optimism. The connexion between war and autocracy is essential. We see it immediately when we are actually at war. Thus, during the last two years we have abandoned to the Executive liberty of person and of speech. We have sat still and watched while a Government department abolished the Habeas Corpus Act. We have reintroduced religious persecution, and condemned young men to death and sent them to penal servitude for obeying their consciences; and we have permitted the military authorities to take charge not only of the policing of the country, but of the expression and formation of opinion. Democrats no doubt flatter themselves that they will recover their liberties and their constitution after the war. But whether they will or no depends on whether or no the international anarchy is to continue. If it is, the nation will be cajoled and bullied to sacrifice its political liberty to the need of national defence. By that kind of imperceptible process by which our constitution develops, the military authority

will thrust aside the civilian; and we shall find ourselves living under a Prussian system, without having ever taken a clear decision in the matter or at any moment definitely surrendered our liberties and rights. Meantime the discipline and training which I have described will be operating on the younger generation. So that it will not be long before they have lost even the remembrance of liberty, and become as proud of their passive abnegation before an officer caste as any German can be. Political liberty has been the capital achievement of the British race. But it, above all things, is threatened by the rising flood of militarism. And while it thinks it stands, it may well take heed lest it falls.

The militarism of which I have thus outlined the possible development is primarily a European phenomenon. The Far East (with the very notable exception of Japan) and the Far West are as yet hardly touched by it. For that reason, those parts of the world are the hope of the world. But then, their development is strictly conditioned by that of Europe. For the world is now one, for evil as well as for good. Every contagion spreads, and every cause produces effects round the whole girdle of the globe. Turning first to the United States of America, we find that that great country—the greatest potential force, material, moral, and spiritual, in the world—has realized, with a shock of dismay, that it is no longer isolated from the European madness. It is part of the system, or rather the anarchy, of States. Americans can no longer disconnect themselves from the chain of international policy. Their future is bound up with the future of Europe. Either they must arm for self-defence, and by so doing join and exasperate the international anarchy; or they must combine with the European Powers to end it. That is what President Wilson has realized, and what he has been saying to a sceptical

and uncomprehending Europe. This question of the American attitude is the crucial one for civilization as a whole, and for that of Europe in particular. For once let the United States arm on the European scale, once let the Far East do the same, and where will Europe be? If the West and the East do not combine with Europe to stay this madness they will be driven to participate in it, to the ruin of Europe as well as of themselves. To reject the overtures of President Wilson at this crisis is to reject what is perhaps the last hope of civilization. Let me, then, cite his words, for they are too little known in this country:—

> We are not mere disconnected lookers on. The longer the war lasts, the more deeply do we become concerned. . . . When it comes to an end we shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence that will give promise of days from which anxiety and uncertainty shall be lifted and bring some assurance that peace and war shall hereafter be reckoned as part of the common interest of mankind. We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all the nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Asia and Europe.
>
> The repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this—that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth Alliance must not be set up against Alliance, Understanding against Understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind. . . . This is undoubtedly the thought of America, this is what we ourselves will say when there comes the proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with one another arbitrary force must be rejected, and we must move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought

of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes the chief part of the passionate conviction of America. We believe these fundamental things:—

Firstly: That every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.

Like other nations, we have ourselves, no doubt, once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honourable enough to admit, but it has become more and more our rule of life and action.

Secondly: That the small States of the world have the right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that the great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.

Thirdly: That the world has the right to be free from every disturbance to its peace that has its origin in aggression and the disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe in these things, that I am sure I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and to make them secure against violation.[1]

So speaks America to Europe. How will Europe respond? Accept, and America comes in to save civilization. Refuse, and she arms, whether she will or no, to destroy it.

And now look East. It is the same alternative. China, next to, perhaps even beyond, the United States, is a storehouse of potential energy with which all Europe would contend in vain once it were developed. But Europe is compelling its development; compelling it not only in the economic but in the military sense. For centuries China has preached and acted on the gospel

[1] Since this speech was made the President has reaffirmed the position then taken up, most notably in his speech to the Senate of January 22, 1917, and again in the speech in which he announced the entry of the United States into the war.

of peace. Europe, taking advantage of her weakness, mocks at the philosophy which has led to it. Europe is as anxious to instruct her in war as to instruct her in industry. Well, in both, Europe is prevailing. Listen to the words of a Chinese Confucian, and see what thoughts European policies have forced upon these men who once believed in reason :—

The contact of China with Europe in the last two decades has revived the martial spirit of the people, which died out in the middle of the Manchu reign. The rise of Japan as a military Power has set them an admirable and practical example. This European conflict has again brought home to them the absolute necessity of an adequate efficient army and navy for the security of their national independence and existence. To the intelligent Chinese of the present generation no person appears to deserve a more appropriate worship than the Krupp engineer who produces a 75-cm. gun, and no nation can give a better lead than the one that raises a voluntary army of three millions in a short period of six months. To cite an instance, I might be permitted to give an extract of a letter I received from a Chinese schoolboy who was expecting to go to America. The letter says : " Having finished my secondary education, I am not entering any university in China. I solemnly hope that in the future I shall be a Hindenburg or a Pétain. Germany and France being now at war, I am going to be trained as a soldier in the land of Generals Jackson and Lee."

To fight is the nature of man ! To urge man to fight is the nature of woman ! To this the Chinese are no exception. Courage, patience, and endurance, which form their physical and moral character, are the basis of the good soldier. Lord Wolseley, speaking with his personal experience of the China War, says that the Chinese soldier is a mighty and worthy foe. Lord Curzon, criticizing the Sino-Japanese War, admits that, man for man, the Chinese are superior to their opponents. It only needs training to utilize these soldierly qualities and to create a gallant army and a mighty navy for the defence of the country and for its war of liberation.

In the last five years Bill after Bill has been considered by the Government for universal conscription ; proposal after pro-

posal has been submitted to President Yuan Shih-Kai for the extension of arsenals and the establishment of shipbuilding yards. The War Office is busily engaged in training army officers and the Admiralty in training naval cadets. Flying schools have been opened, flying corps have been formed; cavalry, artillery, infantry, commissariat, Boy Scouts, Red Cross nurses, and even Woman Volunteer Corps—all have come into being, and all will grow to full strength in time. It is certain that once the foundation has been laid, the structure will be firm; and that once the seeds have been sown the fruits will be wholesome. It may take them fifty years or more before they can be tested in the field, but the day will come when their sinews of war have been provided through the opening up of their resources, when their strategic railways have been extensively built, and when their national education has been speeded up—the day will come when China, possessing one-fourth of the world's population, and occupying an area twenty times as great as Great Britain, will adequately defend her vast Empire and claim the voice and place to which she is entitled in the family of nations.[1]

We see, then, that the prospect I have been opening out extends far beyond Europe. There is no part or corner of the world which is not threatened. Militarism spreads like an epidemic. And either we must cut it off, root and branch, here in Europe, or we must look forward to its extension East and West, to return thence against ourselves and consummate by destruction from without our own internecine strife. Europe is not only committing *harikari*; she is at the same time arming the hand that is to strike off her head, after she has made the fatal cut.[2]

[1] *Clare Market Review*, "The Action and Reaction of the War in China," by S. G. Cheng.

[2] Since this chapter was written a book has been published by a M. Alphonse Séché entitled *Les Guerres d'Enfer* (Deuxième Edition. E. Sansot, Paris, 1915), which develops at length the positions of this chapter. It is to be noted that, by a fatalism too common among French intellectuals, the author regards the whole process as "inevitable." This war is only the prelude to centuries of wars on a scale and of an intensity of destructiveness of which this is only the foretaste.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE 5.—METHODS OF WARFARE.

1. *Submarining.*

The fact that the British in this war have not found it necessary to imitate German methods of warfare at sea cannot prudently be taken as prophetic of the conduct of such warfare in the future. Holding the command of the seas, we have been able to carry on our blockade without too violent a breach with the traditional sea-law. But the submarine has none the less altered the whole position. And already before this war a distinguished British authority both foresaw and justified the policy which the Germans have adopted. Writing in *The Times* a fortnight before the war broke out, Sir Percy Scott said that a declaration of blockade accompanied by the threat to sink by submarines and mines ships attempting to break the blockade "would in my opinion be perfectly in order; and once it had been made, if any British or neutral ships disregarded it and attempted to run the blockade they would not be held to be engaged in peaceable occupations and avocations, and if they were sunk in the attempt it would not be describable as a relapse into savagery or piracy in the blackest form" (*The Times*, July 16, 1914).

2. *Air Raids.*

After long hesitation the British have now (1917) sanctioned reprisals in kind for the German air raids. The French succumbed earlier to the temptation, as the following official German account of the Karlsruhe raid may illustrate:—

"It was obviously no mere coincidence that the French chose Corpus Christi Day for their raid. They knew that on this great Catholic festival, under the bright sunshine, crowds of people, athirst for light and air, would be sure to stream through the streets and squares. That it was people's lives they aimed at is proved by the sort of bombs they threw. Incendiary bombs were only used in a small number. Nearly all the bombs were small, but filled with very strong explosives. They thus broke into very small splinters and destroyed the maximum of human lives, their effect being increased by poisonous gases. Their preparations and in-

tentions had only too great a success. On the Karlsruhe Festplatz, where Hagenbeck's zoo had erected tents, there moved a joyous crowd. Happy children's laughter mingled with the sounds of music. . . . Before there was time to bring the people into safety the first shots fell. . . . The enemy's worst destruction was . . . achieved around the Festplatz amongst the innocent children, who a few minutes before had been so happy. When the French airmen disappeared a quarter of an hour later they could boast of having killed 117 people . . . of whom 82 were children, . . . and wounded 140 people . . . of whom 72 were children. . . ."

On this the *New York Evening Post* comments (June 27, 1915): "Such is the latest record of legitimate warfare under the recognized form of 'reprisals.' Does the human conscience find any justification for such savagery in the fact that Karlsruhe has only been punished for what the Germans have done in France and England? Even in colonial warfare, against tribes who tortured their prisoners and maimed the dead, the nations of Europe have not resorted to reprisals on women and children. . . . It is an outbreak of primitive brutality which fitly marks the status of European 'civilization' after two years of war."

It must be remembered that even the existing international law sanctions the bombardment from the air of "defended" places, and that every great capital is in this sense "defended." Thus London, in the German view, is a "fortress." So, of course, is Antwerp; and in reference to the first Zeppelin raid on that city *The Times* wrote :—

"It marks the beginning of a new epoch in the conflicts of mankind. . . . Much indignation was expended yesterday, much of it was misdirected. Antwerp is a formidable fortress, protecting a strong army, and its bombardment is permissible. Bombs dropped from aircraft are not more destructive than great shells fired from siege howitzers. In all bombardments of defended places the civil population is not exempt, and even the British *Official Manual* declares that in operations against such places 'the town and forts form an indivisible whole.' . . . How is the commander of a hostile airship to give notice of bombardment?" (*The Times*, August 27, 1914).

We are not, therefore, surprised to read in the Press of September 29, 1916, the following notice (German Wireless) :—

"During a British bombing attack on Brussels 15 houses were destroyed and 13 Belgians killed, while 28 were wounded."

On April 6, 1915, we find the *Daily News* complacently remarking of a British aeroplane raid upon the airship shed of Hoboken (Antwerp), which killed 42 German working men and wounded 62 others, that this particular raid "is far and away the most effective air bombardment during the war."

3. *Starvation of the Civilian Population.*

The object of the British blockade of Germany and of the German blockade of England is, of course, to reduce by famine the civilian population; and no one will contend that either party would relax their measures because they found that they were succeeding and that little children were actually dying by hundreds and thousands. Each would say that the enemy ought to give in, and that if they did not the consequences were on their own head. Thus, in a leading article of one of the principal "Liberal" newspapers I read: "We shall be sustained, no doubt, by the belief, which all available information endorses as valid, that Germany and Austria have not merely less than they want, but less, far less, than they need."

In Poland, it would seem, the death by starvation or disease of women, children, and old people is already an accomplished fact. In an appeal for funds for Polish relief signed by Paderewski and Ex-President Taft, the following description of conditions in Poland is given:—

"The latest reports from Poland have been of such a nature that unless we obtain more assistance from you the whole Polish nation will be wiped out of existence. Over 20,500 villages have been levelled to the ground. More than 200 towns have completely disappeared. Sixteen hundred churches are in ruins. Loss in property destroyed over 2 billions (500 million pounds). More than 100,000 young girls of Poland have had their lives shattered by the greatest tragedy that can come to a woman. Victims of the conquering and the retiring armies that have incessantly swept over Poland since the beginning of the war, these unfortunate young mothers, whose babies have died for want of food, clothing, and shelter, find themselves outcasts—helpless, alone, having known of maternity nothing but the sorrows. Fourteen million[1] Poles, including all the children under seven years of age, have actually been wiped out of existence. A prominent American, who has just

[1] *Sic.* (?) 4,000,000 or 1,400,000 (?). The figure clearly is wrongly reproduced.

returned from Poland, where he had been investigating conditions on behalf of a well-known American war relief organization, reports as follows: 'Having had occasion to travel on the main road from Warsaw to Pinsk, about 150 miles long, I noticed that the ground was simply littered with civilian garments and cradles. Four hundred thousand human beings must have dropped dead along that road. The retreating army had burned their homes and compelled them to evacuate the land. There had been no time to bury those who fell. The birds of prey, as well as the wild animals, had cleaned the bones, and the invader, after gathering these bones and grinding them, had used them for fertilizing the fields in his own home land.' And now winter is coming again with all its horrors. It will bring untold misery to the homeless, shelterless, foodless Polish sufferers. Thousands more must die. They are doomed. Help cannot reach them in time. However, out of a population of 34,000,000 (?) Poles still quite a number remain whom you can help us to save, for food can still be obtained in Poland, but only at extremely high prices" (from the *New York Tribune*, November 1916).

Those who still speak of the ennobling and regenerating effects of war are invited to contemplate these facts.

PAGE 9.—CONSCRIPTION BREEDING PERSECUTION.

It is hardly necessary to illustrate this point by the case of the "conscientious objectors." The objection of these men, who number in England many thousands, is either religious or political, and in both cases conscientious. Yet the effort of the Government to give them security against being forced into the army has been defeated by the Tribunals with the full support of public opinion. Hundreds of men, as I write, are undergoing sentences of imprisonment for obeying their conscience, and few voices are raised in their behalf, though those few are pertinacious and courageous. It is clear that the English public does not disapprove this kind of persecution. It is also clear, to any one who knows the English, that there will always be, in every generation, people who will face persecution on this issue. Resistance will breed resistance. The public will become more exasperated as the victims become more obstinate. And it may not be long, if conscription is continued after the war, before these men will be shot, with the full approval of the Press, the Universities, and the Churches.

PAGE 10.—MILITARY TRAINING AND ITS EFFECTS.

This is a large subject, on which I profess no expert knowledge. If the reader wants confirmation of the statements in the text, I advise him to make inquiry among officers and soldiers who have been through the war and are willing to tell the truth. I mention only what has come before my own notice. Thus, for example, in the training for bayonet charges the men are taught to kick the enemy in the genital organs at the same time that they make their thrust. They are trained to charge at sacks or dummy men on which the vital parts are marked. I have heard of men fainting with physical horror under this discipline. More commonly, I am told, it has no effect at all on their imagination. But if the training does not actively promote brutality, it must at least passively hinder the motions of humanity. Suggest to men, by a matter-of-fact teaching, that any course you like to think of is normal and approved, and you will get them to adopt it. For they will not either think or imagine for themselves. If these good-natured boys in all the armies saw or conceived the remote consequences of every bomb they throw in the spirit of cricket, or every gun they fire in the spirit of sport, is it to be supposed that they could do what they do? It is essential both to war and to preparation for war that men should not be allowed, or allow themselves, to realize what they are doing.

That training for war, whether or no it actually encourages brutality, gives opportunity for it is clear from the well attested records of outrages by non-commissioned officers in conscript armies abroad. To convince the reader that those possibilities lie quite near to us at home, I will ask him to consider the following case of the treatment of a recalcitrant conscientious objector, not by Germans but by Englishmen.

"G. B. appeared before the —— Local Tribunal on July 10th to claim exemption as a conscientious objector on moral grounds. Immediately he had made his statement, the military representative read a case from a circular sent out for the guidance of tribunals, in which an applicant had been turned down on the ground that the objection was a political one, and not moral, and the military representative held that B.'s case was analogous. B. contended that his objection was not analogous, and that his objection, based on his conception of war as murder, was moral. The tribunal upheld the contention of the military representative, and he was turned down. The appeal was heard at —— on August 8th, and before B. had

finished his case or called his witnesses the chairman announced that the tribunal were unanimously of opinion that his case was analogous, and the appeal would be dismissed. B. tried to elicit from the chairman whether in his opinion a moral objection apart from religious belief could be sustained. No answer was given to this question. Feeling that this point was of the most vital importance to objectors on moral grounds, B. asked for leave to go before the Central Tribunal, but this was refused. He was left, therefore, without remedy.

"On the morning of August 29th he reported, in answer to a notice, at the —— Town Hall, and was sent the same day to ——. From the start he refused to be medically examined, to sign papers, or to obey military orders. On the attempt forcibly to dress him in khaki he consented to dress himself, but refused to wear puttees. He was handcuffed while the puttees were put on, but he pulled them off when the handcuffs were removed. He was placed in the guardroom, and spent Tuesday night there.

"On Wednesday he was allocated to the 3rd —— and sent back to ——. The escort tied his kit-bag round his neck, nearly choking him, but a soldier from the camp, seeing his condition, cut the string, and placed the kit-bag in a cart from the camp. On arrival here the military policeman threw the kit-bag at him, striking him on the forehead and making it bleed.

"Thursday morning saw the attempt in earnest to tame the conscientious objector. For an hour and a half before breakfast several men told off for the purpose tried to force him to obey orders, and on his refusal he was pummelled until he was bruised from head to foot. In this state he was dragged out to parade after breakfast, and dragged by main force round the field. When he refused to march or mark time his ankles were kicked until they were swollen and a source of torture, fresh relays of men keeping up the fusillade of blows and kicks and arm and wrist twisting. It should be remembered that B. had taken no food after Wednesday noon, and this was Thursday morning. His physical condition with hunger *plus* brutality can be dimly imagined. The major was riding about the field on horseback, and sent for B. to interrogate him as to the reason of his attitude. B. pointed out that he had already stated his attitude, and under proper conditions he would be willing to restate it. He was then handed over to the Gym squad for a further course of 'discipline.'

"The exhibition of the next hour took place in a public park before a large number of men and women and children. At 11 a.m. the wife and sister of B. arrived in the park and were eyewitnesses. He was first taken to the water-jump. The men take a run, vault over a rail, and then leap over the pool of water. B. resisted. He was dragged to the rail, roughly bundled over, and as he refused to leap he was pushed time after time into the water. No time was allowed him to recover his breath. As he scrambled out of the water he was seized and harried round the field by fresh men as fast as they could force him, only to be brought back with the object of making him leap. After he had been doused about a dozen times the attempt was abandoned, and he was taken to a palisade 7 feet high. Men clamber up one side and drop down the other. Five men seized B. and threw him bodily towards the top, but being a fairly big man, instead of landing him clear they caught him on the top, and as he fell over on the other side they caught him. This was not 'efficient enough for the officer. He was dragged back, hurled bodily over the top, and as the men ran to catch him this officer shouted, 'Stand clear!' and he was allowed to fall on the ground like a log. This was repeated a third time, and he was hurried to a frame platform reached by an inclined plank. In a state of physical exhaustion B. was seized on every side and forced at full length up the sloping plank. At the top he was turned head over heels time after time, and finally dumped on the ground helpless and bleeding. . . ."[1]

This treatment was accorded by English soldiers to an Englishman under the supervision and direction of an English officer, presumably a gentleman. It would, I believe, be repugnant to the natural feeling of most Englishmen thus to treat a defenceless man. But military discipline makes it possible, even though it be illegal. For no natural kindness or sense of fair play can preserve the soldier from obeying such orders once they are given.

To complete the story I will cite the following authentic letter from a corporal who had been compelled to do the bullying (not in the case quoted above, but in another):—

"Excuse me writing this, but I cannot help it, because of such an act of injustice nobody ever heard. When I was at —— as

[1] See *Manchester Guardian* of September 20, 1916. Since this date other cases of brutality have occurred amounting even to torture. Several conscientious objectors have committed suicide.

corporal, I was stripped of my stripes because of obeying orders. Anyway, you know what I did. I did the dirty work, after which I was stripped of stripes so as somebody else could get the credit of doing it, although there was no credit in the human eye for what I did; there was no credit for the men having signed articles after the force was used against them. . . . The sooner I am dead the better. I recognize, now it is too late, that I was to do this thing and make a brute of myself by so doing. . . . I will either get my discharge from the Service, for which I am totally unfit, or take my own life."

At present, conscription being new to us, public opinion is against such treatment and the higher military command discourages it. It is in a comparatively few cases that these scenes have occurred. But if conscription becomes a permanent institution in England, how long will it be before such occurrences are regarded as a matter of course? It must be remembered that there is a powerful strain of the bully in many Englishmen. I may illustrate by the following episode, to which attention was called by a letter in the *Daily News* of November 4, 1916:—

"SIR,—In a corner of your issue to-day I find an item of news which ought surely to be rescued from obscurity:

"'At an inquest at Surbiton on Private R. G. Eley, of the Royal Fusiliers, who was knocked down by a train near New Malden, the father said his son complained of being bullied by sergeants and could not face going back after his leave.

"'The Coroner: Well, I can tell you I served in the ranks as a young fellow, and I know a lot about that bullying. It is the way to smarten a soldier up.

"'An open verdict was returned.'

"Will the authorities allow to pass unrebuked an utterance which cannot but gravely impair our military efficiency by bringing the army into disrepute and odium. I know nothing of 'crowner's quest law,' but was it not the official's plain duty to call for evidence as to the treatment to which the young man had been subjected?"

The connexion between military training and the militaristic ideal is well stated by one of the German writers who is opposed to the latter:—

"Sometimes when I watch boys enthusiastically drilling, I cannot escape from the impression that this one-sided physical training

must have a bad effect on the nobler development of spirit and heart. As a natural consequence, the young people must come to the conclusion that there is nothing nobler and more ideal on earth than to carry rifles, march in line, and enthuse in the trenches. In my judgment, the vision of a higher goal and a religious ideal must perish utterly among men brought up in this one-sided cult of nationalism" (*Vorwärts*, December 3, 1915).

PAGE 11.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE WAR.

According to Mr. Outhwaite, speaking in the House of Commons: "The Venerable Archdeacon Wilberforce, who read the prayers in the House, preaching in St. Margaret's Church at the beginning of the war, said: 'To kill Germans is a divine service in the fullest acceptation of the term.' . . . A leading minister in his division had said that if Christ came to the world to-day he would expect to see Him using a bayonet. (See *Hansard* of January 20, 1916.)

Extract from a letter from a conscientious objector (1916):—

"We had the priest in just before dinner and he told us the tale. Of course he was in uniform. He said the Catholic Church upheld this war, and that we as Catholics were bound to fight under pain of sin. He said we were not Catholics, as no Catholic could have a conscientious objection to warfare, and that he could not give us absolution if we went to confession."

With regard to the possibility of the fusion of Christianity, as professed by the Churches, with the religion of the God-State, the following passage is worth citing from a translation of an article by Professor Ernst Troeltsch which appeared in the New York *Sun*. The professor is dealing with the ideas fermenting in Germany in war-time, and he speaks of "the German Imperialists, to whom belong the majority of the German historians, a large number of national economists, the industrial magnates and many officers. They saw all their previous teaching confirmed, and celebrated the great moment of the final breaking-through of the Germans to be the world-race. Races and States must grow or go under. The goal of every great and noble people, to become a world-Power, seemed to have approached very near. . . . To be sure, in this teaching there plays no religious tone; Christianity is not denied, but is warned against every humanitarian and sentimental understanding."

The last sentence gives the key to a position which the Churches of all countries may feel it easy and perhaps imperative to adopt.

It is perhaps worth while to append the following example of militant Christianity from the *Morning Post*, January 2, 1915:—

"The war opens out a vast field of usefulness for the Christian Church; as it reminds people of death, so it reminds them of faith; as it destroys their wealth, so it suggests to them spiritual consolations; as it teaches them the folly of sloth and self-indulgence, so it instructs them in the deeper purposes and meanings of life. Therefore war and faith go commonly hand in hand; and war teaches mankind what child-birth teaches women. The spiritual field is ploughed and harrowed by such terrible events, and the seed which the Church sows should fall upon prepared ground. And if the Church uses the opportunity well, and scorns all comfortable doctrine, not confusing safety with virtue or war with evil, it should reap a great spiritual harvest."

As a pendant to this, I cite the following letter from a German evangelical divine:—

"The peaceable settlement of future international disputes by way of conciliation or juridical decision is a dream which can never be realized. Think of the Hague Palace with its portraits of the Czar and of Edward. As a clergyman you should know that so long as men live on earth, sin reigns, and so long as that is the case, the Government must wield the sword lent it by God" (*Blätter für Zwischenstaatliche Organisation*, October 1916, p. 302).

And this:—

"The whimpering and howling over the misery and havoc of the war I can no longer endure. The war is *not* Germany's misfortune, it is Germany's good fortune. Thank God that the war has come! I say it even now in the third year of the war. And thank God that we have no peace yet; I say it still, and spite of all the victims. . . . Therefore I say it again and again, Thank God that we have the war! It alone can save our people, if they be yet capable of salvation. It is the great operator's knife with which the great Physician of the nations cuts out the most terrible of cancers. Thank God that we have yet no peace! The wounds would close too quickly and the evil become worse than ever" (Herr Pastor Philips, President of the Christian Socialist Party. Cited in *Die Welt am Montag*, October 9, 1916. As the editor remarks, it is

a pity that this gentleman—and many others one could think of—should not pass twenty-four hours on the Somme).

In quoting these passages I do not intend to imply that there is no other attitude to war than this to be found among the clergy. I note, for instance, with satisfaction, that a body of Congregational ministers have issued a letter in which they state that "any compromise between Christianity and militarism involves ultimately betrayal of Christ," and that the principles of Christianity and war cannot be reconciled.

Page 12.—Preconceptions of Militarism.

As an example of the way people imply in their thought a doctrine they nevertheless deny in words, I may refer to an article which appeared in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* dealing with the contrast between German and American political ideas. The author cites an American writer as taking the view (which of course is the one generally taken outside Germany) that the German philosophy of the State rests on two preconceptions: one, that Might is Right; the other that the individual exists for the State, not vice versa. Repudiating this interpretation of the German view, he says, as to the first point:—

"The rule 'might is right,' at any rate in the sense that every Power ought to be allowed to stretch and contract Right according to its good pleasure, has never been defended by any reputable German. Only the enthusiastic perversion that Might ought to be nothing but a servant of Right has been rejected, and rightly, as an ideological soap-bubble."

The latter part of this passage, of course, admits the whole case the writer supposes himself to be refuting.

On the second point he has nothing to say, except that the individual, according to German philosophers, ought to submit himself to the moral law. The charge made against the German view is that it supposes the State to be the ultimate judge of the moral law. And the author does not seem even to perceive this point, so deeply engrained in him is the belief that the State is in fact the judge. (See *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, August 11, 1915.)

Here is another example of the sophistries of the 'Might is Right' theory. Dr. Zacher, a "Geheimer Regierungsrath," writes to the *Müncher-Augsburger Zeitung* of September 14, 1916:—

"Seldom has so much confusion been produced by a mis-

understood foreign word as has been created by the word 'annexations' in the conflict of opinion about the aims of the war. According to common usage the word to 'annex' carries with it the connotation of seizure contrary to Right, while the meaning of the word really is 'to bind one thing with another,' in the sense of 'joining on.' In the case of territory occupied and held in war, there can be no question of wrongful seizure. In such a case one speaks logically of the 'Right' of the conqueror, who creates a new 'Right' adapted to the new relations of Might."

This citation is given in the *Blätter für Zwischenstaatliche Organisation* for September 1916 (p. 306). And the editor appropriately comments: "This new 'Right,' with the creation of which German professors are now trying to throw dust in the eyes of the German people, is unfortunately the ancient right of savagery, whereby the order of social relations was measured by nothing but brute force. To reintroduce this old 'Right' into the modern world is to annihilate our civilization and to reduce ourselves to cannibals."

The views and sophistries here illustrated are not peculiar to Germany. They are those of the militarists of all countries. And they follow from accepting the position that the State, not the individual conscience, is the ultimate depository of moral truth, and that the power of the State is the highest aim of life.

Page 13.—Militarism and Morals.

It is well known that German writers, with that sense of logical consequence which makes them the *enfants terribles* of the world, have stated definitely that what the Teutonic race most needs is a new religion freed from the humanitarianism and universalism of professed Christianity. If English militarists were as clear-sighted or as frank, they would adopt the same position. Captain Ross, in his book *Representative Government and War*, to which I refer in the text, is as contemptuous of morality or honesty or honour as any German could be. He regards the liberation of the slaves in South Africa as simply bad strategy. "What mattered it that black men were slaves? . . . What mattered it even that that country were denuded of these black men, provided that white men grew up in love and reverence for the Mother Country?" The support by the British Govern-

ment of the interests of the natives against those of white settlers was an "indelible disgrace to the British nation." And this observe, is all quite in the logic of the worship of the God-State. For in the captain's view those procedures of the British Government (based upon Christian principle) were inimical to the interests of the Empire. "Justice!—injustice!" he cries elsewhere. "What are such things when the national existence is at stake?" And again: "Morality—immorality! What are such things to great nations when their fate is at stake?"

The reader should seriously consider that the sentiments here frankly stated are practically endorsed, in sheer muddleheadedness, by many people who are shocked by the statement of them.

Page 13.—Militarism and Education.

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, writing of the new educational movement in Germany, says:—

"As with us, the experiences of the war are making the Germans overhaul the principles and practices of their educational system and forecast the best developments for the future. As with us, unfortunately, the German writers on education all of them presuppose that there will be war in the future, and education must prepare for it. They take war for granted, and instead of shaping education in such a way as to make war impossible, their sole idea is, by means of education, to produce the best possible men for fighting purposes.

"Speaking generally, educational writers are sublimely satisfied with the way in which the aims and methods of their education have approved themselves again in this war as they did in the war of 1870–1. Writing at the end of the first year of war, when German arms were in the ascendant, they claim that the German soldier has proved himself superior to the Russian and the Italian on two grounds: first, because the national system of education has imbued the youth of Germany with a stronger sense of discipline; and, secondly, because an educated population lends itself more readily to organization and concerted effort on the largest scale. Special stress is laid on discipline and subordination of self. These results are accredited to the elementary school, but the part which the universities and the secondary schools have played comes in also for special commendation, and the 'volunteers' (i.e. the privileged soldiers of one year's service) are

contrasted with 'the educated shirkers of France.' The writer quotes a Turkish newspaper and the King of Bavaria in confirmation of his views. The Ministry of Education has not been slow to avail itself of the tide of patriotic feeling. A new syllabus for the teaching of history has been promulgated which came into force last Easter—Easter marks the close of the educational year throughout Germany. The new syllabus is avowedly experimental, and headmasters are to report on its success in 1918. Briefly, the aim is to concentrate study upon the last half-century, and more especially upon the achievement of national unity under Prussia and the rise of united Germany to the position of a great world-Power. Hohenzollern Day opened the flood-gates of panegyric. The reigning dynasty was extolled as having given to Prussia the schools which had made it mighty in the world of learning and of military power. The reigning Emperor was extolled as the direct inspirer of all educational reforms which followed as the result of the great Conference of 1890. The qualities which have made Prussia are analysed, and emphasis is laid upon the sense of social obligation and the habitude of obedience. The authority of the State must increase, the individualism which was threatening the country must be repressed. The State must be more and more; the individual must be less and less. The teaching of Socialism is held up as having been in reality individualistic in its tendency, because it disposes the individual 'to make greater claims upon life for personal pleasure and self-indulgence.' Extremists are not wanting. Some writers would exclude all teaching of English and French from the schools, and admit Russian and Spanish only because of their commercial importance. In view of the all-transcending greatness of German education, all disposition to study foreign systems, Swedish, English, or American, is sternly reprimanded."

In the same spirit, one understands, German is being dropped in English schools.

The following passage is taken from an article by Professor Wilhelm von Blume in the *Europäische Staats- und Wirthschaft Zeitung*, p. 951:—

"Internal policy must be determined by external policy in a State whose existence is perpetually threatened. It is from this point of view that the Constitution, the Law, and the Administration must be treated. We must fashion the State with a view to war

in order to preserve peace, and save our skin, if we can do it in no other way. We must—I do not shrink from saying it—cultivate our militarism even more consciously than before.

"War is an act of the whole nation, not only of the army. Therefore the whole nation must be made ready for war, its intellectual (*geistige*) force, its moral force, its economic force. War is above all an act of the 'common man,' however important may be the services of leaders. It follows that every individual must be educated for the State and trained for service in the State. War is a product of technique. We must therefore develop the technical production of our people to the greatest possible perfection. There remains for us therefore no other way than this: we must 'statify' (*verstaatlichen*) the life of the nation in a much higher degree than before."

A member of the German Reichstag, Müller-Meiningen, has proposed compulsory physical training for all boys from the age of six to sixteen, and military training from sixteen upwards. It has then been further proposed that this training be entrusted to military officers, and even to any non-commissioned officer. A Dr. Adolf Matthias, after saying that "There must be made of our youth a giant in military force before which, even in peace-time, our foes will shrink in terror," adds: "The State orders and regulates *not only the acts but the thoughts of its citizens*." This latter sentence gives the full logic of the God-State.

It should, however, be added that, as a counter to these sentiments, there is a movement among German students for greater freedom from State dictation and leave to shape their own ideals. Which of these tendencies will triumph depends upon the way Europe is shaped after the war; and that depends upon the kind of peace that is made.[1]

Similar ideas are found in France. Thus: "Three members of the French Chamber have tabled the proposal that after the war all French boys shall be subject to a Spartan military training from the age of twelve onwards."

The English are likely at first to go slowly in this matter. They will begin by teaching "patriotism" in the schools; that is, a falsification of history (which is what State-instructed patriotism

[1] The above remarks are based on an article in the *Friedenswarte* of August–September 1916, "Richtlinien innerhalb der deutschen Studentenschaft," by Dr. Cornelius Bergmann.

is bound to mean) and a hatred and mistrust of all other nations except those which at the moment are allied with them. The teaching of "religion" will be fused with this, and the pupil will get a general idea that the mission of Jesus Christ is fulfilled, and can only be fulfilled, in the British Empire. The movement will ascend from the elementary to the secondary schools, and from these to the universities. All the time, of course, the official religion will continue to preach an academic preference for peace—in short, the pulpit variety of the song, "We don't want to fight, but, by jingo, if we do," and we shall point with horror to the wicked "foreigners" who positively glorify war.

CHAPTER II

THE REALITY OF THE MENACE

I HARDLY know how my attempt to set forth the meaning and the prospects of militarism may have affected the reader. But there are two possible effects on which I wish to say something before proceeding with my argument. First, some readers may agree that the developments I indicate are probable, but may feel nothing but satisfaction in the prospect. In other words, they may regard as an ideal what I regard as the contrary. I endeavour, in the next chapter, to do what justice I can to that attitude. More important, however, and from my point of view more dangerous, is a different reaction of the reader. He may say that I take it all too tragically; that there may be tendencies in the direction I indicate, but that they will be countered by other tendencies; that we shall be able, in the future as in the past, to continue war, and yet to continue with it civilization, and even Christian civilization. I may have overrated the danger. But it is much more likely, especially by Englishmen, to be underrated than to be overrated. Our unwillingness or inability to think things through, to look to remoter consequences, to make clear to ourselves the ultimate meaning and implications of our policies, make us peculiarly liable to arrive without knowing or intending it, at situations from which

we should have shuddered back had we clearly anticipated them.

I desire therefore, even at some risk of repetition, to remind the reader why it is that I think the danger imminent and real.

Militarism, in the first place, does not happen in any nation because people want or choose it. It happens because it is a consequence of a situation. That situation is what I have called elsewhere the European anarchy. Its essence is that nations have conflicting aims and purposes, just as individuals do; but that they have no system of law and government peaceably to adjust their disputes. They therefore arm, in order to be able to get what they want by force, or to protect themselves against attempts by others to do the same. But arming means counter-arming. In proportion as armaments become formidable, the fear of them increases, and that fear becomes, more and more, the dominant motive of national life. More and more of the wealth, the intelligence, the physical and moral force of nations, is directed to the aim of being safe and being strong. And this involves not only the continuous increase of armaments, not only the constant invention of new and more lethal methods of destruction, but a transformation of the institutions and ultimately of the very minds and souls of men. We all see this, or think we do, in the case of Germany. But Germany is only the leading case. And the same cause, working in other countries, must end by producing the same effects. All that I have said above about the training for war, both on the physical and the intellectual and the moral side, if sometimes it has been expressed in terms which the reader may have felt to be extravagant, is nevertheless in the logic of the movement, and already, at least partly, in the facts, as my illustrations show. On what, short of a revolution in international

policy, does the reader rely, to prevent the development of the full effects?

He will perhaps be inclined to say that he relies on "human nature." But human nature is like an organ. It has many stops and many notes, and it depends on the organist which of these are to sound. In international affairs the master-organist is the situation; and I insist that the situation plays the militarist tune. Does the reader recall what he thought war was like before this war began, and can he measure the gulf between that imagination and the facts? Human nature did not prevent the Germans, nor yet the French, from dropping bombs on an innocent civilian population. Human nature did not prevent the submarining of passenger ships. Human nature did not prevent the use of poison gases. What atrocity is human nature likely to prevent, when human nature is at grips with death? And observe, it is one plain fact about human nature that it soon becomes unable even to attend to the horrors it is perpetrating and suffering. I have talked, as every one has, to men from the front. I know that any generalization about their attitude would be false. But what has struck me personally, more than anything else, is their indifference. They have witnessed and participated in things which, before, they would have shrunk from with horror. But now? "You get used to it." "You are too tired to think of anything." "You just see red." The check of humanity operates not at all, or operates very fitfully, on the men at the front, however humane they may naturally be. And still less does it operate on those at home who are responsible for continuing the war. Nothing has been more remarkable, in the course of this war, than the readiness with which some men sacrifice other men. And this, I believe, arises mainly from a defect of imagination; which, however, we must reckon

as essential in the make-up of ordinary men. What they do not take part in—nay, even what they do take part in—they do not realize. They go through it, and come out of it, as if they had been in a dream. And for that reason I believe that we have no kind of guarantee that any reaction from the horror of war will ever prevent men from prosecuting it to the end, and developing and applying in it the last extremes of cruelty.

And this same lack of imagination will enable men to prepare to the utmost for such war. They will do all they can (Englishmen at least will) to take their preparations as a "picnic." They will turn their eyes away from the reality for which they are preparing. And not even the most realistic preparations, such as have already been introduced and must become more and more essential to efficiency, will arouse any such revulsion as will make it impossible to prosecute them. Men will submit to have their humanity destroyed for the sake of their country, and they will not even know that it is being destroyed. Nor, while they pursue the policies that lead up to war, will they, in the future, any more than in the past, keep fresh before them a vivid picture of what war is. I suppose it might be true that immediately after a war in which the mass of ordinary citizens have participated, the word "war" might reverberate with such sinister import that statesmen would hardly dare to whisper it. But that effect quickly wears off. War becomes a word again. It becomes again the counter behind policies. And no effort of men of imagination—of a Tolstoy here or there—avails to open the eyes either of statesmen or of peoples.

And, mark, it is not that man is an animal loving murder, a merely vicious sadistic beast. No. But all the natural instincts of kindliness, all the casual reactions of individuals to humane appeals, do not save them from acting in accord-

ance with the conditions and policies States have imposed upon them. It is not enough to have decent instincts. Still less is it enough to profess a religion of which the ostensible basis is charity. Instincts and ideals have to be directed by intelligence to a course of action which will give them the opportunity to unfold themselves beneficially. And short of that, no good will, no good nature, no profession, not necessarily insincere, of justice and kindness, will prevent men from preparing systematically, from producing by their preparation, and from pursuing by all and every means to the bitter end, the satanic thing that modern war is. Human nature will not save us. Nothing will save us but the harnessing of human reason to human charity.

It will not do, then, to expect that some mere revulsion of humane instincts will deliver mankind from the prospect before them. There will have to be something much more definite and deliberate than that. And the most obvious thing to suggest is economic exhaustion. Thus, I have heard it argued that General Skugarewski's forecast, cited above, is fantastic, because it omits to consider the financial impracticability of such a development. It is indeed impossible to foresee the economic future with any clearness. There are possibilities of social revolt, of universal anarchy, of wide-reaching transformations of the whole industrial structure, including the ownership and distribution of wealth. But that mere lack of funds will prevent war, I have myself no sort of confidence. All the forecasts of experts have been refuted by the experience of the present war. And we find, to our astonishment (1916), that we can feed our population better than it has ever been fed in peace-time, while we are withdrawing from productive labour millions of workers. True, in part we are living on capital. But for a year or two, that, it is

thought, need not dismay us. True, we have raised loans which will involve after the war an annual expenditure of hundreds of millions in interest and sinking fund. But that will be mainly a transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich, and the rich, at any rate, are not likely to complain. If society wants expenditure on war it will always manage to provide it. And it will be ready, in order to provide it, to degrade the standard of living of the mass of the people to the minimum of bare necessity. For the war gospel, expressed without reserve, is this: "It does not matter how you live, so long as you are always ready to kill and be killed." Will the people revolt against this impoverishment for the sake of war? Possibly. But if so, only because they have understood the causes of war, seen that it is avoidable, and determined to take joint international action to avoid it. In other words, only if the people get exactly the kind of education which militarists will be most determined they shall not have. But in that case it will not be economic exhaustion that will have put an end to war. It will be enlightenment. So long as the people covet and hate and fear, without even knowing that they are doing it, so long they will stand for war at whatever cost. That, I fear, is the last word.

"Will there not then be a moral and religious revulsion?" There may be. That there should be is essential, if civilization is to be saved. And perhaps it will have to be of a quite simple, uncompromising kind—a mere declaration to society and the State, by the conscience of individuals: "We do not stand for this. Say what you like, do what you like, we refuse! Carry on your war and your preparations for war if you can, without us, and over our bodies. We will take no part in them." There are some thousands of men taking this stand in England, even in

the midst of a great war. Their numbers may increase in all countries after the war; and their resistance may make it possible and necessary for nations and Governments to attend to the voice of reason. Yet, after all, even so, their sacrifice would only be, as it were, a gesture to compel men to attend. The attention, the comprehension, and then the will to a new direction of policy, is what we must have, if war is to be ended. Most men now do not "want" war. But most are convinced that it must be, and that they must prepare for it. To convince them of the contrary, it is not enough to demonstrate the satanic character of the war they are preparing. They will discount all that, will look away from it, just because they will believe it cannot be avoided and therefore ought not to be dwelt upon. The mere refusal to take part in war and preparation for war they will regard as a form of fanaticism. And they will be ready, under the influence of their fear, and of what they hold to be their patriotism, to suppress the fanaticism by every means at their command; just as the Romans managed, first by persecution and later by absorption, to destroy the menace of early Christianity to the pagan State.

I conclude that we must not rely on "human nature," nor on economic forces, nor yet on the resistance of rebels against war, to save us from the prospect opening before us. We must rely on enlightenment as to cause and effect. We need the conviction that war is not necessary, and the adoption of a policy that will make it unnecessary. I shall proceed later to elaborate these two points. But first I must take up a question even more fundamental. I must deal with the case of those who think militarism not only necessary, but desirable.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 42.—Attitude of Soldiers to War.

The following estimate of the effect of war on the British soldier is taken from a letter from an officer at the front, published in the *Open Forum*:—

"On balance he has been slightly brutalized by his experience in this war, yet on the whole I believe he has been changed very little by it; at any rate, when he gets back to billets he has forgotten all about it and is just what he was."

The letter is quoted at length below, p. 76, where the reader will see that the author attributes very good qualities to the British soldier. But these, as he says, were not created by war. And the actual effect of war he estimates as above.

In the same connexion I may remind the reader that the main effect produced on the minds of war-correspondents and (if they are to be trusted) on the soldiers at the front by the "tanks" at their first appearance was one of amusement. These are apparently among the most destructive engines of war that have yet been invented. But they make the English laugh—only that! One is reminded, as the *Nation* pointed out in an article on the subject, of the famous passage in *Gulliver's Travels* where Gulliver describes to the Houynhnms the ways of men in war. "The man who invented the tanks," writes a correspondent, "deserves much of the army, if for no more than that he has made it laugh as it has fought." Gulliver assured the incredulous horse that he had seen his own dear countrymen blow up a hundred enemies at once in a siege, and as many in a ship, and beheld the dead bodies come down in pieces from the clouds "to the great diversion of the spectators" (*Nation*, September 25, 1916).

We have advanced since the days of Swift in the scale and ingenuity of our methods of destruction, but the "nature of the beast" remains essentially the same.

Page 42.—Attitude of Non-combatants to War.

Here is an interesting impression by an Italian journalist of the state of feeling in Russia in the summer of 1916. It will serve

to illustrate my meaning, though of course I recognize that it is only an impression, and that different people attending to different things will get different impressions about anything so complex as the attitude of a whole nation. Still, no doubt, among other things that were true, this was true. And a similar impression might be derived by any foreigner from the condition in war-time of the prosperous industrial districts of England :—

"Well, what do they think of the war at Petrograd? At the front, now that the frosts are nearly over, they expect great doings. Here, however, it would seem that they do not think about the war at all. They say very little about it. The war? 'It has been going on such a long time!' and meanwhile here is the spring. . . .

"Russia has now got accustomed to the war. They take no more interest in it, and are no longer frightened by it; the war is no longer a novelty. 'We shall have it for some years yet,' they say, and settle down to it.

"The country has become tranquil and indifferent, and has recovered its equilibrium. It has the temper now for *resisting to eternity*—passively. Last autumn Petrograd was in fear of the Germans arriving, when they were still 500 versts away, after five months of fighting that had exhausted them; now, after seven months of rest and reconstruction, they speak no more of them. 'They will not come.' There will be no besieged cities, no starvation. So there is no need for economy. Such is young Russia, which proceeds by instinct, which knows no stopping places, which fronts the riddle with unknowing, joyful serenity.

"Severe-minded people at Moscow started a crusade against extravagance. Russian women in the towns love elegance at any cost. The Puritans thought that war economy for the war loans was a duty. They had no following. A paper which made inquiries found that at Moscow itself the fashionable shops had made miraculous profits; they had done better in one year of war than in five or six seasons of peace. Everywhere there is a frenzy of enjoyment.

"Such is the transformation of urban Russia in the war. It reverts to what it was before, only with more money to spend. After passing through internal and external crises, fears and threatenings, spiritual and political oscillations, it has slowly settled itself comfortably again to its peace habits of enjoying

life, of making the most of the passing moment, of trusting in the future with a vague instinct of powerful vitality, only at times bursting out into criticism, even of the war, from that spirit of contradiction and over-intellectuality which is the mental delight of many Russians. There is in the Russian temperament, as in the system of Russian social life, a certain elasticity of nature, primitive but tenacious of existence, like that of protoplasm; it yields under the pressure of the finger and rises again intact as on as the pressure is removed. It derives this immutability from the country itself, which has resources without end, and can stake on the war hundreds of thousands of men, or square miles of territory, without feeling exhausted or even threatened. It derives it, too, from the boundless immensity of the country, for which national solidarity or patriotism can only exist as yet in an extensive sense, as there exists an extensive, not intensive, culture of its scarcely populated soil, so much greater than its needs. And this tranquil indifference, which in the case of the cities is associated with the pursuit of pleasure, even now in war-time, on the anxious eve of the final decision, arises, too, from another calm and mighty force—the humble simplicity of Russian country life. It was the country which gave the Empire its riches in time of peace, which preserved its equilibrium and stability in the shock of the violent agitations for reform among the town-dwellers. Now it furnishes the towns with bread, meat, and men for the trenches. 'This silent great wheel of Russia goes on turning slowly, and never stops'" (*La Stampa*, June 1, 1916. Letter from Virginio Gayda, Petrograd, dated May).

CHAPTER III

THE MILITARIST AND THE PACIFIST IDEALS

In the preceding chapters I have set forth the results that must reasonably be expected to follow from a continuation of the existing international anarchy. I have written in the hope that the reader will think those results intolerable and will consequently be ready to urge or support a radical movement in the opposite direction. But I am aware that some who may read this book, and many who will not read it, will be affected differently by the prospect before us. They will not be repelled by it. They may tolerate it. They may even welcome it. And as it is essential that those who intend to fight for peace should understand what it is they have to oppose, I shall now proceed to examine the ideal impulses which make for war and contrast them with those which make for peace.

And first I must point out, what lovers of peace are apt to forget, that there is such a thing as the love of war, either for itself or for its supposed effects on character and life; and that that is one element making for the perpetuation of war. Few people frankly admit this. Yet the admission may be found, and not only among Germans. And it is much more often felt than it is

expressed. Here, for example, is an utterance to which it is worth while to attend :—

> I do not myself understand our theoretical craze for no-war, which would mean a constipated civilization ; . . . all great creative movements have flourished in or sprung from warlike conditions. The idea that as a result of this war Europe is going to develop into an abode of Arcady, where men no longer fight or learn to fight or want to fight, while lawyers and politicians rule over us with unctuous infallibility, and there is no longer need for a stout heart and a dripping sword—this is one of the drollest views ever kibbled for the democratic table. . . . The spirit of fighting is directly associated with the sex instinct. Atrophy of the one inevitably brings about atrophy of the other. . . . To talk of the abolition of war is to conceive of life without strife, which is its inherent reason and beauty.

We who believe in peace as a necessary condition of Good are apt to meet utterances like this with silence, or indignation, or wordy argument. But in doing so we miss our antagonist's point and so underestimate the forces we have to oppose. The words cited are a foolish and trivial expression of a genuine feeling—the feeling that life without war would be a dull and drab affair. The feeling is superficial. It is due to inexperience both of life and of war. But it influences a great many people ; more people than we choose to admit. And it will continue to do so, and to do so the more in proportion as the memory of what war really is sinks once again into the background. Let us try to realize, then, what was in the mind of this writer,[1] however crudely he may have expressed it.

At bottom, what appeal to him are certain states of feeling. He likes to imagine himself, and to imagine

[1] I do not think it necessary to cite his name, for I have no interest in personalities. He is just one of a school.

other men, engaged in a struggle of body and wits so intense that all energies are absorbed in it. It is this release of energy from the checks of reason, of conscience, and of self-interested calculation that appeals to him; the functioning as a unity, free from the paralysis of doubt or the boredom of half-interests; the activity (as he imagines) of all the faculties at their keenest under the stress of imminent and continuous risk. This kind of experience can no doubt be partly obtained in various forms of sport. And, in fact, the men we are considering do often spend the greater part of their peace-life in sport. The connexion between war and sport is very close, at any rate among Englishmen. But sport lacks some of the most important elements of war. It lacks first the sense of "consecration," which lays the conscience to sleep. It lacks, secondly, the enormous enhancement which is given to all emotion by its being shared by great numbers of men. Few people can resist the contagion of a march past, even in a cinematograph. And in one aspect war is (or rather is thought to be, by those at a distance) a continuous march in time, if not physically yet spiritually. This sense of unquestioning comradeship, in acts reduced as nearly as possible to instinctive reactions, seems to be what at bottom attracts men to war. And I suppose that the most "pacifist" of us are not without comprehension of that.

Now it is true that all this makes an appeal not only to what is bad, but also to something that is good in human nature. But the appeal is that of an illusion about war, not of the reality. Real war is something very different, as all who have experienced it would be the first to admit. Literature has invented a fiction which still inspires boys and old men and romanticists. Vague remembrances of Marathon and Thermopylæ blend with

mediæval tales of chivalry. Pictures of hand-to-hand conflict according to the rules, of chivalrous reconciliations, of mutual honour and respect, move confusedly before the imagination. The sentiment and the ethic of a method of war as extinct as the Stone Age are applied to what has long ago become a matter of cold-blooded calculation and organized butchery by machines. For modern war is summed up in such phrases as these, inadequate though they be to represent its monstrous horror. The men who go out to it and go through with it have indeed a courage not the less admirable because, as is now clear, almost every one possesses it. But admirable, too, is the courage of the worshipper who flings himself under the car of Juggernaut. And the nobler the victim the more the pity.

Editors and bishops who take a kind of holiday jaunt along the front, personally conducted and carefully shielded from the real facts, may come back talking cheerfully of war. That is what they went for. It is only those who have lived weeks and months in the trenches, those who have taken part in a bayonet charge, those who have struggled like brutes with feet and hands and knives and clubs, who have trampled on the faces and mangled limbs of wounded men, and staggered away at last hardly knowing what they have been doing; those who have lain hour after hour between the lines at night, tortured themselves and listening to the screams of the tortured; those who have hung in agony on barbed wire till a spout of liquid fire released them: these men, with their bowels dropping out, with their lungs shot through, with their faces torn away, with their limbs blown into space, are the men who know what war is. Is this an ideal? The question answers itself. Yet so long as words take the place of things in men's thinking and feeling, so long as second-

hand emotions, and remembrances of remembrances of books, are substituted for experience, so long will it be possible to write such words as I have quoted above, and so long will such words have a certain weight. It is only possible to idealize war because those who idealize it are dealing with a word, not with the thing.

My first reply, then, to the idealizers of war is that modern war does not really contain the things they hold to be good, or contains them only as one element in such a mass of others as makes them cease to count in the balance. I do not believe this statement can be seriously questioned. But those who have been through the war, and they only, can judge. And to their judgment I appeal.

Let us turn now to the ideal of peace. On what preferences does this rest? The advocates of war are apt to pretend that it rests on a mere love of security. But this is to take a view of pacifism as ungenerous and as false as that which supposes the love of war to arise from a sadistic lust for murder. Pacifists who have a positive and passionate attitude to life (and they are the only ones we need consider) have also at bottom a love for certain feelings and activities. What they like and desire is free friendship, where men co-operate or compete as independent individuals, not as passive creatures of a mass movement. The activity they prize is that of reasonable will, not that of irrational instinct. And they find their conception of the highest life in voluntary creation, in political and social work, in science, in speculation, and in art. To be swept away on a torrent of corporate passion is to them not an ideal at all. On the contrary, it is the negation of all they value. They are neither more egotistic nor more materialistic than the others. But all their social activity they desire to be constantly accompanied by a full sense of

personal choice. Further, while the "war-men" overlook the act of killing as trifling and negligible, in view of the tremendous flood of vigorous life which they imagine to accompany it, to the "peace-men" that act, like all violence and coercion, destroys the value of any life they could prize. That the others among whom they labour should be also labouring, equally, freely, and in the same spirit as themselves, is what they want; and that in these concurrent or competitive labours there should be the least possible antagonism.

Now, it is true that such "peace" as we have actually achieved is almost as remote from the ideal of the pacifist as real war is from that of the war-man. The pacifist, therefore, needs and intends to transform peace as well as to abolish war. But does any war-man mean, or intend, or think it in any way possible, to transform war from its present form of mass-murder? I have never heard of any one who thought that either possible or desirable. Whereas the pacifist's vision of a society of passionate and creative lovers is in the heart of every man and woman who has a peace-ideal at all. That is the pacifist's strength as against his antagonist. War as an ideal lies behind. Peace as an ideal lies in front. The one can spur to action, the other only to regret, or to sentimental or dishonest fancies. The organized butchery that war is, and henceforth increasingly must be, can inspire no man who has seen and known and felt what it is. The harmony of contrasted effort that peace might be may fail to inspire because it may be thought chimerical. But it needs must inspire every one who has the faith to believe it possible.

At this point, very likely, I shall be met by a protest from the war-man. He will say: "You misrepresent me when you suppose me blind to the horror of modern war, when you suppose that my respect for it is based on illusions

about its nature. I admit all that you say. The reason that I stand for war is, not that I admire the activity of killing and being killed in the modern way, but that I admire the power to face and endure that. War to my mind is tragic; not a picnic, or a sport (as the superficial Englishman is apt to think), but an assertion of that element in life which gives it all its nobility. War can only be faced if it is faced in the spirit of religion. And there is a religion of war."

What is this religion? I will quote in illustration the following passage:—

> In war and in the right of war man has a possession which he values above religion, above industry, and above social comfort; in war man values the power which it affords to life of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the ideal.[1]

Let us consider this. We have, first, the belief on which I have already dwelt, that the tensest, most "worth while" moments of life can only be had in war. But here that belief has associated itself with a reflective, philosophic, and religious temperament. The author has realized the tragedy involved in his standard of values. He has realized that the feelings he desires can only be attained at the cost of infinite suffering and infinite evil. That has not led him (as it might have led simpler and less intellectual men) to revise his feeling of what is valuable. It has led him to construct a mysticism. Unwilling to say simply: "We live in an intolerable and futile world, a world indifferent to all our ideals and all our hopes, a world not only of tragedy, but of tragedy unredeemed and unredeemable," he affirms that, in some incomprehensible way, some purpose must be served by all this suffering, without which men

[1] Cramb. Cited by Bruce Glasier, *Militarism*, p. 19.

like him could not have the feelings and activities they desire. He assumes that some "ideal" end is being achieved, though we cannot see what it is (for he is not shallow enough, if I understand his spirit, to suggest that any of the objects that may be attained by war constitute its justification). His religion is thus one form of the religion of suffering—the pagan, not the Christian form; a form which is perhaps best set forth by Nietzsche in the words "Be hard." Accept suffering, injustice, cruelty, all uttermost evil and conflict, for the sake of being hard; and believe that somehow there is some sense in it all, though it does not appear how.

When a war-man is both philosophic and intelligent, that is the kind of religion he is driven to. But if in such matters he is a simple, unreflective soul, he will adopt an easier course, and dispose of the question by assuming another world where we shall all be happy and harmonious; a world in which, if he reflected, he would see that he personally would be very miserable, since he would not be able to fight. Thus, for instance, Bismarck said that if he had not been a Christian he would have been a republican. By which I suppose him to mean that if he had not believed that there was another world, where somehow everything is made right, he would have abstained from making hell of this one.

Turning now to the pacifist, he too may have his religion. And his religion, too, may include a belief in some "other world" of harmony. But in that harmony he really would find satisfaction, for it is really his ideal. The bottom of his belief is that the impulse in him to love and to create is the divine impulse; that that is the core and the meaning of the world. And whatever he may believe or not believe about a world beyond, that spirit working in this one is the spring of his religion.

That is why Christians and Atheists may, and often do, have the same religion. For the essential thing is the common spirit, not the theology.

On the other hand, between the "War-Christian" and the "Peace-Christian" there is a profound gulf; just as there is between the "War-Atheist" and the "Peace-Atheist." The theological distinctions are not the important ones in this matter of religion. If they were, we should not see, as we do at this moment, one set of Christians persecuting another, while the persecuted are sustained and defended by atheists. The one important difference between men is the difference in what they hold valuable, and in the degree of passion and conviction with which they adhere to and pursue that. The rest is embroidery. To the man who has the religion of peace, the supreme value is love. To the man who has the religion of war, the supreme value is strife. There can be no reconciliation between these attitudes. Men have simply to discover which it is they stand for. And it is these ultimate antagonisms that constitute the tragedy of life.

These ultimate ideals may seem somewhat remote to the reader. Let me then show him, by an illustration, how they affect very important decisions. As I write, the main road from Warsaw into Russia is lined with bones. At intervals all along are baskets, full of the dust of bones. The dust in the baskets is that of little children, whom their mothers were carrying in the enforced flight of the whole civilian population. The rest is that of the mothers and the fathers and the elder children. To both war-man and peace-man we may assume this is a tragic spectacle. The difference is that the peace-man says: "See! War is the crown and consummation of Evil. Down with war!" The war-man says: "No! War

is tragic, but it is great. Long live war!" I know not what difference more profound could divide men. I know not in what sharper intensity ideas of Good and Evil could confront one another. I have merely tried to formulate in general terms the spiritual antagonism that issues in these opposite verdicts.[1]

Now, these opposite religions naturally connect with opposite political and social ideals. And these too it will be worth while to try to describe.

I will start with the familiar antithesis between "liberty" and "authority." The ideal of peace, I believe, goes along with that of liberty, and the ideal of war with that of authority. This, of course, is quite compatible with the patent fact that men have often waged wars for liberty. Have they not also waged wars for peace? My point is that liberty, in the sense in which I am here conceiving it, requires peace for its fulfilment; while authority, if it does not require war, requires a kind of organization best favoured by the preparation for war.

Advocates of liberty take a friendly and hopeful view of human nature. They conceive it as continually pushing and straining—in all men, not only in some—towards a full and noble life, much as trees may be thought to aim at a perfect and symmetrical growth, and only to fail to attain it by overcrowding or by inclemencies and accidents of climate or position. Nothing has to be put into the tree. Everything is there, if it had its chance.

[1] The reader, I hope, will understand that the position he in fact may hold—namely, that war is evil, but may be a necessary evil, to avoid a greater one, as in the case of a "war for righteousness"—is one I am not here dealing with. The man who takes that view has apparently the ideal of peace, not of war. He wages war for the sake of peace. It is clear that there need be no war for Right unless some one had first made war for Wrong. In my judgment all wars come from errors somewhere about Good and Evil. But I discuss all this in later chapters.

So with Man. It all lies there in him. But natural and social obstacles continually hinder its realization. Thus, to the advocate of liberty, the important thing is the preparation of the ground. That is why liberty is sometimes accused of being an empty or negative ideal. What is to come out, the libertarian trusts and feels, it would be presumptuous to define. It is a something "ever on before." But some suggestions of it, to confirm his faith, he finds in every great manifestation of the human spirit. Thus his main aim is always to remove obstacles. The positive content life, set free, will reveal.

And that is why I say that there is a deep connexion between liberty, so conceived, and peace. For the unfolding process is to proceed from an inner need. All coercion is opposed to it; and the profoundest objection of the pacifist to war is that war means coercion. In peace he does not honour a mere absence of contention. He desires no flat and tedious unison of identities; but rather that contest of free spirits in which each stimulates the other by the very difference of his aim, and in which a man would no more kill his opponent than his ally, for his opponent is his benefactor. The object of war is to eliminate the foe, the object of peace is to grow strong by him. And this all the great men of peace know—the rivals in science, in art, in moral passion, in individual and social ideals. "Freedom for you," they say, "that I may be free; and freedom for me, that you may be." And all freedoms, they believe, can dwell together and multiply in the same world, the same country, the same parish. The word of war is "I *or* You." The word of peace is "You *and* I." War and coercion; but peace and liberty.

It will be replied, "But wars are fought for liberty."

They are. But a lover of liberty will never wage them save to remove a coercion by a coercion. And war he will always hold to be a desperate remedy, likely to destroy the very thing it is waged to secure, as we see but too clearly at this moment in England, and are likely to see and feel for years to come. It is only in a true peace—one in which coercion (social and economic as well as political) should have disappeared—that the soul could unfold to perfection. Thus peace, though it is not the ideal, is the condition of it. It can be misrepresented as a negative state. But it is not that. It is the condition of all that is positive. For it is the space that gives room to the soul to grow.

To this ideal of "liberty" is opposed that of what I have called "authority." The difference is radical. The "authoritarian" does not believe in "human nature." He believes in select individuals. The confusion, violence, anarchy which to the libertarian are the result of ignorance and oppression, to him are the spontaneous and inevitable products of the human soul. Man is a quarrelsome, ignoble, incapable brute. So he always has been, and so he always will be. There is no hope for him, save to be drilled into order. And, fortunately, there do appear on the earth select men, capable of doing this. That these men should govern the others, not by their choice, but in their despite, is the proper, the "divine" arrangement. All else is anarchy. This view, of course, is aristocratic, but it is not necessarily oligarchic. The arrangement aimed at may be aimed at for the sake not of the rulers, but of the ruled. And, in fact, it is commonly so represented by those who adopt this attitude. The "Many" will be as good as they can be, and as happy as they can be, under such rule. Happier, indeed, than the "Few" who are the rulers. For these have reluctantly

assumed a duty, not for their pleasure or profit, but for the Good of the whole. Once more the tragic element emerges, as in the religion of war. The great man may be noble, but cannot be happy. The masses may be happy, because they cannot be noble.

Now this attitude does not imply necessarily a love of war. But it does imply a love of military discipline, because military discipline is the most rigorous and uncompromising; and the danger of war is an element without which it cannot flourish. It was not really with reluctance that Plato put his *Republic* on a military basis, though he plays a little, at first, with the idea of peace. He required an army for his type of discipline, and the discipline was the purpose of the community. Like all men with this kind of idealistic bent, he stood outside his creation, and contemplated what appeared to him to be its æsthetic beauty. He knew well that there would be little happiness within it. Authoritarians may deprecate war, because war has a side which is anarchy. But they must welcome military organization, because it is the type of order. And they would be as reluctant to inhabit a world without war as the libertarian is to inhabit one with it.

It will readily be seen that to these opposed political ideals correspond opposed interpretations of history. The libertarian thinks of history in terms of progress. He sees in it a continuous removal of hindrances to free life. At the beginning he sees man caught in a fate inherited from his animal ancestors. He sees him emerging in small groups, opposed to other groups by conflicting interests, by lack of comprehension, by contacts that are all of strife and war. He sees the process of history as a constant enlargement of the area of co-operation. And when he looks at the contemporary world, the antagonism

of national groups appears to him as an atavism, surviving into a condition in which universal co-operation already largely prevails in spite of political anarchy. To remove that anarchy he believes to be as possible as it is desirable. And its removal he sees as another great step forward in the progressive transformation of human life from the form of coercion to that of co-operation.

The authoritarian reads history differently. He emphasizes the coercion throughout; and he believes that this changes its form rather than its essence. History to him is oscillation, not progress. It is the oscillation of a pendulum about that point of rest which is the perfect static order that the "philosopher" or the "hero" or the "dictator" would impose.

In setting out this opposition between libertarian and authoritarian, I am of course simplifying the real attitudes of men and omitting those intermediary and compromising positions which in fact most of us adopt. But I wish to bring the reader back to what I believe to be ultimate antagonisms of temperament and outlook, explaining much of the antagonism of practice revealed confusedly in our contemporary life. He will see, I think, what I am aiming at if he will consider, on the one hand, the life-work of Voltaire, Shelley, Mazzini, Walt Whitman, Jaurès; and on the other that of de Maistre, Carlyle, Treitschke, Bismarck, Pobidonostseff. Somewhere deep at the roots of modern life, with more or less sharpness of definition, these ultimate principles are contending. And the difference of orientation given by the difference of the soul affects not only the action of men, but their whole interpretation of the facts of history and society.

Well, the one side is drawn to peace, the other to war, or at least to organization for war. And the pacifist has to fight not only (what are his easier antagonists)

routine, stupidity, greed, lack of vision. He has to fight an opposite ideal, claiming its own nobility.

Now, in this contest, it is the contrary of the truth that the pacifist takes the negative and his opponent the positive side. A pacifism which is merely an objection to strife has no force in it. And a cult of war which is strenuous and determined, and has faith in itself, is strong. But the pacifism I am defending has been and is a positive impulse. It is one with that whole movement of social transformation which is vaguely called democracy and which is essentially pacific, even when it believes that it is only by violence that it can attain its ends. It has a conception of the meaning of history and of life as inspiriting as that of its opponents is depressing. It sees the centuries marching with it to its goal and it sees that goal as a free and delighted life.

Compare—that I may make it clearer by an example—the picture of the world presented by Carlyle with that held up by the long and noble line of French idealists, from Turgot, and earlier still, all the way to Jaurès. To Carlyle history represents little but nemesis. It is one long, dreary tale of crime and retribution. A jealous god lies for ever in wait to punish men who stray for ever from his way. That way they are unable to find or to keep. Therefore he sends them from time to time a "hero" to beat them into submission. And the way of the hero is sword and fire. Odin in Scandinavia, the Teutonic Knights on the eastern marches, Cromwell in Ireland, Frederick in Silesia, these are the figures he is forced to admire. For the mass of men, sheer contempt. For Jesus, or for Socrates, little better. All victory interpreted as Right. All defeat interpreted as Wrong. Everywhere sin and punishment, punishment and sin. All this is but too congenial to the British and German soul. But how other is the vision

of the French! As far back as the sixteenth century it was a Frenchman, Bodin, who half saw human life as progress. It was Frenchmen—Turgot, Condorcet, Rousseau—who mixed that fiery wine that set streaming over the world the divinest madness it has ever known. It was Frenchmen who, awakening sobered, saw the social behind the political revolution, and laid down the great lines of a socialism that was truly an ideal, a socialism for all, a socialism where science should co-operate not only with industry but with art, and all of these with love. That, throughout, has been the French note, as distinguished from the German. And the last testimony of Jaurès vibrates with a synthetic passion whereby it stands out, beside Marx's monument to class-war, as the soul of a man beside the corpse of a mammoth. Against this passion of faith, fusing all history and life in its crucible, what can avail the unfaith of authoritarians? Their victory is never anything but that of guns and bayonets. And against these ever will arise resilient the soul of man. In all the philosophy of war there is nothing that could appeal to youth; and youth has the mastery of the world. No! Pacifism is not an obstruction, a refusal. It is the fire at the heart of the world.

And that fire English pacifists would do well to seek in France. We English see and feel too exclusively from the moral point of view, and our notion of morals is too narrow. The obstinacy of simple conviction that, as I write, is defying all the powers of society to force a few poor men to fight when their conscience forbids, is indeed a great English quality. Again and again it has saved for us our liberties and our soul. But it is private, personal, uninformed, unimaginative, better to resist than to create. It has not been married to intellect. It has not been sown as a seed in the matrix of the world, to grow up

as the tree of science and art. The stream of total idealism flows full and strong, where it has always flowed, in France. And it is thence that we may best draw the inspiration that will make of pacifism not a mere protest against militarism but a taking of the field to establish that true peace which is the rivalry of generous souls. The cause of war is the cause of the established order, of capitalists against wage-workers, of social discord and antagonism, of tyranny, of hypocrisy, of stupidity, of cant. The cause of peace is the cause of justice, charity, and love, of immense corporate efforts to control nature by science and art, of an individualism the tenser and fuller in its personal life that it is participating consciously in a collective work. For it is only the collectivism of war that destroys the individual. The collectivism of peace might fulfil him.

What kind of a man, then, does the pacifist look forward to? A tame man, as war-men pretend? No. But neither the war-man's fierce man, nor yet the noble, nor the king, nor the "philosophic ruler," nor any of those types that presuppose a passive subject class, a "twenty millions mostly fools," an orgy of destruction in the midst of which the "hero" shall shine supreme, or an ordered State over which he shall brood like Providence. Not these. But active centres everywhere of passionate life, freely combining for their joint ends. One poet only has had a concrete vision of the pacifist's ideal. From him I take the prophecy of it:—

I dream'd in a dream I saw a city invincible to the attacks of the whole of the rest of the earth.
I dream'd that was the new city of friends.
Nothing was greater there than the quality of robust love, it led the rest,
It was seen every hour, in the actions of the men of that city,
And in all their looks and words.

What that city breeds is not soldiers. It is—

The noble character of mechanics and farmers, especially the young men,
Their manners, speech, dress, friendships, the gait they have of persons who never knew how it felt to stand in the presence of superiors,
The freshness and candour of their physiognomy, the copiousness and decision of their phrenology,
The picturesque looseness of their carriage, their fierceness when wronged,
The fluency of their speech, their delight in music, their curiosity, their good temper and open-handedness, the whole composite make,
The prevailing ardour and enterprise, the large amativeness,
The perfect equality of the female with the male, the fluid movement of the population,
The superior marine, free commerce, fisheries, whaling, gold digging,
Wharf-hemmed cities, railroad and steamboat lines intersecting at all points,
Factories, mercantile life, labour-saving machinery, the North-east, North-west, South-west,
Manhattan fireman, the Yankee swap, Southern plantation life.

This is the liberty, these the contests, these the heroes of peace. And if we could achieve such a peace, should we be driven to make an ideal of war?

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 53.—The Realities of War.

To illustrate the very inadequate words in the text would be to cite everything real and genuine that has been allowed to come through to the public, supplemented by all one has heard privately. The following are merely a reminder from material I happen to have beside me. Here, for instance, is a more or less real account of a bayonet charge (from the *Manchester Guardian* of July 25, 1916):—

"The trench was in a beastly state. It was like porridge with

syrup over it, and we were all absolutely plastered—hair and moustaches and everything. The Boche was crumping us all the time. We had to be mighty careful about matches, the Boche being no more than a hundred yards off. Our adjutant came along about three, checking up watches and giving us divisional time. Mine was all right; never stopped once from the day I bought it till that left wrist of mine was hit—see! It registers my first hit—3.26.

"Just before three I got my position—right in the middle of my company. We were going over at 3.25, you know. The trench was deep there, with a lot of mud and water, but there was no set parapet left: just a gradual slope of muck, as though cartloads of it had been dropped from the sky by giants—spilt porridge. I wanted to be first out if I could—good effect on the men, you know—but I couldn't trust myself in all that muck, so I'd collared a rum-case from ——'s dug-out and was nursing the blooming thing so that when the time came I could plant it in the mud and get a bit of a spring from that. I was in a devil of a stew lest some of my chaps should get over too soon. They kept wriggling up and forward in the mud. They were frightfully keen to get moving.

"I thought I could just make out our artillery lift, about a minute and a half before the twenty-five, but I wouldn't swear to it. On the stroke of the twenty-five, I got a good jump from my rum-box, and fell head-first into a little pool—whizz-bang hole, I suppose; something small. It loosened two of my front teeth pretty much. I'd my whistle in my teeth, you see. But I blew like blazes directly I got my head up. Never made a sound. Whistle full of mud. But it didn't matter a bit. They all saw me take my dive, and a lot were in front of me when I got going. But I overhauled 'em and got in front.

"I believe we must have got nearly fifty yards without a casualty. But it's hard to say. It wasn't night, you know; just a glimmering kind of a greyness. Not easy to spot casualties. The row, of course, was deafening; and we were running like lamplighters.

"You think you're going strong, and—Woosh! You've got your face deep in porridge. Fallen in a shell-hole. You trip over some blame thing, and you turn a complete somersault; and you're on again, wondering where your second wind is. Lord, you haven't a notion whether you're hit or not. I felt that smack on my left wrist, along with a dozen other smacks of one sort and another, but I didn't know it was a wound for an hour or more. All you thought

about was trying to keep your rifle muzzle up, and I guess the fellows behind must 've thought a bit about not stickin' us with their bayonets more'n they could help. I was shouting '——' the local name of the regiment, you know. The boys like it. But my sergeant, who was close to me, was just yelling, 'Down 'em, boys!' and 'Stick 'em! Stick 'em!' for all he was worth.

"There was no real parapet left in that Boche front line. Their trench was just a sort of gash; a ragged crack in the porridge. Where I was, there was quite a bit of their wire left; but, do you know, one didn't feel it a bit. You can judge a bit from my rags what it was like. We went at it like fellows in a race charge the tape; and it didn't hurt us any more. Only thing that worried us was the porridge, and the holes. Your feet sinking down make you think you're crawling: making no headway. I wish I could have seen a bit better. It was all a muddy blur to me.

"But I made out a line of faces in the Boche ditch; and I know I gave a devil of a yell, as we jumped for those faces. Lost my rifle there. 'Fraid I didn't stick my man, really, because my bayonet struck solid earth. I just smashed my fellow. We went down into the muck together, and another chap trod on my neck for a moment. Makes you think quick, I tell you. I pulled that chap down on top of my other Boche, and just took one good look to make sure he was a Boche, and then I gave him two rounds from my revolver, with the barrel in his face. I think I killed the under one too; but can't be sure.

"Next thing I knew we were scrambling on to the second line. It was in the wire of the second line that I got my knock-out; this shoulder, and some splinters in my head. Yes; bomb. I was out of business then, but as the light grew I could see my chaps having the time of their lives inside that second line. One of 'em hauled me in after a bit, and I got a drink of beer in a big Boche dugout, down two separate flights of steps. That beer was good, though it was German."

Here is a little case of reprisals—Russian, as it happens:—

"According to an official report, on August 29, 1914, in the commune of Liweze, circle Sokal, youths and men, on the plea that the inhabitants of Liweze had fired on the Russians, were rounded up and shut into a house. A Russian patrol of eight came to the house. The commanding officer, Faehnrich, gave the order, 'These dogs are to be shot.' The patrols shot through the window and the

door on the prisoners and then massacred them with sword and bayonet. These victims of Russian bestiality, eighteen in number, were aged from fourteen to seventy years."

The reader, I hope, will not be led away from the point by irrelevant discussions as to the relative brutality of different nations. War necessitates these kinds of brutalities, whatever nation is waging it. And the fact that the Germans have committed them with more deliberation than others, ought not to blind us to the much more important fact that they belong to the nature of war. No soldiers are under any illusions on the subject.

I give now an extract from a German soldier's diary:—

"We have been parched with thirst and lie in cold earth-holes at nights. The whole battlefield was full of dead, and there was great heat during the day. We are indeed no longer men, only as it were half-living creatures.

"There lie in the Delville Wood, which we and the English have occupied, thousands of dead. And the number of flies and the smell! . . . These days I shall never in my life forget—what we had to endure there. One would hardly think it possible what men can endure" (*Manchester Guardian*, August 29, 1916).

Finally, I give two hospital scenes:—

"Among the German wounded in one of the hospitals it was observed that one man seemed to be in great trouble over something. His wound was making excellent progress, and there seemed nothing to hinder a complete recovery. Finally, he confessed what was preying on his mind. He was guilty, he said, of tying three wounded Frenchmen together and throwing them into a river. And now, night and day, he could hear nothing but their cry, 'Pitie! Pitie!' which would haunt him for the rest of his miserable and, as he hoped, brief existence.

"The same informant tells me that there are many cases of Germans in the French hospitals similarly affected, some of them having lost their reason as a result of scenes they have witnessed and in which, it may be presumed, they took an active part" (Central News).

Again:—

"It is my last day here, and I return to one of the German wards. There are six beds here—at the foot of each a card with the name, the regiment, and the doctor's diagnosis of each case; at its head are scrawled upon a slate the letters 'Cath.' or 'Pr.,' to

indicate the faith of each poor wreck of humanity. To look round upon them—a school-teacher from Saxony, a peasant from Prussia, a clerk, a shop-assistant—is to realize the infatuated cruelty of conscription in its blind, unintelligent, inexorable compulsion of men, snatched from the farm, the loom, the class-room, the counting-house, to fight for a cause they do not comprehend, in a place of which they have never heard, against an enemy with whom they have no enmity. Pathetic is their eagerness to speak their mother-tongue, and at the first words of German which I utter one of them in a corner of the ward rises in his bed and turns on me a look of unutterable wistfulness. But, hush! My eyes are drawn irresistibly towards another bed. On this bed lies a lad with blue eyes and a soft yellow down upon his unshaved chin; his face is white as chalk with a kind of misty pallor, glistening with cold sweat. One bare arm is extended with the finger pointing upwards to the ceiling, the other is curved as if he were holding some one in a long embrace. The fingers are plucking, plucking, as though at an invisible rope which is for ever escaping his grasp. His teeth are clenched—it is a case of tetanus—but through them there escapes a mournful and imperative cry that never ceases—'Emma! Emma! Emma!' The nurse, a brave little Englishwoman, whose ministries never tire, whispers to me that it is the name of his fiancée—he has never ceased to extend his arms and to call upon her name. Poor boy! perhaps even now in this thy hour of perplexity and anguish thy Emma, in some little village far, far beyond the Rhine, is upon her knees praying for the lover who will never return. The cry grows fainter and more faint, the yearning arms relax, all heads turn upon their pillows to look with mute fixity at their dying comrade. There is a rush of doctor and nurses around the bed. The room is flooded with the soft radiance of September sunshine, yet never has a room seemed to me so dark. I turn away and stumble out into the court-yard, and as I pass through its portals I see the hearse" (from the *Westminster Gazette*).

Does the reader need more? I offer him this from a surgeon's notes:—

> But, oh Lord, what other sights I have seen to-day! It's horrible—horrible—horrible! I am often afraid that the tragedies I see will haunt me all my life; that my dreams will be blood-red, and that armies of wrecked men will parade before me as I sleep. I thought I was hardened. I'm as sensitive as a little convent-girl of seventeen. . . .

The next passage speaks of a scene in the retreat:—

> Hundreds of other wounded continued to come to us. Several times there were as many as thirty or even forty Red Cross carts standing in a line waiting to be emptied. Tragedy—horrible tragedy all the time. Limbless men with deathlike faces, fearfully gashed bodies and heads. The straw on which the men lay was sodden with blood. The atmosphere was foul; it stank of blood, and sweat, and human bodies. The open-air spaces occupied by the wounded were stuffy like crowded rooms.

Then, for the civilians at the same place:—

> And the refugees. . . . Hundreds of them—old and young and middle-aged. An old, old man, trembling as he sat on a heap of luggage. An old lady, black silk dress and lacy cap of another age, in an invalid's chair. Young mothers nursing their babies, with fear in their eyes. One of our generals found a dead woman by the wayside this afternoon. She had tramped for days from somewhere many miles away. Weak and ill, she had lain down by the roadside and died. "C'est la guerre!" says one officer. "C'est la guerre!" says another, dismissing the tragedy with a careless shrug and raised eyebrows. "C'est la guerre!" says every one. I am sick of the phrase.

"Yes," the reviewer comments, "this is war; and those who have never known war in their own lands should read this book and discover what a foul business it always must be" (from *On the Russian Front*, by K. Scotland Liddell. Review in the *Nation* of October 28, 1916.)

Having read these pale reflexes of some infinitesimal part of what has been going on continuously among millions of men for more than two years, will the reader turn back and read again the passage quoted on p. 51 in the text, and see what he thinks of it?

Page 56.—The Religion of War.

It is almost impossible, for one to whom the "war-ideal" seems as monstrous as it does to me, to write of it with any measure of restraint or justice. But if I try to fix "objectively" its weak spot, I find it to reside in the constant pretence of pursuing some kind of "spiritual" end, and yet never even attempting to define that end in any terms but those of destruction, conquest, and extermination. "What are the ideal qualities?" "Those that enable one

to exterminate without fear or revulsion of feeling." "To what end do these qualities serve?" "To the end of waging war." There seems no emerging from this circle. Germans talk much of what Germany is going to give the world when it has finally subdued it, after centuries of bloody warfare. But what can it give, on its own showing, except war? For only war, in this view, is noble! Directly you try to define something good that would not be war, you are back on one of the peace ideals—art, or love, or knowledge, or harmonious organization. This immense piece of stupidity that lies behind all the German highfalutin is characteristic of their modern way of thinking. They never question their premises, nor even conceive them to be questionable.

As an example of the confusion of this German Romanticism, I may cite the following passage from a certain Richard Fugmann in a pamphlet entitled *Segen des Sieges*. Before the war there was:—

"Division everywhere and petty everyday interests. Truth and faith had vanished. The pledged word no longer held. Treaties were concluded only to be broken. Business life assumed a form very like universal fraud. In town and country a terrible way of life began to spread. No prophet, no preacher of morals, no apostle of nature, no seer, could arrest the stream of degeneracy and corruption."

The war broke out, and, says Fugmann, hey presto! everything was changed. Everything became noble and beautiful. Yet what was this war? It began with the invasion of Belgium, in defiance of a solemn treaty; it continued with the Belgian atrocities; it bids fair, before it ends, to have converted the whole of Europe into a horde of homicidal lunatics. And this gentleman is quite unaware of it! He is thinking all the time of some idea of war in his head. "No matter!" he may say, "the war is going to achieve great results." What are they? Why, the Great Germany! And what does that mean? Why, that the "Edel-Deutscher" (that is the brand to which the author belongs) "will form the world according to his sense and will." On what kind of model? Here is the reply to that very natural question: "Hard Edel-Deutsche, with natural inner greatness and goodness. May we have a severe government that selects the fittest. The supremacy of the military over the civil authority would be profitable to us for many years, and further our unity." That is all. In other words, the war has to serve the great purpose of maintaining militarism and preparing for other

wars. (See a notice of this book in *Vorwärts*, September 24, 1915.)

Here is another illustration of the same point of view from Sombart's *Händler und Helden*:—

"It does not hurt us at all if all the others fail to understand us. We do not need them. It does not hurt us if they remain for ever our enemies. For the threatening of the Fatherland by foreign foes belongs essentially to the Ideal picture which we make of the German nation of the future, to which, among many other blessings, Heaven has granted this one, that it lives in the midst of a world of foes. . . . We not only expect future wars, we hope for them. For in opposition to the melancholy treatise on 'Perpetual Peace' of the dried-up particularist Kant, we see in war itself 'a holy thing, the holiest on earth.' We, as heroes, have sheer warrior virtues, which attain their full development only in war and by war. That is why we praise war as 'the greatest moral power of which providence makes use to preserve men upon earth from rottenness.'"

(The above is a summary of Sombart's views, taken from the *Welt am Montag*, July 10, 1916. I have not yet seen the book.)

It would be a mistake to suppose that this view of war as the purpose of life, the great regenerator, is confined to Germans. Among Englishmen and Englishwomen of the upper classes no one is more popular than the late Lord Roberts. And his views on war appear to be substantially the same as the foregoing. I take the following summary from *Common Sense* of December 2, 1916:—

"War is as inevitable as death. It is salutary, necessary, and is the only national tonic that can be prescribed.—LORD ROBERTS.

"This is the philosophy of militarism, in the light of which all the ideals for which this country entered the war, for which our young men have died and are dying, must be revised. War is inevitable: it will always recur. War to end war is an absurdity. War will never end. It is not desirable that it should do. To desire it is, indeed, a sign of that 'degeneracy' that follows 'over-civilization.' This degeneracy, which 'sets in like a blight,' finding its expression in 'pacifism and the desire for pacifism,' and humanitarianism generally, 'spreads to the younger generation, and a diseased country is very quickly brought to the condition when it must either die or be operated upon. It is the inevitable law, both of nature and nations. Then comes war—the final test.'

"The final test—and the only tonic: the iron that can cure its anæmia.

"The sentences quoted, in which is expressed the quintessence of militarism, are not taken from Bernhardi, Treitschke, or any Prussian. They occur in an essay by the late Lord Roberts, read the other day before a New York Club, and reported in the *New York Tribune*. Lord Roberts is a hero to millions of his countrymen; and this makes it the more instructive to have his thoughts expressed thus fully and forcibly. Germany made the war. Then Germany has saved the world. If militarism is a good thing, and a means to health, Germany was nearer health before the war than any other nation. This is what militarists think, though not all of them have the logic to see it or the honesty to say it.

"'I have the temerity to assert that Germany is the Allies' best friend. This is true because Germany has supplied the tonic which England and France and Russia urgently needed. By making war, Germany has forced these countries out of degeneracy and has obliged them to set their houses in order.' Germany, he goes on, is 'rescuing her opponents from suicide.' We did not realize it, but before the war we were all (with the apparent exception of militarist Germany) in a most parlous state of over-civilization, and 'history shows that at the moment when countries arrive at over-civilization something must happen, and that something is war. 'History' also shows, however, that even war brings only temporary salvation; the process is an endless one, a veritable task of Sisyphus. We are saved, but only for a time. Peace and its canker must return. And so history repeats itself. War will come again 'with the swing of the pendulum.' Thus, though war is a good thing, because it calls out splendid qualities, it is not permanent in its salutary effects; nations sink back again inevitably into that terrible condition from which war is needed to save them."

This romantic view of war derives its only real force from the fact that, among all the complex happenings of war, there occur cases of individual heroism and beauty of character. It is true. But is there one of those noble men who would choose war, if he thought it could honourably be avoided, in order that such opportunity should be presented? I do not for a moment believe it. The state of mind of such men is probably well expressed by the following extract from a war-letter of a German student:—

". . . For there were hours of late which will weigh heavy on

the memory like a stoppage of the heart, like black waves which are not to be got rid of with any amount of denying. Childhood and youth are passed for good and all. The time of overshadowing has begun.

". . . The elasticity of life is incomprehensible; I should never have thought that one could survive such things. If I come safe out of this time of trial, everything must be begun over again.

"I see death and cry to life. I had achieved little in my life, which had been filled with study. To God I have commended my soul, I have sealed it up firmly and surely in Him. I am free to dare all. My eternity belongs to God, my life to the Fatherland, but to me remains joy and strength" (*International Review*, May 31, 1916).

This is fine; but it is no glorification of war. And in all the mass of soldiers, how many such men are there? And for those men, how many such moments? Why, next minute, it would be the duty of that man to be struggling like a wild beast in the trenches, with feet, hands, and knives, his whole spiritual and moral and intellectual life arrested and buried beneath the flood of sheer animal rage that alone can carry a man through such work. We are apt to scoff at the Germans for being drugged with ether. That they require to be so drugged, if they do, is to their credit. The man who could so act undrugged must be something less than human.

Sober observers who have been at the front are under no illusions as to the ennobling effects of war. I quote the following letter published in the *Open Forum*:—

"DEAR ——,

"I have been meaning to write to you for many days, but haven't found time. I am at last a comfortable distance behind the firing-line in fairly good billets. We expect to stay here till December 11th. The rest and peace are welcome, though rest is hardly a good word for it, as they work us pretty hard morning and afternoon with route marches, drill, and military exercises of various kinds.

"You asked me to enlarge on some remarks I made when I was back the other day, on the futility of war. I will try and put down what I meant.

"When I said 'futility,' I was hardly using the word at the

moment in its most practical sense. What was in my mind was the huge unnecessary waste of life, of the lives of happy, healthy men, with consequent misery to those who loved them, for no gain of any sort to humanity. I have seen six months now of continuous trench warfare and latterly of heavy fighting. It has not upset my nerves or my health ; it has chiefly disgusted me, apart from its interest as a game of skill. What I have felt chiefly about the war is its vileness and out-of-dateness. It has seemed to me so ludicrously out of place in these civilized days that at the worst moments the incongruity has almost made me laugh. More and more I have felt it to be a child's game played by those who had pretended to be grown up. I can understand the justification of murder where there is some strong personal motive more easily than I can understand the justification of war. War is simply wholesale underhand murder—it is essentially, and on principle, underhand—continuing until the misery caused on one side is so much in excess of the misery caused on the other that an alteration in certain national boundaries is agreed to and there ensues the misery of a peace following extreme exhaustion.

"The above is commonplace and obvious and deals rather with the moral aspect of war than its futility. But I stick to futility. War I think morally futile, because I do not believe at all in the romantic view of it, i.e. in the good qualities which it is supposed to breed. It is true that it tests men, like plague, shipwreck, famine, or any other adversity, but in doing so it does not *make* the good qualities that come to light, it merely makes them apparent. No man in his senses would advocate the occasional sinking of a liner, or the inoculation of a disease, in order to promote heroism and self-sacrifice, yet justification of war on such ground is equally indefensible.

"With regard to the feelings of the men out here in moments of crisis, I should say that they were much simpler than the story-writers would have you believe. The average Tommy is very simple, because he's so unthoughtful and wanting in imagination and all capacity for self-analysis. I am convinced that in the actual moment of assault—it is more like a 'jog-trot' than the 'fiery rush' of fiction—the average Tommy is conscious chiefly of a sense of discomfort and a vague feeling that somehow or other and for some reason or other it's got to be done. This unreasoning instinct of a thing having to be done is his strength, and what makes him as

good a fighting machine as any in Europe. Half an hour after the show I suspect that little or no impression is left on his mind by what he has been through, and from then onwards he tells increasingly tall stories about it. . . .

"I never cease to wonder at the Tommy. He's so elementary and stupid in many ways and yet such a good fellow. Ordinarily he never stops 'grousing' and grumbling. His food is his chief concern, and he *never* stops grumbling about it, usually quite unreasonably; if the resources of the Savoy and its chef were placed daily at his disposal, I don't think he would grumble any less. But apart from that he can always find trifles to grouse about, especially if he can discover, or imagines, that some one else has been more favoured than he in some respect. He uses vile language, quite ridiculously and unmeaningly, and by force of example gets more and more into this habit. He is very sentimental, but doesn't know it, wouldn't admit it, and covers it up under a mask of coarse jocularity. On balance he has been slightly brutalized by his experience in this war, yet on the whole I believe he has been changed very little by it; at any rate when he gets back to billets he has forgotten all about it and is just what he was. Normally he is either in a state of being aggrieved and dissatisfied or is rowdily cheerful. His mania at all times for kicking about a football is quite astonishing. So far I haven't said much in his favour, but there is a great deal to be said. When suffering and endurance are really necessary, he suffers and endures without a murmur. Also he has an instinct for saving life, and his gallantry and kindness in succouring wounded comrades are beyond reproach. As for stretcher-bearers, I hardly like to talk about them for fear of being extravagant. Early on in training men are selected pretty much at random for stretcher-bearers and are taught First Aid, etc. When they get to work out here, a mantle of heroism seems to descend upon them. Really my company stretcher-bearers seem to me one and all to be Heroes with a very large H. Their bravery, their self-denial, and their devotion to duty have been simply beyond words—and almost all Company Commanders will tell you the same. This has been a digression. I must get back to 'futility' and polish it off.

"With regard to the wicked and ugly waste caused by war, I suppose nobody can quite realize it who has not seen, as I have, hundreds and hundreds of corpses—our best stuff most of them,

our bravest and healthiest youth—lying unburied where they fell, putrid and blackening. It's a filthy sight. I have hated seeing it, and it has made me more than ever furious at the folly of war. Well, where is the gain for which all that ugly slaughter, with the misery it has made, is the price? There should be a big gain to justify it. As far as this war is concerned, I think myself that in the circumstances that had arisen it was unavoidable. But those circumstances should never have arisen. I hope and pray that the world may wake up from its madness, as from a bad dream, and that this may be the last war, but I haven't much faith in any such happy prospect. Those who have fought and survived will come home slightly brutalized, but otherwise just as they were, and they and people in general will soon forget the waste and black murder aspect of this foul thing, whereas the newspapers and literary glorification which always accompanies a war will have sounded a note which will go on ringing for generations. My only real hope lies in the probability that a war twenty years hence will be entirely a matter of flying machines and poisons. It's almost certain that methods will be discovered of destroying life by chemical gases or otherwise over vast areas at a time, and then if politicians disagree either one nation will swiftly exterminate another or civilization will give up this insane method of settling disputes. As for this war, I suppose nobody out of Bedlam dreams that there can be any gain to anybody from it. On the contrary, it must result for all in great loss and years of suffering. At best an even greater possible peril to humanity may have been removed. But that only if a pernicious mental disease has not been spread from Germany to other countries! Are you quite sure that we have not begun to catch it? I am not. I can see that in some ways we are more Hun-ish than we were. Well, . . . I've written you a fearful long screed, and it's late and I must go to bed. I am having a pretty good time here. I am billeted in a farmhouse and the country round is rather jolly. I forgot to say that shooting Germans at a reasonable distance feels *exactly* like shooting pheasants. Also that Tommy Atkins and Fritz have no personal dislike of each other. They would cross to each other's lines and fraternize to-morrow if it were possible. It happened last Christmas and during January, and will happen again unless the authorities, as is possible, make strenuous efforts to keep the game of hate going.

"Ever yours, ——."

PAGE 60.—EMERSON ON LIBERTY.

The following passage from Emerson may serve to illustrate the idea that underlies all belief in liberty :—

" There is in every man a determination of character to a peculiar end, counteracted often by unfavourable fortune, but more apparent the more he is left at liberty. This is called his genius, or his nature, or his turn of mind. The object of education should be to remove all obstructions and let this natural force have free play and exhibit its peculiar product " (Emerson, *Journal*, vol. 3, p. 416).

It will be apparent that this view of education belongs to the ideal of liberty. The opposite view, attached to the ideal of authority, would make education a training in definite dogmas to counteract the nature of the individual, as it was in the Jesuit system and will be in the militarist system, if ever it can get itself established, as shown in the first chapter of this book.

CHAPTER IV

THE STATE AS A SUPER-PERSONALITY

I HAVE made an attempt in the last chapter to set forth the ideal impulses that underlie, respectively, war and peace. I have done so because I believe them to be the most fundamental. It remains true, whatever men may say or think, that ideals are the greatest force in the world. What makes people sceptical about this is the fact that men commonly profess ideals which they do not believe, and act on others which they do not profess. This is peculiarly true of the English, who hate formulating their ideals, even to themselves.

Still, it is ideals—the ones men really have—that move the world. For those who live by ideals are the active centres in a waste of habit and routine. That is why the world has always been governed, and always will be, by minorities.

On the other hand, it is true that no ideal impulse can do work by itself. It may sing by itself, as Shelley sang, and all the Utopians, and lovely and inspiring the song may be. But if it is to do work it must be harnessed to coarser elements. Ambitions, lusts, interests, with these it must make contact; and, making the contact, must lose its purity. Therein is the tragedy of life, both for the individual soul and for historic movements. It is as though some spiritual energy were always pressing in from an

outer region to penetrate the crass world of matter, and in the process of penetration were for ever parting with its own nature and becoming assimilated to the stuff it endeavours to control. Into the heart of youth it enters freely. But soon the communication with the source is cut off and the imprisoned element struggles with alien substances till it becomes fused with them and they with it. That is why, when an ideal is set forth barely, as I have tried to do it, there comes quickly a reaction of feeling. "Where," men say, "in the real world, is this ideal? What force has it? What embodiment?" It is those, then, who can show it not pure but in the amalgam, not as an isolated impulse but as part of the tangle of life, that will have credit. And it is this that is the capital achievement of the French intellect. Germans in the past could develop an ideal that was all pure thought. The nemesis has been that, returning to reality, they discover no ideal at all except that of force. The French have shown the ideal in its actual travail to shape the real. The English, clinging to reality, have been apt to deny ideals.

An Englishman, then, at the point I have reached, will probably turn to me and say, "You have talked about ideals of war and peace; but all that is words. Of course we should all like to avoid war if we could. But it is not a question of our will and our desires. War is in the nature of things. It is inevitable." Is it? To that question I will now address myself.

In a pamphlet published at the beginning of the war, I wrote as follows:—

War is made—this war has been made—not by any necessity of nature, any law beyond human control, any fate to which men must passively bow; it is made because certain men who have immediate

power over other men are possessed by a certain theory. Sometimes they are fully conscious of this theory. More often, perhaps, it works in them unconsciously. But it is there, the dominating influence in international politics. I shall call it the governmental theory, because it is among governing persons—emperors, kings, ministers, and their diplomatic and military advisers—that its influence is most conspicuous and most disastrous. But it is supported also by historians, journalists, and publicists, and it is only too readily adopted by the ordinary man, when he turns from the real things he knows and habitually handles to consider the unknown field of foreign affairs. Very briefly, and, therefore, crudely expressed, the theory is this: "The world is divided, politically, into States. These States are a kind of abstract Beings, distinct from the men, women, and children who inhabit them. They are in perpetual and inevitable antagonism to one another; and though they may group themselves in alliances, that can be only for temporary purposes to meet some other alliance or single Power. For States are bound by a moral or physical obligation to expand indefinitely each at the cost of the others. They are natural enemies, they always have been so, and they always will be; and force is the only arbiter between them. That being so, War is an eternal necessity. As a necessity, it should be accepted, if not welcomed, by all sound-thinking and right-feeling men. Pacifists are men at once weak and dangerous. They deny a fact as fundamental as any of the facts of the natural world. And their influence, if they have any, can only be disastrous to their State in its ceaseless and inevitable contest with other States."

Reviewers have denied that this theory is held by anybody. They cannot be well acquainted with the political literature of Germany or they would know that there it has often been given explicit expression. Some account of the matter will be found in an essay by Mr. Gooch,[1] who thus sums up the views of Treitschke :—

The State stands high above the individuals who compose it, and it exists in order to realize ideals far above human happiness.

[1] *The German Theory of the State*, by G. C. P. Gooch. Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review* of June 1915.

This it can only do if it is strong. It is no part of its duty to inquire whether its actions are approved or disapproved by its subjects. It is the guardian of the national tradition and a trustee for the interest of unborn generations. . . . In like manner the State owes no allegiance to any external authority. International law is a mere phrase, and no tribunal can arbitrate between sovereign States. Treaties are a voluntary self-limitation, and no State can hamper its freedom of action by obligations to another. It must be ever ready for war, which, when undertaken for honour or for some supreme national interest, is wholesome and elevating. For war is not a necessary evil, but an instrument of statesmanship and a school of patriotism. Only in war for the fatherland does a nation become truly and spiritually united. . . . It is idealism that demands a war and materialism which rejects it. . . . The State is Power. All its institutions and practices must be directed towards this goal. The youth of the country must be trained to arms and courage must be fostered by duelling.

The author ends his survey of the recent trend of German thought with the words: "The idolatry of the State has reached its logical issue in the elevation of force to the sovereign principle in national life and in international relations."

It is not, however, when it is formulated that the theory is most pernicious. It is when it is held unconsciously. For then, though it governs all a man's thinking, its essential absurdity never appears to him. The most radical changes in the orientation of the human spirit are effected by setting forth in clear language the concealed presuppositions of current thought. For the best way to convert a man is to show him that his reasoning rests on premises which he is bound to deny as soon as they are exposed. It is encouraging to me, therefore, to find that critics consider the doctrine outlined above to be absurd. I agree with them. But that does not alter the fact that the doctrine is implied in most speaking and writing on international politics, and, as I

venture to guess, in that of the critics themselves. I have read, since I wrote that passage, many books, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and speeches in many languages, and the result has been to confirm my belief that the view there set forth really is the one prevalent among those who profess to speak with authority on international relations. The literature is so vast that this statement cannot be proved by citations nor disproved by counter-citations. But I would ask the reader to test it for himself. Let him substitute, in anything he may read on this subject, for the names of States—England, Germany, France—the names of the corresponding peoples—the English, the Germans, the French. Let him then endeavour to form some concrete image of all the varieties of classes and individuals, professions, occupations, interests, which those names aim at designating. Let him next ask himself precisely who, of all these, is being benefited or injured by the policy that is being discussed; and he will, I think, quickly come to the conclusion that his authors are not thinking of men and women at all. They are thinking of words, like power, or prestige, or empire. Their whole game is a game with counters; or would be, were it not that the moves with the counters effect real changes, though changes unforeseen and unintended, in the lives and fortunes of real people.

This dwelling among abstractions is one principal characteristic of the doctrine we are criticizing. The other is a kind of mystic fatalism. It is supposed not only that history is governed by "laws" (as it may be, but if so we have made little progress in discovering them), but that these laws operate from outside upon men who are passive instruments under their power. This is the same error which sees, in the "laws" of nature, commands, instead of descriptions of behaviour.

But the error becomes pernicious when it is applied to human society, because it tends to paralyse beforehand the operations of reason and the motions of humanity by an assumption of ineluctable fate. "So it has been, so it is, so it will be"—though it be in plain and admitted opposition both to the interests and the desires of men. There are publicists and historians who enjoy the spectacle of the suffering of mankind, and feel a kind of æsthetic indignation against those who insist on pointing out that what they are contemplating is not a tragedy of fate, but a muddle of incompetence, ignorance, and bad will. It is only when we look back on the irrevocable past that this pathos of "necessity" is either possible or tolerable. The present and the future is the domain of foresight and of will.

The reason why people find it difficult to believe that those who control international politics conceive the State in this abstract way, is that, in domestic affairs, modern States really do, to some extent, pursue the real interests of the citizens, and are thus, partially at least, what they should be, instruments of society. That is why most people are usually more interested in domestic than in foreign politics; for in domestic politics they attempt to get things done which will subserve the real well-being of themselves and their descendants. It is true, of course, that even here there is no identity between the State and society, even in countries supposed to be democratic. For, in fact, government is everywhere to a great extent controlled by powerful minorities, with an interest distinct from that of the mass of the people; and this fact gives a key to the internal politics of all contemporary States. But the theory, at least, is accepted that society controls government and directs it in its own interest. So that the State may be plausibly regarded as an aspect of society

and as concerned with real things and people. What has been above said, therefore, is not intended to apply, and would apply only within narrower limits, to the State as controlling and directing internal policy. In foreign policy, on the other hand, I maintain it to be true that the "State" both is conceived and behaves in abstraction from the concrete interests of the people.[1]

It may perhaps be objected that this cannot be true because men would never be moved by abstractions. It would be as true to say that they are never moved by anything else. For they are moved by their passions, and their passions respond to words rather than things. The more remote the issue from daily experience, the more violent the appeal to passion. And nothing is so remote from ordinary men as the issues of foreign policy. When these come up, men have nothing to fall back on except their primitive sense that they all belong with one another and don't belong with a remote, unknown being called the "foreigner"; a sense to which there attaches a passion derived, according to sociologists, from instincts of the animal herd or pack. Arouse this, and it is strong in proportion to its emptiness of concrete knowledge and experience. And it may be aroused by any of the words or phrases which have become associated with it—"Holy Russia," "Deutschland über alles," "Britons never, never, never will be slaves." These kinds of cries have only to be raised and any issue you like may be made one of national pride or honour or interest. You have only to suggest that it is such, and at least nine-tenths of the population will believe you. They like feeling strongly in that way, and they resent the attempt to show them, by a consideration of the facts, that the feeling in the

[1] What qualification is necessary for this statement will be found set forth below. It comes mainly under the heading "defence."

given case is absurd. It is thus that every attempt at international agreement, even the most obviously necessary and convenient, may be, and often is, opposed as a kind of treachery to the nation-pack. For example, when first an international postal convention was suggested, "Nationalists of all countries saw in the proposal a menace to national sentiment and national glory."[1] When an international agreement for wireless telegraphy was proposed, "the usual parochial cry of national interests was raised."[2] In such cases what raises the passion is not real reasons or real dangers, even though these be alleged. It is the abstract notion, almost the word, "the foreigner." Unless we realize the power of abstract conceptions and words to raise passion, we have not the key to the problem of international relations. For it is by rousing passion through words that small groups of men, knowing their own mind, maintain nations in a state of armed peace and precipitate them periodically into war.

We have to take along with us, then, in all our inquiry, this fundamental fact, that the actions of men are controlled more by passion than by reason; that passion is aroused by abstract notions and words; and that it thus becomes possible for men to sacrifice everything they have to causes which have no bearing on their real interests, whether material, moral, or spiritual. It is on these abstractions that most of the reasoning of international politics rests. And it is because of them that the reasoning, though so bad, passes muster; that the facts alleged in its support, though so false, are accepted; and that criticism and analysis beat in vain against structures of sophism as flimsy as any that have ever served to confine the spirit of man in the torture-house of his own misconceptions. Some of these chains of

[1] Woolf, *International Government*, p. 120.
[2] Ibid., p. 134.

false ideas we shall now proceed to examine, remembering always that they derive their apparent cogency from the element of passion that bears them up, and on which they float like seaweed.

In my criticism I shall subject them to one simple test, the same to which the Benthamites subjected domestic institutions, namely, their actual bearing upon human well-being. The importance of the service performed by this school to the theory and practice of politics has been obscured by more or less irrelevant discussions about hedonism. It is, in my judgment, quite true that pleasure is not the end of life. But any Government would have earned the gratitude of mankind if it could do even so much as to promote pleasure and diminish pain. And if we could get so far as to prevent Governments, in their handling of international relations, from accumulating on mankind evils inconceivable in their magnitude and unredeemed by any compensating good, we should have made an enormous step in human progress.

This general idea then, the subordination of international politics to the well-being of real men and women, will govern everything I have to say. I will now proceed to examine critically the causes why international war occurs, and the reasons alleged to show that it must occur.

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION

In a book by a Swedish writer[1] I find the following passage :—

> From this point of view, it is clear that wars, in the true sense, are a matter of States, not of individual men. . . . Historical events are influenced by free will, but taken by large and by long do not contradict the equal law of necessity. Wars appear as unheard-of revolutions, not to say as simply incomprehensible, so long as one applies to them the measure of the individual man; but the suffering of war must not be measured by the unrest of our hearts, but by the suffering of the State, for it is the need of the State that provokes them, not that of individual men. To such great events a merely anthropomorphic perspective is inadequate; the historian must elevate himself to a "planetary" point of view. But that demands of the historian the capacity to grasp the State as an independent super-individual personality, different in kind from the individual, even though it be essentially akin to him. Only he who can in this way set himself free from the prejudice and narrowness of the individual is in a position to form a scientific conception of war as an instrument of development.

This is a typical passage in illustration of the doctrine I am combating. Here is the flat assertion that the State is a personality "different in kind" from the individuals it controls. Here is the implication that its well-being has nothing to do with the well-being of real men and women; that their

[1] Dr. Rudolf Kjellen, *Die politischen Probleme des Weltkriegs.*

sufferings are irrelevant, and, of course, also their joys, their goodness, their badness, their intellectual, moral, or spiritual growth. The purposes of the State, we are told, are "super-individual." And when we ask *what* these purposes are, we are informed (in what follows) that they are "Sufficient extension," "Freedom of movement," and "The possibility of powerful union." To the defect of the various States in one or other of these respects the origin of the present war is traced.

I proceed to ask *why* the "State" requires any of these things; and if "It" does require them, why we, men and women, are to incur this frightful suffering in order to secure them for "It." And it becomes clear, on further reading (as far as anything becomes clear), that the State requires them in order that it may be great and strong. Well, how does this strength of the State react on the goodness or badness of its citizens, present or prospective? No answer, of course! For the question has never been asked. The premises adopted exclude the question. Let us, however, who are dealing with realities, that is, with men and women, insist upon asking: Why must the State be strong?

The first answer given is likely to be, "In order to defend itself from attack." So that, so far, we get the result that this war was inevitable in order that every State might become stronger for defence in some future war. This seems odd, at first sight. Let us, however, pursue it. And first let us take the simple and plausible view that every State felt that it was threatened by a stronger State, and desired at once to meet that danger in the present and to guard against it in the future by strategic advantages which it hoped to gain as a result of the war: Russia wanting, for that reason, Constantinople, Italy the control of the Adriatic, Germany a port on the North Sea or the Channel, Great Britain a control over the land route to India, and so on. Admit it,

if you like, and admit, what I do not dispute, that it is the real interest of citizens, and not merely of the super-individual State, that they should not be attacked, and successfully attacked, by another State, since that would involve them not only in all the losses of war, but in what they may judge to be worse, the loss of independence. But, then, why had any of these States to fear attack and therefore to develop strength?

The first answer is this: They all had to fear attack because they were all armed against it. This may seem to some readers a paradox, but on reflexion it will be seen to be self-evident. A principal cause of war is mutual fear and suspicion; and the fear and suspicion is due to the armaments. Increase of armaments for defence in any State is interpreted by the rest as increase for offence. None believes the statements or pledges of another; and the preparation against war comes to be itself nothing but a veiled form of war. It may well seem surprising that, in the face of this plain fact, the maxim is still current, among men supposing themselves to be realistic and practical, that the only way to keep the peace is to prepare for war. But in fact the source of the error is clear. These men look at the question exclusively from the point of view of their own nation. "We," they say in effect, "should never make a war, at any rate if we could get our way without it. We are a just people, and everything we want to get is just. If, therefore, we were so strong that nobody would dare to attack us, there would never be war. And as, in that case, we should always get our way, there would never be injustice. Moral: pile up armaments till you are demonstrably stronger than anybody else." "The present war," says this school, "would not have occurred if Great Britain had had a conscript army on the continental scale." This looks sound enough. But meantime people in every other

country are reasoning in precisely the same way. So that the doctrine, looked at all round, amounts to this: "The only way to keep the peace is for every State at the same time to be stronger than every other." The maxim thus becomes a flat absurdity as soon as every nation adopts it. But every nation does adopt it; with the result that you get an endless competition in armaments, an increasing strain, mental, moral, and physical, and finally, and in consequence of that strain, a breakdown into war. This is the plain truth of the matter. And the history of the past forty years, culminating in the war, is a sufficient illustration of it. Those who argue that the war would have been avoided if we had built up a conscript army, forget that the threat involved in such a policy would more likely have precipitated the war at an earlier date. Competing armaments must necessarily tend to produce war, unless and until some Power or alliance of Powers should establish a superiority so evident and insuperable that the attempt to cope with it should be abandoned as hopeless. But no such alliance of Powers would be likely to remain united for long. And no single Power could ever attain a position of undisputed supremacy. And if any Power or alliance of Powers should succeed in doing so, there would have been established precisely that hegemony over Europe which it has been the object of British policy for centuries to prevent. Every great Power tends to suppose that a peace established by its own supremacy would be the proper solution; for every Power supposes itself to be just, competent, and the representative of the highest form of civilization. We are like the rest in that respect. Only we do not happen to want the hegemony of Europe, since our Empire is beyond the seas. We content ourselves, therefore, with preventing any other Power from getting it, and for that reason among others it is not likely that any Power ever will get it. That being so,

one clear conclusion emerges. The way to peace, if any one really wants it, is not by piling up competing armaments, but either by putting them down by agreement or by putting them all jointly at the service of peace and law. That way, or no way! I do not believe any intelligent man with a competent knowledge of the facts could dispute that. And I revert to the statement with which I began this argument: the first and most obvious cause of war is the fact that States are armed, and armed against one another.

It is usual, however, for governments and nations to maintain that their own armaments are only for defence, whereas those of other nations are for aggression. And this is not necessarily hypocrisy, though of course it may be. For all States may really believe that they are on the defensive. But also, and at the same time, there is a common belief among statesmen and publicists that, in fact, some States, even perhaps all States, not only are, but must be, aggressive; and that for that reason, quite apart from the fears and misunderstandings fostered by the international anarchy, there must always be war. The necessity for war, in this view, is derived from the need States have to expand. And this need again seems to be regarded as in some sense "natural," like that for the expansion of water into steam at a certain temperature. On this idea a whole system of international politics is based. Imperialism is regarded as an "inevitable" phase in the history of nations. No sooner have they achieved independence than they must set out on a career of conquest. As an Italian writer (shade of Mazzini!) has put it, "Nationalism is only a step on the way to Empire." Nations, it seems to be thought, have no choice in the matter. Expansion is a fate, though a joyous and noble one. And those who oppose it are dreamers, sentimentalists, and whatever else is included in the ritual of abuse which these gentlemen

affect. This view of the relation of States appears to be so widely held that it will be worth while to examine it somewhat carefully.

We may notice, in the first place, that what lies behind the theory is passion, even when it pretends to rest on science; and the passion centres about the "State," abstractly conceived. The "State," it is thought, is a Being, that must grow like other beings. And with that Being the theorist identifies his own ego. He imagines himself growing with it, and in this vicarious expansion of his personality finds compensation for its actual limitations. It is this passion for expansion that gives plausibility and weight to arguments that, seen in a dry light, would appear at once in all their insufficiency.

The passion implies the judgment: "It is a good thing for States to expand." And I meet this statement at once with the question, Why? What particular people, when and where, are going to be benefited by the expansion, and in what way? What particular people are going to be, I will not say happier (since this school is apt to profess a contempt for happiness, at any rate for other people's), but better or nobler? Suppose that Russia takes Constantinople. How will that affect the Russian peasants? Will they be materially or morally or mentally or spiritually superior to what they are now? Is the ordinary British citizen a better man, because he is the citizen of an Empire, than his forefathers were in the reign of Elizabeth? Was the individual Roman citizen under Diocletian a better man than the contemporaries of Camillus? Is the individual Swiss on the average a worse man than the individual Briton? The answers to these questions would certainly be complicated and controversial. But at any rate the answer "Yes" is not self-evident. On the other hand, the "expansion" policy implies an unending

series of wars, each more terrible and destructive than the last, not only to the material but to the moral and spiritual life of men. Against this certain evil what certain good is to be set? I venture to say, none whatever. There are some problematical goods, in so far as it may be alleged that the civilization of one nation is "higher" than that of another. I shall consider that directly. Meantime, my point is that the questions I am asking are the only relevant questions, and that expansionists never ask them, or never ask them seriously. The truth is, that all that is in the mind of the ordinary literary or poetical or journalistic politician [1] is the pleasurable excitement that he feels at the idea that he belongs to something big and growing. It does not occur to him even to inquire how the policy he advocates affects the real life of the mass of men. He even feels that question to be a kind of insulting irrelevance. And, probably, if you could get a frank confession from him, it would run something like this: "We people, a few poets, a few journalists, a few aristocrats, a few soldiers, and others whom we can bully, cheat, or flatter to be our jackals in the hunt—we are the only people that really matter. If others do not share our ambition, so much the worse for them! Fortunately our position, our talents, our wealth give us power to put our policies into effect. We shall do so, regardless of pettifogging considerations about consequences. If you press the idle question as to what we think will be gained, we reply that we now, and people like us in the future, have, and will have, certain emotions which we cherish, and which we can only satisfy by a policy of expansion and war: and to satisfy these we are prepared to sacrifice anybody and anything else. This we

[1] The reader will understand that I am dealing here with the "romanticism" of expansion. The alleged "real" reasons are discussed later.

call idealism. To challenge it is to confess yourself a materialist. And there, if you please, let us leave this discussion, which is offensive to a gentleman and a man of honour."

It is not likely that any one except a modern misinterpreter of Nietzsche—as ignorant of politics as he is of life—would express himself in such words as the above. But the spirit of them is easily to be detected underlying the lucubrations of expansionists, whether in England, Germany, Russia, France, or Italy; and it is the influence of that spirit that gives apparent cogency to their arguments. Englishmen, I gladly concede, are less liable to such emotions, and less aware of them when they have them, than more imaginative and romantic peoples. But we are considering the general motives of the policy of expansion. And I say, with some confidence, that, among the few who stir the many to action, this kind of feeling is a real, if unavowed motive. But, equally clearly, it is the motive of a minority; and one which, if it were frankly expounded, as I have expounded it, would be dismissed with ridicule and contempt by the mass of every nation. It certainly does not constitute an irresistible popular obsession, against which reason and humanity must always struggle in vain. Policies of expansion do not originate among the masses, they originate among the few. And those few are inspired by the romantic passion I have characterized.

This passion they sometimes support by the theory that the civilization of their State is so superior to that of all others that it is a duty to mankind to impose it by force on the world. This view has been expressed with unusual frankness by recent German writers. But it must not be supposed that it is peculiar to Germans. It may be found underlying the Imperialism of all nations. The English Chamberlain was as much a believer in it as the German

Chamberlain. And it is a Scot who writes: "If I were asked how one could describe in a sentence the general aim of British Imperialism during the last two centuries and a half, I should have to answer: 'To give to all who come within its sway the power to look at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the standpoint of an Englishman."[1] Panslavism is as sure that the salvation of the world depends on its domination by Russia as Pan-Germanism is that it depends on its domination by Germany. And it is in the following passage by a great Russian writer that I seem to find expressed better than anywhere else the real spirit of all these movements:—

> Is it not thus, like the bold troïka which cannot be overtaken, that thou art dashing along, O Russia, my country? The roads smoke beneath thee, the bridges thunder; all is left, all will be left behind thee. The spectator stops short, astounded as at a marvel of God. Is this the lightning which has descended from heaven? he asks. What does this awe-inspiring movement betoken? And what uncanny power is possessed by these horses, so strange to the world? Ah, horses, horses, Russian horses! What horses you are! Doth the whirlwind sit upon your manes? Doth your sensitive ear prick with every tingle in your veins? But lo! you have heard a familiar song from on high; simultaneously in friendly wise you have bent your brazen breasts to the task; and hardly letting your hoofs touch the earth, you advance in one tightly stretched line flying through the air. Yes, on the troïka flies, inspired by God! O Russia, whither art thou dashing? Reply! But she replies not; the horses' bells break into a wondrous sound; the shattered air becomes a tempest, and the thunder growls; Russia flies past everything else on earth; other peoples, kingdoms, and empires gaze askance as they stand aside to make way for her.[2]

I cite this passage for the reason that it gives, more purely than anything else I have come across, the "idealistic"

[1] Cramb, *Germany and England*, p. 125. For further English citations, see J. M. Robertson, *The Germans*, chap. i.

[2] Gogol, *Dead Souls*. I am not responsible for the translation.

side of this passion to spread one's Kultur. The passion, it is clear, is simple, naïve, and instinctive. The man wants to see his country "first." First in what, and for what? Ah, that question he has not asked! Being a poet, and not a philosopher, he gives the whole case away by admitting, almost boasting, that he has not the least idea where Russia is going. The point is, that she should go fast, and that all other nations should have to stand out of her way. Well, that is, at bottom, the main inspiration of patriotic Imperialism. Afterwards, when it seems necessary to give arguments, people begin looking for something plausible to say about the ways in which their nation is superior. But they feel it to be superior long before they have inquired whether it is really so. They feel it to be so, because they belong to it, and what they belong to must be superior. The foreigner, not being under this illusion about any nation except his own, sees through and exposes these pretensions of others. But he advances similar claims about his own people. It is, indeed, true that different nations have different merits, and that, in this or that respect, one is superior to another. But, on the whole and altogether, this idea of superiority is an illusion of egotism. Nations can no more appraise themselves justly than individuals can: less, indeed; for men give free vent to their collective vanity, and even regard it as a virtue, while they are aware of the danger and absurdity of personal conceit. We can all see this truth, when we listen to the self-applause of other nations. The whole civilized world is laughing at the way the Germans talk of themselves. And justly. But one may well doubt whether even the much soberer and finer plea for Anglo-Saxon civilization put forward by the writers of the *Round Table* would be read without a smile by foreigners. The plain truth is that a comparison between

nations that have attained to stable government is so complicated, and so subject to the idiosyncrasies and preferences of the person judging, that no conclusions from it could ever be anything more than interesting. As far, indeed, as the Western nations are concerned, their achievements resemble one another far more than they differ. These nations are constantly interacting and borrowing from one another. And the notion that any one of them is even so different from the others (to say nothing of superiority) that the conquest of the rest by it, were that even conceivable, would seriously affect the whole nature of European civilization, is really preposterous. What we have is simply Western civilization; and we shall continue to have it, unless we destroy it by internecine strife. Its character does not depend on whether any, or which, of its component nations exercises any temporary hegemony.

When we turn to the East, it is different. The civilization of India, or of China, or of Egypt, is radically different from that of the West. But he would be a rash man who would say simply that one is "higher" than the other. The spectacle of Europe at this moment is not calculated to impress a Confucian, or a Buddhist, or a Brahman, or a Mahommedan, with the superiority of the West. The life of Manchester or Sheffield is not demonstrably nobler than that of Benares. And the German or French peasant is not obviously a finer creature than the peasant of China or Japan. These questions of comparative merit are indeed not uninteresting to discuss. But it is clear beforehand that no certainly true conclusions can be arrived at. And for nations, as for individuals, the only sound rule for practice is to give to each one the best possible chance to develop freely, subject to the equal freedom of others. This rule would be easier

and simpler to apply to nations than to individuals, though it is subject to limitations which I shall notice presently. The opposite policy, of imposing one's civilization by force on the rest, is as false in ideal as it is chimerical in practice. Germany could not, if she would, impose "her" civilization on the rest of the Western world. Why, Rome even could not impose hers on Greece; rather the contrary happened. Nor have the English imposed theirs on India. They have made only a confusion of both. And a serious observer will draw from that case many grave doubts as to the advantages of the conquest and government of one people by another, even when all has been said that can be said (and it is much) on behalf of the order and material development that has resulted from the conquest.

The true way for one civilization to "conquer" another is for it to be so obviously superior in this or that point that others desire to imitate it. The Germans have had successes enough of this kind, and they would have had more if they had abstained from war. The more they try to bully other people, the less will these recognize even the real merits that they have. It is these simple facts about human nature that they are so curiously unable to appreciate. If they really have a gospel of "organization" to preach (to me it seems the poorest gospel ever put forward), they may be sure that it will have its success, without their attempting to impose it by armies. It will have all the success it deserves. And it ought not to want to have any more. And so with the English. What is our real success in the world? Not, I venture to think, our "Empire," but our practice of self-government, which has made way over the greater part of the civilized world, not by conquest but by its intrinsic merits. What is the real triumph of France? Not Morocco, nor Tunis, still less the transitory and disastrous conquests of Louis XIV or of Napoleon,

but the prestige, and the deserved prestige, of French culture. All good things propagate themselves by imitation; and, so far as I know, one good thing only can be propagated by force, and that is order.

And this brings me to the one clear exception to all I have been saying. When a people cannot establish a stable political system; when it lives by raiding its neighbours; when its internal confusions spread beyond its borders to better organized communities; when it occupies territory rich in valuable materials which it cannot utilize itself, and will not let others utilize; then it cannot claim the right to free and independent development. In these cases I do not deny a "right of conquest." But having said this, I must add that the way in which conquests have in fact been achieved, the motives, and many of the results, constitute an indelible stain upon the record of the white race. Never has any nation intervened in any country genuinely and solely in the joint interest of the native inhabitants and of civilization as a whole. Motives of egoistic exploitation and acts of hideous oppression and cruelty have been almost everywhere the origin and result of intervention; and only by degrees, after the event, has some decent standard of administration, some concern for the well-being of the native population, grown up. Even in our own day we have seen the horrors of the Congo and of Putumayo.[1] And much as the English have learned by their own ill-record of the past, much as they may justly claim to have advanced in their ideals and their achievement, we have yet lived to see, in the midst of the war for freedom, a British Colonial Secretary return to the worst traditions of

[1] And, observe, the system of the French Congo was as bad as that of the Belgian. And British companies were responsible in the last resort for the atrocities of Putumayo.

mercantilism, and initiate a policy by which millions of natives are made to suffer in order to put money into the pockets of British merchants.[1]

Nevertheless, bad as is the record of the European nations, it is impossible to maintain that Africa or America should have been left unsubdued and undeveloped. More questionably, the same may perhaps be said of some Eastern countries. So far as this is true, we may justify "expansion" for the sake of spreading civilization. But we cannot, for that reason, justify one civilized nation for making war upon another in order to seize its dependencies. It is indeed intelligible that a nation like Germany, arriving late in the field, should feel an ambition to try its hand at "civilizing," and a regret that the principal regions available for that purpose should have been already occupied by others. But to threaten or make international war, in order to seize from others that field of enterprise, is justifiable by no conceivable standard of international ethics. What have the nations of Europe to do, destroying one another in internecine conflict, in order that one rather than another may undertake the thankless and difficult task of developing dependencies inhabited by men of alien race, and risk in the process (as history shows that nations do risk) its own finer achievement at home? Any nation, one might think, would be thankful to be spared that dangerous duty (dangerous to a nation's soul), though a nation upon whom history has forced it has no right nor power to shirk it. But to go to seek it, in these days, by machine guns and mass-murder! Ask the people frankly what they think of that! Never was ideology so false as that which would plunge the world in war in order that one rather than another of the nations of Europe —all so inadequate to the task—should try its hand at solving this riddle of the Sphinx.

[1] See Notes and Illustrations to Chapter VII, p. 145.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 92.—Armaments as a Cause of War.

The view taken in the text about the effect of armaments is so self-evident that I can hardly imagine an intelligent man honestly disputing it. The contrary view, however, will always be maintained by those who, because they want war, want also preparations for war. Thus the *Morning Post* writes (January 2, 1915):—

"It is necessary for all patriots who do not believe in these material millenniums[1] to maintain unceasing vigilance and to preach constantly the truth that naval and military precautions are the only means yet devised to prevent war. . . .

"If this country had not been deluded and tempted into inadequate preparation and fancied security there might possibly have been no war at this time. We are paying now the heavy price which pacifists laid on the future. We shall have to pay a vast sum in lives and money which might have been saved in preparation."

The exact point of my disagreement with the *Morning Post* is that I hold that, while an international force might prevent war, a rivalry of national forces must produce it. But the truth is, as the rest of the article suggests (see above, p. 33), that the *Morning Post*, like the German romanticists of war whom I have already discussed, believes that war is itself the goal and ideal of nations, and that without it they must degenerate. I respect the honesty with which this newspaper has asserted its position. If we know who our opponents are, and what they really think, we can the better and the more honourably fight them.

As an extreme example of what I can only call the insanity of the militarist doctrine of arming to keep the peace, I cite the following from *Humanité*:—

"Let us away with these empty, senseless words, and organize our Army so that France can put nine million combatants in the field. She will be able to do that in forty years hence if, from to-day, the means are granted that I enumerated. Then France

[1] A "material" millennium seems to be one in which people do *not* use every kind of material weapon to destroy material bodies and things. A spiritual millennium, presumably, is one in which they do.

will be able to defy all attack, even that of all Europe combined" (cited from *Humanité* in the *Labour Leader* of October 26, 1916).

When France has nine million combatants in the field, how many will Russia have, or Germany? Nine million is about the whole adult male population of France. There could not be a better *reductio ad absurdum* of the fallacy of arming to keep the peace, so long as the international anarchy continues.

An armament manufacturer may fairly be supposed to have motives, other than a disinterested love of war, for supporting the popular fallacy. And one is not surprised to find Mr. Hudson Maxim reported as saying to the American public:—

"The fighting among other nations has done much towards preparing us for war, and therefore much towards insuring international peace for us." He adds that, "If war is ever to be conquered, industry will be its conqueror."[1]

Perhaps. But hardly the armaments industry.

The fallacy, *Si vis pacem para bellum* has been exposed with exceptional vigour by "Roland" in *The Future of Militarism* (Fisher Unwin, 1916). The exposure would be final, if men could be moved by argument and reason. But it appears to be the boast of Mr. Oliver, against whose *Ordeal by Battle* "Roland's" book is directed, that neither he himself nor any other great man is so moved. I show some disinterestedness in recommending this book to the reader, for the author includes me in his denunciations. I only hope that Mr. Oliver does not feel as unscathed as I do!

Page 99.—Imperialism.

Italian Imperialists are as violent and aggressive as any German; and even when engaged in war for the "rights of small nations" they do not moderate their claims. In an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of October 10, 1916, we read as follows:—

"One of the most interesting political developments of recent years is the rapid ripening of Italian Imperialism. Crispi had the mentality and the ambitions of the Imperialist, but the disaster in Abyssinia drove Italy back to home problems. In the months preceding the Balkan Wars a little group of Imperialists began to make a renewed impression upon Italy. The Tripoli campaign was not

[1] See *New York Times Magazine*, July 11, 1915.

their work alone, but it definitely launched Italy on the path of expansion and automatically extended the influence of the Imperialists, a few of whom won their way into Parliament. The Imperialists fought hard to bring Italy into the war on the side of the Allies, and for that we have reason to be grateful to them. They have ever since been engaged in imparting to the Italian people a sufficiently extensive vision of its Imperial future. The quality of Italian Imperialism does not differ materially from that of other brands, although it has a pronounced aroma of futurism. The interesting thing about it is its programme, or rather, the claims it puts forward for Italy in the resettlement of the world. In the region of Epirus and in the matter of the islands of the Archipelago it has no tenderness for Greece. In Dalmatia it is suspicious of and hostile to the claims of the southern Slavs. It is worth noting that Signor Bissolati, the distinguished Italian Minister, has recently protested against pretensions and a temper which render difficult or even impossible a good understanding with Serbia. But the Italian Nationalist looks far beyond the Adriatic and the Ægean. The *Idea Nazionale* demands the whole coast of Asia Minor from Messina, near the Cilician Gates, round to the north of Smyrna, with the interior as far as the watershed of Anatolia; the southern coast of the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora as far as a point opposite Constantinople; the Yemen; a free hand in Abyssinia; and a rectification of frontiers in Tripoli and Somaliland. The Italian Imperialist, it will be seen, takes a comprehensive survey, and is not deterred by the prospect of conflict with other Powers. There is no reason to suppose that he has succeeded in endowing the Italian Government with so ambitious a programme, but a skilful and persistent agitation can usually count on some success with the man in the street."

In further illustration, see the quotations from the *Idea Nazionale* in the *Cambridge Magazine* for October 28, 1916.

Lord Northcliffe is quoted in the *New York Times* as saying:—

"England and Germany know that there is something more than a continental land war at issue, great as that is, and that there is a racial mastery at stake—the Saxon or the Teuton—which civilization will go forward in the future or which backward? Both of them cannot go forward together as in the past."

Compare with this the *Daily Mail* at the Fashóda crisis, urging England to "roll France in blood and mud."

There is only one stable idea in Lord Northcliffe's political philosophy: the superiority of the English to everybody else. The other nations take rank, from time to time, as they are our allies or our enemies. On this whole subject it is worth while to cite the following from Jaurès: "The fatherland, in absorbing or rather exalting individual egotisms into a great collective egotism, too often covers with a semblance of generosity the most brutal cupidities. Men may have the illusion that they are serving justice when they are sacrificing themselves for the interests, even the unjust interests, of a Force in which they are included, but which is infinitely stronger than they. Hence blind zeal and brutal maxims. Hence the adhesion given, even by superior minds, to the detestable formula: 'My country right or wrong.'" —Jaurès, *L'Armée nouvelle*, p. 452.

CHAPTER VI

THE GROWTH OF POPULATION AS A CAUSE OF WAR

THE motives for expansion which I have dealt with so far may be called ideological. They consist of ideas in people's minds, suggested and reinforced by the passions of collective egotism. If, and so far as, they have affected policy, they have done so through no pressure of fact and need, but only through their infectious appeal to an undisciplined imagination. But it will now be urged that the "real" motives of policy are not of this kind; that it is ineluctable facts that impel statesmen and nations; and that "expansion" is a natural necessity rather than a human ambition. Well, let us examine this.

I will first refer briefly to an argument which weighs much with soldiers and statesmen. Owing to the danger of war in the present condition of international anarchy, defence becomes an absorbing preoccupation. But one aspect of defence is strategic frontiers; and to secure these nations will use and even make wars. Thus, for example, sentiment apart, one reason why Russian statesmen desire to occupy Constantinople is that they may be able in time of war to send a fleet into the Mediterranean. It is with a view to the contingency of war that Italy

desires to dominate the Adriatic. It was, in part at least, for military purposes that Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine. But no such annexations can be made without war, and they usually prepare the way for another war. So that, actually, men provoke war in order to guard against the risks of war. The absurdity of this needs only to be pointed out to be self-evident. But it will continue so long as the international anarchy continues. For that anarchy engenders fear of attack, and fear of attack provokes attack. It is that fear that will be a principal obstacle when we set to work to reorganize international relations. Meantime, there is no "natural" necessity about all this: it is a result of a state of things which we could cure if we liked.

But, says the objector, there is, nevertheless, a natural necessity behind war. Well, what is this necessity?

One answer is, the increasing pressure upon subsistence, due to increasing population. Here we really do seem at last to have a cause for war which may be called "real." Let us examine it.

Given that a nation or a State is confined to a given territory, and that its numbers increase in every generation, the time must come, it would seem, when the territory will not suffice to maintain the people, and some of them must emigrate or starve. But unless there is unoccupied territory of the right kind available they will have to invade that occupied by other people. And if these people in turn already require what they occupy for their own sustenance, they will resist this invasion by force. In other words, there will be war. Put in its simplest terms, this is the case for the necessity of expansion by war.

Now, I do not deny that we have here a case for war of a quite different kind from that which we have

hitherto been examining. For we have come down to a fundamental instinct for life, which affirms itself at all costs, defiant of all arguments, and indifferent to all consequences. The disturbances and conflicts that filled long ages of history were due to shortage of food and consequent migrations. Men will fight rather than starve, and they will see others starve before they starve themselves. Agreed.

But now, in the modern world, does that case occur, and need it occur? That it does occur, or need, on the continents of Europe, America, or Australia will not, I believe, be affirmed by any instructed man. Two facts are always operating to prevent it. One is the development of industrial technique, both of machinery and of organization, by which it has become possible to support, on a given area, an increasing population in increasing comfort. This development has, no doubt, been seriously hampered and limited in its beneficent effects by war and preparation for war. For armed conflicts in our own time, so far from being a way of getting subsistence, are a way of destroying it on an enormous scale. But even so, the outstanding fact of the last century is increasing population within a given area accompanied by increasing wealth. It is only our imperfect system of distribution which masks this fact—a system which every international war makes it more difficult to improve. The case of Germany affords a very interesting example of this general truth. Some years ago there was a considerable emigration from that country to the United States, and German Imperialists were crying that Germany must have colonies wherein to settle her "surplus population." Since then, by the development of industry, emigration has been more than balanced by immigration. That particular case for a war policy has thus disappeared,

and the advocates of war have had to fall back upon a different kind of argument.

It may, however, be reasonably replied that this process cannot continue indefinitely; that the conditions that have prevented population from outstripping subsistence are transitory, and in fact are rapidly passing away; and that with the filling up of America, Australia, and New Zealand, and the progressive exhaustion of the soil and of its raw materials throughout the world, it is a question of time, and perhaps but a short time, before men will once more be driven to fight one another for subsistence. That the fat years we have been enjoying for a century may pass, will not, I suppose, be denied. All the more is the pity that we waste their resources in war instead of husbanding them for the lean years. But to suppose that we must therefore revert to a primitive struggle for existence is to ignore another great factor. One of the most striking and important facts of the modern era is the deliberate control of the birth-rate. The population of France has long been stationary for that reason. The increase in all countries called civilized is becoming less and less in proportion as they become civilized. So that it would seem that if in future we cannot adapt subsistence to population we ought to be able to adapt population to subsistence. This is a point of the utmost importance, and deserves careful and frank consideration not only by experts but by every ordinary citizen, and especially by the clergy and others whose business it is to instruct the public.

The population question is, in fact, by way of settling itself, if only it is allowed to do so. But this process, so necessary if we are ever to have a civilization in which a life worth living shall be possible for the mass of men and women and children, is constantly threatened and attacked

by what passes in the newspapers for public opinion and in the pulpits for religion. I cannot here attend to all the arguments advanced against the limitation of the birth-rate. I am concerned with the question only in so far as it bears upon international war. And in this connexion, very briefly, the circle of argument is this :—

MILITARIST : Since our population is expanding, we must expand our territory, and that we can only do by war.

PACIFIST : But look at the facts. The rate of increase of our population is steadily diminishing, and so is that of all other civilized countries. We may look forward, therefore, with some confidence to a condition of stationary population in all Western States, and consequently to a really progressive society, delivered once for all from the two great scourges of mankind—poverty and war.

MILITARIST : What ! The population tending to become stationary? We must stop that !

PACIFIST : My dear sir, why?

MILITARIST : Why? Because otherwise we shall be short of fighting-men.

PACIFIST : But I was arguing that there was no necessity for war.

MILITARIST : No necessity? What tomfoolery !

PACIFIST : But where is the necessity?

MILITARIST : The pressure of population.

This brief imaginary dialogue sums up volumes of controversy. If the reader will keep his attention fixed on the point in future, when he comes across these discussions, he will find that much of the apparent cogency of the argument for war depends upon the same people holding at the same time both the view that there must be war because the population increases and the view that the population must increase in order that there may be soldiers for war. It would be tedious to dwell further on this absurdity, although the mere exposure of it will do little to prevent its continued currency. But there remain some arguments

in connexion with this question of population which require more serious attention.

Just as, within the limits of a single State, it is the fact that the diminution of the birth-rate is greatest among the well-to-do and least among the very poor, so with nations it is among those whose civilization is materially the most prosperous that the population tends to become stationary, and among those that in this respect are more primitive that it tends to increase up to the limit of subsistence. We thus get the fear that the pressure of population in a "backward" nation may drive them to make war on a more "advanced one, and that the very fact of the greater population of the former may give it the victory. It appears that Germans are constantly haunted by this spectre in regard to Russia.

But there seems to be no valid ground for the fear. For, however great may be the increase of the Russian population, in any period to which it is reasonable to look forward, it will not outstrip the possibilities of support on that enormous, rich, and undeveloped territory. If Russia is now an aggressive Power,[1] it is not through pressure of population, but through that obsession of power and size with which I have already dealt. If, on the other hand, we look forward to a time at which, if the present rate of increase were to continue, Russia would really be over-populated, we must remember that by then, it is reasonable to suppose, the same checks will have begun to operate there that are now operative in the Western nations. The view, then, that the proportionally greater increase of the Russian population constitutes in itself a menace to other countries seems to be unfounded. The real menace of Russia, like that of Germany, lies in the ambitions and illusions of its governing class.

But, further, even granting that any nation may, in

[1] This was written before the Russian revolution.

certain cases and for certain periods of time, really be in danger of over-population, why should that lead to war? What is to prevent the "surplus" population from emigrating elsewhere, so long, at least, as there is not general over-population over the whole world—a contingency which, for the reasons given above, we need not contemplate, unless we deliberately provoke it by our unwisdom.

Two answers are given to this question. One is the objection some nations feel to "losing" their population by emigration. Here, it must be remarked at the outset, we have left the region of "natural" necessity and have come back to ideas in people's heads. Ideas, too, which are so modern that it is difficult to accord them any value but a transitory one of fashion. For years and decades after the British Colonies in America threw off British allegiance, British and German subjects emigrated thither, to the great advantage and satisfaction alike of the emigrants, of the country to which they went, and of the country they left. Only in comparatively recent years has it become the fashion to stigmatize as undesirable and unpatriotic this natural and wholesome process. Why is it now questioned and attacked?

One reason is that governments object to losing potential soldiers. And here we get another instance of the circular argumentation of militarists:—

MILITARIST: We must have war in order to seize territory so that our emigrants may remain under our own flag.

PACIFIST: But why should they remain under your own flag?

MILITARIST: Because we require them for soldiers.

PACIFIST: But why do you require them for soldiers?

MILITARIST: Because of the war we intend to make to seize the territory.

PACIFIST: But you said that the reason for seizing the territory was that there was going to be a war. And now you say——

MILITARIST: Oh stop this logic-chopping and think in continents!

Apart from this mere confusion, however, it is urged that it is the duty of every State and every citizen to perpetuate and expand the national type of civilization. So that Germans, for instance, going to America and becoming transformed by American habits and institutions, are thought to become, though it be involuntarily, traitors to their own national tradition. I have already dealt with this form of militant nationalism, and I will not repeat what has been said above.

But there is another point to be taken here. We have dealt with the quite recent and, let us hope, transitory objections offered by governments and "public opinion" to the emigration of their citizens to lands under a foreign flag. We have now to notice the objection on the part of these countries to receiving immigrants. These are much more formidable. They are, in the first place, economic. The population of a new and rich country with a high standard of life will, or may, object to being "flooded" by immigrants who will undersell their labour at wages which, to the older settlers, do not constitute a decent living-wage. Whether, or at what point, this natural resistance will go so far as seriously to restrict immigration, will depend on the special circumstances. In the United States, up till now, the arrival of new drafts of pauper labour has been accompanied by a moving of the earlier settlers up and out into other more highly paid occupations. But this cannot go on indefinitely; and there are signs that the traditional hospitality of the United States to immigrants from Europe may be very seriously restricted in the near future. It is, however, difficult to imagine such restrictions being made a cause of war between the white nations, unless an unrestricted fertility, encouraged by religion, law, and public opinion, should take the place of the present adaptation of population to subsistence, and

at the same time unjust social institutions, bad education, and false traditions should continue to hamper the development of industry and agriculture. All this, conceivably, may happen, and may produce a real local over-population, which again may lead to desperate efforts to get access by war to the wealth of more favoured and more intelligent communities. Nations so situated would no doubt be likely to lose any war in which they might engage. But they might be driven to attempt the enterprise. They would be so driven, however, not by any necessity of nature or any fundamental condition of human life, but by a policy, at once stupid and base, of which their waste of wealth on armaments would be an important and essential part. If they have war for that cause, that will be their own fault and choice. It will be due, once more, to wrong ideas and ideals, and not to "natural" necessity.

But, besides the economic objection to receiving immigrants, there is another still more serious. There is the bar of colour. We are back here once more upon something like a "natural" fact. If people are too much and too obviously different from one another they find it hard to live on equal terms in the same community. And in the case of immigration from the East into America or Australasia or South Africa, the economic motive is reinforced by an objection, in many people perhaps instinctive, to men of a different colour. What proportional part is really played in this antagonism by the economic and by the colour motive respectively, we need not here attempt to estimate. The result, at any rate, is a solid block-feeling of resistance, which may have good biologic justification, and in any case may be an insuperable obstacle to immigration from the East to the West. Now, if the populations of India, China, and Japan are already pressing, or will press in the future, upon subsistence within their own

boundaries, and if they are forbidden all access to rich and under-populated countries, we shall have really one of those cases for war which look like natural necessity. It must be observed, however, that this problem is not insoluble, though it is very difficult. The intercourse between East and West takes already, and will progressively take, the form of the exploitation of the natural resources of the East by Western capital, enterprise, and skill. In proportion as this is done—and it is, of course, already being done on an enormous scale—those countries will be able to support a larger population. They will become more prosperous; and it is only reasonable to suppose that prosperity will induce among them, what it has induced in Europe and America, a decline in the birth-rate and a tendency towards a stationary population. This result no doubt will be delayed in the East by religious and social custom, in particular by that institution of ancestor-worship which makes it a moral duty to have as many sons as possible. But these religious and social customs are undergoing decline through contact with the West and need not be expected to offer a long resistance to the tendencies that show themselves wherever industrialism has spread.

We need not therefore look forward to an inevitable conflict between East and West in some nearer or remoter future, even if we accept as final and irreducible the present attitude of the Western nations, whereby they claim to monopolize to themselves and their descendants the whole of the comparatively under-peopled Western world, and to confine the Orientals, however overcrowded they may be, to regions in which they do at times actually perish from insufficient nourishment. This inequity should correct itself as a result of Western enterprise in the East. And meantime, it should be possible by temporary

transactions to meet the existing emergency. To pass from the consideration of this real and difficult but quite specific problem to grandiose imaginations of inevitable armed conflicts for existence between East and West, is merely to indulge a hectic and untutored imagination under the pretence of realistic reasoning. But all militarists are romanticists, even when they are professors. Their imagination revels in the idea of war. And they are predetermined, in all their inquiries, to come out with a demonstration that war is inevitable, and an exhortation to regard it as therefore admirable.

Finally, and as the conclusion of this whole matter, if the supply of food to the world is really going to be a difficult problem, the most hopeful way to solve it is for all nations to co-operate in the effort, and, as a first step, to cease diverting from production to destruction a great part of their capital, labour, and intelligence. This really is the last word, brief though it be. And I do not see that it needs further elaboration. Internationalism lies as inevitably on this line of approach as it does on every other. Internationalism is common sense. War is insanity.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 109.—Over-population as a Cause of War.

The ordinary journalistic way of regarding increase of population as a necessary cause of war is well illustrated by the following passage from the *National Review* :—

"Germany must expand. Every year an extra million babies are crying out for more room, and as the expansion of Germany by peaceful means seems impossible, Germany can only provide for those babies at the cost of potential foes, and France is one of them." (Cited in *War and Peace*, December 1916, p. 41.)

The argument that we must increase our population, explicitly with a view to the next war, has naturally been made prominent during the war. Thus, for example, Mr. Herbert Samuel is reported as saying :—

"Now, the war has made us realize that it is the mass of a people that tells, and that the security of our own civilization depends not only on the quality and efficiency, but on the quantity of our people.

"It is the rapid growth of her population, which has increased during ten years by 8½ against our 3½ millions—that has given Germany her aggressive power; and if we would hold our own when this war is over and compensate for the war waste that has taken place, we must take measures to increase and multiply our own people." (Cited in the *Malthusian* of February 15, 1916, from a speech at the Guildhall.)

This dismal perspective of an infinite series of wars might seem rather to be a reason why no children at all should be produced and the human race should put an end to its tragic existence. But of course it is possible to hold that population may continue to increase without becoming in itself a cause of wars owing to an actual struggle for food. Thus Sir J. Crichton-Browne, while advocating an increase of population, says :—

"The bugbear of the exhaustion of our accessible coal-fields need not frighten us. Science will yet open up to us new sources of available energy. The food problem need cause no alarm, for Canada is increasing her wheat production greatly in excess of our consumption. The country is not overcrowded as a whole, although congested in certain areas, and with suitable redistribution will carry many more human beings than it now does."

This may be true. But on the other hand, Dr. Pierson, the famous Dutch economist, writes : "No improvement in the economic situation can be hoped for if the number of births be not considerably diminished."

Professor Taussig, the American economist, writes :—

"It is clear that restraint on the increase of numbers is one essential of improvement. Stated in this way, the Malthusian position is impregnable."

Dr. Warren Thompson, of the University of Michigan, says :—

"The conditions which made possible the unprecedented expan-

sion of the European peoples in the last fifty years are passing away."[1]

I pronounce no opinion on the question of fact, for I am not competent to pronounce one. Nothing, I should suppose, can be more difficult than to form a true estimate of the amount of population the world may be able to support in reasonable comfort at some future time; for many of the factors, and especially the factor of technical invention and organization, must be incalculable. Granting, however, that we did really have to contemplate in some future an actual insufficiency of food on the earth for all the people on it, then, though that situation might lead to war, war would not assist it; unless war meant, as it has meant in the past, the actual extermination of the whole of one nation by another. This is an unlikely contingency, except in the case of mere savages, attacked by men equipped with all the resources of modern science. If Germany (say) and Russia fought one another for food (or the basis of food, raw materials and land), both nations would lose a great part of their population. There might be (it does not follow that there would be) a slight temporary let-up in the pressure of population on food. But unless the increase of population were otherwise checked in both nations, the pressure would quickly begin again. The last reply to this will be: "The Germans then (supposing them to be victors) must systematically exterminate the Russians." *À la bonne heure!* We see whither this logic is leading us. And I ask, in all seriousness, if that extreme contingency should really threaten mankind, would it not be better that all nations alike should gradually die off, by a voluntary limitation of population, as it became more and more impossible for them to maintain themselves on the earth? In other words, the position of the extreme pessimists as to the exhaustion of the food supplies of the earth leads, in all reason and humanity, not to a series of wars which would have to be literally wars of extermination, if they were to be effective for their purpose, but to an extreme application of the practice of voluntary restraints on population. I write this to finish the argument, not because I have yet found any reason to believe that this extreme form of pessimism is justified.

[1] I take these quotations from the able article on the subject in the *Cambridge Magazine*, June 3, 1916. The article has been reprinted, with the title *Fecundity versus Civilization*, by Adelyne More (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.).

I cannot forbear to note, in this connexion, because it is so characteristic of the militarist bias when it enters into a German professor, that in an interesting and intelligent article a certain professor, Dr. Branca, after discussing elaborately the possibilities of increasing food supplies, and concluding that the principal hope lies in chemistry, and that an artificial synthesis of food-stuffs might indefinitely postpone any real shortage, even with a population continually increasing, adds (lest any one should derive from this some hope that wars may cease) that there are *other* forms of hunger than hunger for food, namely, "Land-hunger, Power-hunger, Gold-hunger"! He then refers to wars caused by these foolish and superfluous desires as "struggles for existence," infers that they are "inevitable," and concludes that any German who doesn't want to annex territory is guilty of a "crime against the German people." With such bad-natured stupidity is "science" compatible! (See *Europäische Staats- und Wirthschaft-Zeitung*, August 25, 1916.)

The question of the control of population in connexion with civilization and war is treated by Mr. Havelock Ellis in an article published in the *Nation* of September 25, 1915. He concludes that "the arrest of the falling birth-rate, it cannot be too often repeated, would be the arrest of all civilization and all humanity."[1]

Page 118.—Immigration from Eastern Countries to America.

As a practical policy for regulating immigration from Eastern countries to the United States, Professor Gulick suggests that the immigration in any given year be limited to one-fifth of the number of natives of the country in question already naturalized as American citizens. This, he thinks, would ensure that the new-comers will be duly assimilated to American manners and institutions by their countrymen, already themselves assimilated. (See "Two Addresses" on a new *Immigration Policy and the American-Japanese Problem*, by Professor Sidney L. Gulick, pp. 27 and 34.) Professor Gulick, the reader should remember, has resided many years in Japan, and is a deservedly respected authority on that country.

[1] The article is reprinted in *Essays in War Time* (Constable).

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC COMPETITION AS A CAUSE OF WAR

I HAVE argued, in the preceding chapter, that a sober examination of the plain facts gives little support to the idea that in the modern world pressure of population on subsistence need drive men to war. If we consider, in the first place, the great industrially developed nations that are now at war, there can be no question about this. They do not suffer from over-population ; and, if they did, their remedy would be to improve their social institutions and their industrial technique, or to adjust their population to their resources. Science, not war, is the only way to deal with the problem, in the present or the future. But while war cannot solve it, it can and does make the solution more difficult. For war destroys both capital and labour on an enormous scale; and preparation for war diverts them continually to the creation of means to destroy themselves. If nations really directed their policy with a view to subsistence, they would scrap all their armaments. From an economic point of view, there is nothing to be said for war, and everything to be said against it.

On the other hand, it may be urged with truth that it is important, with a view to subsistence, to develop all the resources of the earth ; and it may be assumed that this can only be done if the industrially developed nations

make war on the industrially undeveloped, in order to exploit the resources the latter control. That is certainly the way the thing has been done in the past, and it would be idle now to discuss whether it might not have been done otherwise; whether, for example, men of the Livingstone type might not have civilized Africa without force; and whether war was the best and only possible way of opening China to Western influence. But, in any case, that necessity for war is already past. Every part of the world is under the influence or dominion of some Western or Westernized Power; and if the civilized Powers did not quarrel among themselves as to which of them should wield that influence, war need no longer arise over the issue between "civilized" and "uncivilized" peoples.

"But that is precisely what the Powers do quarrel about." They do. But why do they? Because their ideas and their policies are mistaken, not because any natural necessity drives them. So I shall argue in this chapter.

The economic development of nations is often held, by those who regard war to be "inevitable," both to be itself a kind of war and necessarily to lead up to real war. This is one aspect of the "expansion" theory. There is no room, it is thought, for everybody to take part in the production and exchange of wealth. The nations, therefore, in this competition impinge and press upon one another; and then they must fight—for space, as it were, and air. Let us examine carefully this rather curious notion.

First, trade between nations is regarded as being itself a kind of war between them. This, on the face of it, is a very odd idea. So far, indeed, as trade is competition, it may by a metaphor be called war, just as, if any one likes, he may say there is "war" between two football teams. But the war, in the case we are considering, is not between the two countries engaged. It is a struggle

of foreign producers against home producers, to the benefit of home purchasers. The point, though it is simple and obvious, is so commonly misunderstood that it is worth while to labour it a little. "Germany," we say, trades with "England" and "England" with "Germany." But what really happens is much more complicated. First, some German producers compete in British markets with some British producers, and some British producers compete in German markets with some German producers. And these rival producers in both countries may be said (if you like) to be at war, and to be injuring one another. On the other hand, it is by selling to British purchasers that the German producers injure (if they do injure) the British producers, and it is by selling to German purchasers that the British producers injure (if they do injure) the German producers. In either case, the purchasers, British or German, are benefited. The German importers cannot injure British producers except by the process of benefiting British purchasers. There is simply no other way of doing it. And vice versa. Thus, to cut off this trade would be, it is true, to prevent the German importers from injuring the British producers. But also it would prevent them from benefiting the British purchasers. If, then, a tariff is a "war" measure, it is one which injures ourselves as well as the supposed enemy.

Further, these British purchasers who benefit by the German imports are themselves very commonly producers. In that case the German imports are the raw material for British industry. Thus, in injuring one class of British producers, the German importers are benefiting another class. So that to cut off that trade is to sacrifice the interests of one set of British producers to those of another. We cannot wage war against German trade without waging it also against British trade.

Secondly, the German producer cannot sell in England without buying from England, directly or circuitously. And in thus buying he is benefiting British sellers, and, if the sellers are manufacturers, is benefiting British manufactures. It is thus impossible for the German importer to injure one class of British producers without benefiting another; and equally impossible for the British to cut off German imports without injuring one class of British producers while benefiting another.

It is clear, therefore, that to conceive foreign trade as a war between the countries engaging in it is to misconceive it altogether. It is a contest between some members of the various countries concerned, resulting in the benefit of other members of those countries. And to import into the controversy about tariffs this prejudice that an importer is an "enemy" implies either confusion or dishonesty. The issue is between the rival interests of producers and purchasers in the home country; and on that ground alone it ought to be considered and decided, so long as we confine ourselves to the national point of view. When it is so considered I believe myself that the argument for free trade is unassailable. But that controversy I leave to the economists.

In general, perhaps, the candid reader will agree with this statement. But he may put in certain demurrers. Thus he may urge that, though international trade is not even by metaphor "war" between the nations taking part in it, it is nevertheless a "kind of war" between sets of traders in the different nations, and that in this war things are done which are "unfair" and injurious and ought to be stopped. Thus, for example, nations are apt to complain that other nations "dump" goods upon them and to ask for special protection against this practice. Now, there is a case here for investigation and possibly

for regulation. The investigation is required, first to get a clear notion as to what is meant by "dumping"—whether it is merely selling abroad at a lower price than you sell at home, or selling below cost price, or doing either of these things with a view to "capturing" the market and then putting up the prices—which would seem to involve a difficult inquiry into motives and intentions. Secondly, the investigation would have to ascertain whether the trade of the nation did or did not stand, on the whole, to lose by such dumping. If it should be proved that it did, there would be a preliminary case made out for regulation. But such regulation, as I shall argue later,[1] should be international in character, so that those practices and those only may be prohibited which all nations agree to be pernicious, and the existence of such practices may not be made an excuse for tariff wars, as disastrous to the prosperity of the individual nations as to the comity and peace of the world.

Again, it is arguable that an "invasion" of cheap goods injures labour by compelling employers at home to reduce their prices and therefore their wages. I cannot discuss here the complicated question as to the total gain and loss involved to particular classes and to a whole community by the entry of cheap goods from abroad. But clearly this is not a case of the interest of one nation being opposed to that of another. It is a question of a conflict of interests between classes and sections of the one nation, between producers and consumers, or between one set of producers and another. There might conceivably, in a given case, be arguments for a tariff which on balance would be sound. But it would be quite erroneous to regard such a tariff as a measure of "defence" directed against a "foreigner" who wants to do the nation an injury by trading with it. It is only by benefiting somebody in the nation that the

[1] See Chapter XII.

foreigner can injure anybody else. And his motive is no more to injure than it is to benefit his customers. His motive is to benefit himself.

I have spoken hitherto of direct trade between two countries. I now turn to the competition of two countries for the markets of a third. This is a different case. The purchasers in the country where the importers are competing will presumably benefit by the competition. But the competitors may injure one another if they are trading in the same goods. There is therefore, in this case, some sense in saying that the two countries concerned are carrying on a "trade war." If, for instance, Germans and British compete in China, and Germans get the best of it, no other British need be benefited, and the defeated British are injured. The situation, however, need not be, and commonly is not, as simple as that. For instance, in China German distributors have been ousting British. But what they distributed were British goods; and they captured that trade because they were more intelligent, more hard-working, and more enterprising than British distributors. British distributors were injured, but British manufacturers were benefited by this result. And, of course, wherever there is division of labour between the traders of different countries in the markets of a third, these traders may be presumed to be benefiting one another as well as the people of the country in which they operate. If, for example, Germans make railways in Shantung and British traders use them, the British are benefited no less than the Chinese by this German enterprise. This, at least, would always be true under that régime of the "open door" which Free Traders advocate. Under free trade conditions there is thus no general presumption that competition between the traders of different nations, even in the markets of a third, implies a "war" between them, in which the

one must succumb and the other survive. The very victory of the traders of one country in one branch of activity may mean a victory for traders or manufacturers of the other country in another branch. So that we must not presume that, for example, the exclusion of German competition in the East or in our African Dominions would necessarily benefit British trade.

The general truth of what has here been urged will hardly be disputed. But I shall be met with a new objection. There is, I shall be told, one nation, Germany, which is not influenced solely by trade motives, but adopts a national policy whereby trade is used as an instrument of political "domination." It is not easy to deal with this charge, because the facts adduced in its support are so few and so questionable. Pamphleteers and journalists often speak as though the mere fact of commercial penetration, of lending money, of opening markets, and the like, though innocent and right when done by other nations, became an act of war when done by Germany. Thus I have seen it argued that the control by a German company of the lighting or the tramways of foreign cities constitutes a "domination." Yet it is never argued in England that the British Continental Gas Company "dominates" the German cities where it operates. It is not, however, necessary to my purpose to pursue this argument, because, if it be true that Germany, or any other country, perverts trade to political purposes, then we have a procedure not due to the nature of trade but simply to the desire to dominate. In other words, we have left the contention with which I am at present dealing, that war follows inevitably from the nature of commercial competition, and we are back upon that desire to dominate which I have already discussed. The trade war, in the case supposed is an episode in a war

decided upon for other reasons. The war is not the consequence of the trade; the methods of trade are a consequence of the war.

In this connexion I may deal briefly with another point. It is often urged that international trade, either in general or in some particulars, makes a nation "dependent" on others and so weakens it in case of war. Pushed to its furthest point, this argument would lead every nation to be completely self-supporting and to do no foreign trade at all, in order to be always prepared for war. The sheer impossibility of this for great commercial and manufacturing nations in the modern world rules it out of practical politics. But, of course, the prospect of war may reasonably suggest special measures to ensure "independence" in certain matters essential for war. But here, once more, the war is not produced or led up to by the trade. The trade is restricted because the war is supposed to be imminent on other grounds.

Look at it how we may, it seems clear that the competition of international trade, when pursued only for the sake of trade, is not a competition between nations to injure one another; that it implies mutual benefit, or it could not exist; and that, in fact, by the web of reciprocal interest and acquaintanceship which it spins all over the world and across the frontiers of all States, it is, if honourably pursued, a potent influence making for peace. It was thus, of course, that the early Free Traders saw it. Cobden was a hard-headed man, but he had his vision; and this is the far future to which he looked forward:—

I have been accused of looking too much to material interests. Nevertheless, I can say that I have taken as large and great a view of the effects of this mighty principle as ever did any man who dreamt over it in his study. I believe that the physical gain will be the smallest gain to humanity from the success of this principle.

I look further; I see in the free trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe —drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. I have looked even farther. I have speculated, and probably dreamt, in the dim future—ay, a thousand years hence —I have speculated on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may be. I believe that the effect will be to change the face of the world, so as to introduce a system of government entirely distinct from that which now prevails. I believe that the desire and motive for large and mighty empires, for gigantic armies and great navies—for those materials which are used for the destruction of life and the desolation of the rewards of labour—will die away. I believe that such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used, when man becomes of one family, and freely exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother-man. I believe that, if we could be allowed to reappear on this sublunary scene, we should see, at a far distant period, the governing system of this world revert to something like the municipal system; and I believe that the speculative philosopher of a thousand years hence will date the greatest revolution in the world's history from the triumph of the principle which we have met here to advocate.[1]

In the midst of the greatest war of history, this passage falls on the ear with a sense of poignant irony. It marks how far the world has receded from the vision and the ideals of that great man, upon whom men now affect to look down with contempt. But what, in fact, has prevented any approximation to this generous forecast? Certainly not the failure of Cobden's policy, for that has never been universally tried. But neither can we say that wars continue merely because free trade has not been tried. It would be truer to say that free trade has not been tried because of the national egotism and mistrust that provoke war. But then, again, protective trade policies based on national egotism become themselves contributory to

[1] Speech of January 15, 1846. See Hirst, *Free Trade and the Manchester School*, p. 229.

the international friction. It is not trade, it is restriction of trade, that helps to provoke war; not necessity, but human policies running counter to what, in this matter, is the nature of things. For to deal with one another, to exchange goods, to have joint access to natural resources, that is a common interest of all nations. Exchange takes place, in fact, even across tariff barriers; and if it did not, if it were possible for States to fence themselves off from one another by impassable commercial frontiers, the consequent injury might furnish a real cause for attempting by force, that is by war, to break through the restrictions. It is not true that trade is a cause of war between nations. The cause of war is the determination to interfere with trade; and that cause becomes powerful in proportion as the interference becomes violent and effective.

This will become clear if we take particular examples. What is the cause of that friction between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which immediately led up to the present war? Primarily, no doubt, the ambition of the Serbs and Croats included in the Dual Monarchy to become citizens of an independent Serbia, and the ambition of the latter to annex them. But, besides that, there was an economic cause. Serbia has no port, and is largely dependent for her export trade on the markets of Austria-Hungary. This fact has been used by the Dual Monarchy as a means of putting political pressure on Serbia by closing the frontiers to her trade. This constitutes a real injury, both to the material interests and the self-respect of Serbia. It has given her a valid reason for desiring to seize a port on the Adriatic, and that desire was largely the cause of the second Balkan war and of the continued friction which led up to this war. Here is one case where not trade but restriction of trade has been the cause of war. Other examples will occur to the reader. For

instance, the desire of Russia to own Constantinople and to control the waterway into the Black Sea is partly due to the fact that the Power controlling the Straits can close the Straits to Russian trade, and, in time of war, has in fact done so more than once. Of course, the occupation of the Straits by Russia would leave the same danger hanging over Turkey, Bulgaria, and Roumania. But, once more, the cause of the friction is not the nature of trade, but the running counter to it by policy. Again, if the Italians occupy Trieste, and if no guarantees are given of a free route for the trade of the German hinterland, a friction will be set up between Italy and the Central Powers which may well lead to another war.

Yet one more example, and one of immediate urgency. Germans are much preoccupied with the idea of an economic union of Central Europe. Such a union, if it meant the better development, by joint organization, of the economic resources of all the Central European States, with the consent and approval of them all, accompanied by a greater extension of free trade, would be a benefit to all the world. What converts this idea into a menace instead? Simply the absurd notion that, to accomplish this economic advance, other countries must, in some way, be annexed, or semi-annexed, to German political sovereignty. Thus Naumann writes: "A real Mid-Europe needs agrarian territories on its boundaries and must make the accession to them easy and desirable. It needs, if possible, an extension of its northern and southern sea-coasts, it needs its share in oversea colonial possessions."[1] Why? All it really "needs" is free transit for trade across frontiers, and free organization between nationals of different political allegiance. All of which is to be had without annexations and the continual wars, with accompanying economic loss,

[1] *Central Europe*, p. 198.

which annexations involve. As it is, in peace-time, in spite of hostile tariffs, German trade leaps all frontiers and crosses all oceans. Throughout, Naumann appears to be thinking of war conditions. And then, in order to meet these conditions, he advocates measures and policies which are bound to produce and perpetuate them. This is the typical logic of militarism. On the other hand, of course, the policy suggested by the Allied Governments—the policy of the Paris resolutions—plays directly into the hands of these German annexationists. For if the Allied States intend to cut Central Europe off from commercial intercourse with the rest of the world, then, and then only, it becomes a matter of life and death for the German States to make themselves self-supporting by annexing territory, in order to have access to necessary products and markets.

These are European examples. But the fact, or threat, of interference with oversea trade is an even more potent cause of international friction. Great Britain controls more than one-fifth of the surface of the globe, including huge areas which have immense economic importance, not only as actual or potential markets, but as sources of raw materials. The closing of these to other nations, wholly or partially, would be an immediate menace to the peace of the world. When Mr. Bonar Law, the other day, announced a new policy, or rather a return to an old one, which we hoped was finally abandoned ; when Mr. Mackinder claimed that our African dependencies ought to be treated "as an asset of the Empire," and interpreted that phrase as meaning that British citizens were to monopolize "a considerable proportion of the advantages that come from these regions," these gentlemen were as certainly engineering a combination of all other States against the British Empire and opening an era of world-wars, as if they had put their signature to a document framed with that object. But

it would be a false policy, not the nature of trade, nor even of Empire, that would set in motion that train of causes. From a political point of view, the British Empire has been able to maintain its existence without arousing a combination against it, because it has been a free trade Empire, or at least one without differentiation against foreigners, during the period of intense competition that dates from the middle of the nineteenth century. The partial reversal of that policy by the self-governing dominions, and the new prospects opened up by Mr. Bonar Law and his friends, are full of ill-omen for the future of the Empire and of the world. But if, in consequence, the British Empire goes under, together with Western civilization, we shall not be able to lay the blame on "economic necessity." Our own short-sighted cupidity will be the culprit. Interfere with the flow of trade and you create a friction which may lead to war. Leave it free, and you release the forces making for peace. That is the really fundamental fact, against which sophisms, ambitions, cupidities, short-sighted patriotisms beat in vain.

I have spoken, so far, of the course of trade and of the closing of markets and trade-routes by policy. But there are forms of competition other than competition to buy and sell goods. There is competition of capital to exploit land and minerals and raw materials of every kind; and, in course of this, to place loans and obtain concessions. In this competition the capitalists and investors of different countries compete with one another. But this is not the same thing as a competition between the nations concerned. The immediate beneficiaries of a concession are the financiers and shareholders concerned. Whether also the whole nation to which these persons belong benefits is far more questionable. It is certain that it does not benefit in the same

proportion. For the total effects of the enterprise upon the whole world of business and labour depend upon a long chain of circumstances in which the nationality of the original investors is but one and not the most important link. If, for instance, a railway is made in Mexico or China, and new resources tapped, every nation will benefit in proportion to its enterprise and capacity, so long as the open door is maintained and free access permitted to traders of all nationalities. The concession for the railway may even carry with it a condition that all materials and rolling stock be supplied by contractors of the same nationality as the concessionaires, and yet other nations may have nothing to complain of. Their railway contractors and workers will be employed on some other railway, not on that one, that is all. It is not as though, really, in a world as incompletely developed as this, there were just so many opportunities of using capital and labour and no more. The opportunities are indefinite. The British or French labourers, or the British or French population as a whole, would have nothing to complain of if capital stayed at home and developed the home country instead of embarking on venturesome speculations abroad. Probably, on the whole, the best results for the whole world, and for every country in the world, are attained by letting capital go where it sees the highest return, though there is much to be said, which cannot be said here, as to the way in which capital exploits defenceless labour among primitive peoples. But the broad fact is true, that the competition of the capital of different nations is not the same as competition between those nations, since it does not affect, or affects but slightly, the total national interest. It should not therefore affect the policy nor the political relations of States. But in fact it does. And it does so because

governments conceive it to be their duty to back the enterprises of their own capitalistic groups by diplomacy, which means ultimately by the threat of force. The consequence is, that concessions, loans, and the like become questions of international policy and give rise to the kind of friction that leads to war. In illustration of this fact I have only to mention the names Morocco, China, Persia. Every one knows that the effort of this or that nation to get some monopoly of the resources and markets of such areas constitutes a great part of the international tension. But, once more, why? Because policy interferes with the natural economic mechanism. If governments did not back the often predatory ventures of their nationals, if they allowed success to go to the more enterprising, the more intelligent, and the more industrious, without respect to their nationality, and if they never attempted to use commercial and financial penetration as a lever to acquire political influence, these complications would not arise.

But is there then no justification for this behaviour of governments? There is some. The economic penetration of countries which have weak or corrupt governments would either not be accomplished in the absence of some guarantee that order would be kept and contracts observed; or it would be attempted by mere adventurers, with disastrous results to the native population, necessitating after all in the end political interference by the civilized State. Certain experiences of the British in this respect are informing.[1]

It may be urged, therefore, that some support and control by governments of their financial and trading adventurers

[1] The reader may be referred to the account of the penetration of Fiji by British adventurers given in *The Project of a Commonwealth*, Part I, p. 223 (Macmillian, 1915).

is essential to the economic development of the world. But then, why should that support lead to international complication, and to war, or the threat of war? Only because governments think of such situations as an opportunity of backing their own nationals instead of jointly holding the ring, and seeing that there is fair play and no favour all round, both to the competing groups of traders and financiers, and also (which is certainly not less important) to the native inhabitants. The solution of this difficult problem would seem to be international instead of national control. I shall return to this point later.[1] Meantime (to reaffirm my present contention) not here any more than in the other cases that I have touched upon is it true that war arises from the necessities of economic competition. It arises from bad policies, from interference in the natural course of business and trade, in the supposed interest of this or that nation, but really in the interest of this or that group of capitalists or merchants. It is these interferences by governments that lead to wars. It is not the real exigencies of national interest.

But at this point I must sound a note of warning, directed especially to the democracies of the New World, or to those which are struggling to establish themselves in the Old. In Europe hitherto, and in the United States, the commercial policy of governments has been influenced or controlled by powerful groups of rich men, and the mass of the nation may be said to have been guiltless of its errors. But it would be foolish to suppose that therefore that mass is more enlightened or more unselfish than the few. And very likely, in the near future, a policy will be suggested to the people whereby it may appear that they can profit by iniquity and that wars

[1] See Chapter XII.

may be made to "pay." Let us take the case of the British Empire. If we chose to introduce the policy of monopoly now foreshadowed by a section of the Government, the House of Commons, and the Press; if we chose to say of the natural products of a quarter of the globe, "Since we took them by force we therefore own them, and the rest of the world shall have none, or shall have our leavings," we could, perhaps, make ourselves for the time being richer; and if we socialized the advantage, if we bribed our people by offering them their share of the loot in improved conditions of living, we could perhaps get their assent. Under the present régime, where the profits of financial and commercial enterprise go to those who own capital, it is true to say that it is not the nation but groups within the nation that profit by aggressive commercial policies. But socialize your wealth, as it is partially socialized in Australia, and the temptation to which minorities succumb becomes a temptation to a whole people. The appeal from the self-interest of the few to that of the many fails, and a nation becomes an organized pack to hunt food by starving and killing other packs. It is this future which is opened out by some of the tendencies of the present day. The predatory Central Europe of Naumann is to be just and generous within its own boundaries: all are to share the supposed economic advantages of the new régime. Similarly, the predatory British Empire desired by some of our tariff reformers may offer a greater justice in the distribution of the spoils to its own citizens. A progressive harmony of interests within the frontiers of a nation is compatible with a progressive hostility to all outside them. The policy of nations may become frankly a policy of robbery, and then much that has been said in this chapter would cease to be true. If, for instance, after

making war a nation were to proceed to steal the private property of the citizens of territory annexed, as it would seem some Germans desire to steal the coal and iron of Belgium and France, if this property were then to be made national and its revenue devoted to the common interest, then indeed it might be arguable that war could "pay" in the pecuniary sense. And for such wars popular assent might be secured. The penalty, of course, would be paid. It would be paid in full, in all the ways on which I have dwelt in my first chapter. But if men be willing to sell their lives and their souls in the pursuit of wealth by theft, I do not know that it can be shown that their enterprise is necessarily fantastic. Perhaps some nation might come to "own" the world, and live upon its tribute. But I think better of the heart and the mind of men. For, consider! As I write, there are dying on the battlefields of the world hundreds and thousands of innocent youths, in anguish such that, if the reader could witness it, he would think his whole fortune lightly spent to bring it to an end. The only thought that enables men and women with the ordinary feelings of humanity to endure this fact is their belief that the sacrifice is redeemed by some ideal purpose. What if they should learn that nothing lay behind all this but the competition of rich men to be a little richer or of poor men to be a little less poor? Yet it is just this that those men have in mind who believe that nations ought to make war for economic gain. The whole conception of international relations now current in the world is influenced by this idea that war can be made to pay. Professors, publicists, journalists in all countries put it forward without reprobation as a scientific truth. Well, if it *were* true? What decent man or woman would say anything else than: "Let us remain poor, then, to avoid war"? Nothing could

justify war but an ideal purpose. And the extension of trade and the increase of wealth, whatever it be, is not that.[1]

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 122.—Economic Competition and War.

I have already referred (p. 108) to the way in which the desire to be secure in a future war prompts policies which themselves produce war. Here is another case. At this moment (1916) one of the great objectives of the present war is the ownership of Alsace-Lorraine. The one thing about which both France and Germany seem to be clear is that the people of those provinces are not to be consulted in the matter. And why? Very largely, as becomes increasingly clear, because of the deposits of iron in this district, and their importance for the manufacture of armaments for the "next war," or for increasing the wealth (as is supposed) of the countries concerned, the wealth being regarded as an asset for war. In other words, the expectation of another war, and the determination to be prepared for it, is both prolonging this one and preparing the way for the next. So fatal is the circle in which the nations have become involved by the international anarchy they have accepted. I quote, in illustration of this point, the following from the *Cambridge Magazine* of September 23, 1916:—

"*L'Echo de Paris* suggests that the only effective way to cripple Germany, after the war, is to deprive her of her superiority in coal and iron ore. This can be even more effectively done by the annexation to France of Lorraine, which at present furnishes most of Germany's mineral wealth, than by the erection of tariff walls.

"'All industries depend more or less on metallurgy. . . . A German writer has said: "The brave representatives of all the industries of Germany threw themselves through the breach opened by Krupp, and step by step, along with them, the commerce of Germany has spread over every land."

"'To strike at Germany through her metallurgy is really the

[1] On this whole subject I would refer the reader to the chapter on "The Economics of Peace" in Mr. Brailsford's book *A League of Nations.*

surest way to strike her death-blow, and this should be the inevitable result of the victory of the Allies, and especially of France. . . . The taking of Lorraine, alone, is what has permitted the development of German metallurgy, securing her industrial, military, and political domination. By losing Lorraine Germany would lose this iron ore, which she has not and could not obtain elsewhere, and which she will no longer obtain except at such a price as we French will be able to control. Controlling this, one of the principal elements in the price of the German products, we could effectively shatter her attempts at international competition, her extravagances of dumping.

"'This will be the decisive blow. We French could strike it alone, but that would not be enough, and the Allies would do well to reflect upon it. . . . Let England especially remember that it was because she allowed Prussia in 1815 to annex the coalfields of the Sarre, and in 1871 the mines of Lorraine, that England's policy laid the foundations of the metallurgical wealth of Germany, and created a master for others and for herself.'

"*Critica Sociale*, August 16th–31st:—

In an article on 'The War with Iron for Iron,' Schiavi writes on the true objective of the Verdun offensive. The rich Lorraine iron basin extends over German, French, Belgian, and Luxemburg territory. Though Germany extracts 21,000,000 tons with her 300,000 miners from Lorraine, she still has to import 12,000,000 tons of iron ore. Her production of pig-iron is nearly double that of England, and second only to that of the United States. Whereas in 1907 Germany exported 600,000 tons of ore to France, in 1913 she imported 3,000,000 tons from France. More light is thus thrown on the sinister hidden struggle for the raw products which are the life-blood of a modern industrial State. Will peaceful international agreements ever replace the grim struggle of economic war? Schiavi despairs of such a solution in the present state of society.

"*Evening Mail*, August 7th:—

An article on 'Fighting for Steel Markets' says: 'In the London *Outlook* of July 8th is an illuminating article on "Lorraine and German Metallurgy." It is a call to England to see that France gets back Lorraine, because this would destroy the German steel industry and leave Great Britain a free hand in the export field. It is shown that Germany before 1871, when Lorraine was acquired,

was rich in coal but poor in iron ore. Take away her iron ore, and her iron industry is gone.

"'Figures are cited to show what England has lost and what she must regain.

"'Great Britain is called upon to remove the Germans from Lorraine and regain the steel trade of Europe.

"'It is a striking illustration of the solid basis of fact that must be behind Great Britain's championing the cause of smaller nations. The history of Ireland, the Boer Republic, Egypt, and Persia must make it clear that small nations *per se* are not indiscriminately championed. The designs upon German metallurgy are a specific instance of that principle which the London *Times* of March 8, 1915, proclaimed in such classic form: "In this war England is fighting for exactly the same kind of reasons for which she fought Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. She is not fighting for Belgium or for Servia, for France or for Russia. They fill a great place in her mind and her heart, but they come second. The first place belongs, and rightly belongs, to herself."'

"*Zukunft*, July:—

"Harden gives prominence to, and endorses the French view of the importance both to France and Germany of the iron mines between Metz and Verdun. The documents in which the Six Industrial Unions set out their demands have now been translated and published in the French papers, and France can realize that Germany, if victorious, will take from her the iron district of Briey. The first note of alarm was sounded by Berenger, the Secretary of the Senatorial Defence Committee:—

"'Every one of us,' he said, 'soldier or civilian, recognizes that iron is king in this war. . . . That is why Germany has flung herself on the district of Briey, which produces 90 per cent. of our ore, and why she has done everything in her power to keep it. That is the real object of the attacks on Verdun, and of the mad submarine warfare which aimed . . . at preventing us from obtaining iron from England or America. The mining district of Briey forms the battleground where France and Germany are fighting for the control of iron. This basin lies between Metz and Verdun like a giant key between two mighty fortresses. . . . Can we understand at last that Germany's desire to take Verdun must be as strong as our own to regain Metz? Before the war Germany used 28 million tons of iron ore in the year: 21 of these came from the

part of Briey that was annexed in 1871. France used 22 million: 15 of these came from the part that remained French. This district was lost at the invasion. England and America had to make good the deficiency. Germany seized the French and Luxemburg districts, set almost all the furnaces to work, and therefore could add to her own 28 million tons 15 from France and 6 from Luxemburg: a total for herself and her allies of 49 million tons. . . . The six German Unions have told the Chancellor that it would have been impossible to carry on the war if the production of iron and steel had not doubled since August 1914: and seeing that 60 to 80 per cent. of this depends on the ore from Briey, the war could scarcely be won now without the undisputed possession of the entire district. This explains the obstinate attacks against Verdun. . . . If it falls, the Germans can believe in an indefinite prolongation of the war, for Briey holds in her lap 3,000 millions tons of iron ore. But if we keep Verdun and win back Metz, Germany loses nine-tenths of the raw material for her steel.'"

I do not here discuss the economic soundness or unsoundness of the extracts I have quoted. I quote them as illustrating the kind of considerations that determine the policy of States. As a matter of fact, unless the country owning these deposits forbade the export of them, the iron would go to the best buyer, foreign or home; and Germany (or France) would get as much as she chose to pay for. And this is as it should be, were the world bent on developing production instead of devising destruction. Of course, if the deposits were simply stolen by the conquering nation from the present owners, and their revenue socialized for the benefit of all its citizens, that nation might be said to benefit economically. I discuss that possibility in the text. Hitherto nations have not thought it wise or just to adopt such policies.

Page 125.—Dumping.

On this question of German dumping, the most fantastic illusions have gained currency during the war. Thus, for example, Mr. Hughes is reported to have said: "If we do not act, and at once, peace will overwhelm us more surely than war; the Germans will dump their sugar and their goods generally into our markets, our streets will be thronged with unemployed men, and industrial chaos will reign in the land" (*The Times*, May 11, 1916). In the only

sense in which it would seem that dumping can reasonably be complained of—the case of deliberately underselling competitors in foreign countries at a loss, in order to capture the whole trade, and then put up the price—I have not yet found an example established by evidence. Further, there seems to be no evidence, as there is no probability, for the contention put forward at the Paris Conference that Germany is preparing to "dump" cheap goods on all the allied countries as soon as the war is over. I cite the following from the *Sunday Times* of November 12, 1916:—

"An American business man who has for years been managing a branch establishment in Berlin was recently interviewed on his arrival in Rotterdam from the German capital. He characterized the German 'dumping' scare as absurd. 'Not only will there be no dumping,' he said, 'but German industry will be terribly handicapped for years because of the shortage of raw materials.

"'Even the steel and iron manufacturers,' he continued, 'though they have greatly enlarged their plants and are doing an incredible amount of war work, cannot undertake immediate exports when peace comes, because they must first import hundreds of thousands of tons of copper, zinc, and materials which Germany can get now with the greatest difficulty, if at all, as they are reserved for military work.

"'There is no raw cotton in Germany excepting the reserve used in manufacturing high explosives, and very little wool, and cotton and wool must be imported in great quantities before the textile mills can resume operations.

"'So far from Germany outstripping her rivals in foreign markets, her manufacturers are lying awake at night worrying because they think British and French industry, released from war work, will grab the old German markets before raw material can be imported to the Fatherland, turned into finished products, and exported.'"

It may be worth while to add that "dumping," in the sense in which it rouses British indignation when supposed to be done by Germans, was originally a British invention. "As early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, English industries were employing the expedient of selling in foreign markets large quantities of their manufactured products at prices below the cost of production to themselves, in order to nip in the bud a similar industry developing in the country of import."[1]

[1] Grunzel, *Economic Protection*, p. 148.

PAGE 133.—TRADE AND POLITICAL FRONTIERS.

The international organization of business does, of course, easily overleap political frontiers. Witness such world-wide combinations as the Oil Trust and the Tobacco Trust.

PAGE 138.—THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY.

See *Hansard*, vol. 85, No. 81, Debate of August 3, 1916, on the Colonial Vote. The point in discussion was the imposition of an export tax on palm kernels from West Africa. These kernels are used for margarine and oil-cake; and the avowed object of the tax was to confine the supply to the British Empire, a rebate of the export duty being allowed if the kernels were crushed within the Empire. It was explained that if the tax was not sufficient to secure the monopoly to the Empire it would be increased. In his speech defending the tax, Mr. Mackinder said: "These regions ought to be treated as an asset of the Empire," and explained himself to mean that "we are entitled to a considerable proportion of the advantages that come from these regions." Major Hunt put the matter even more simply when he said: "The land belongs to the Empire, does it not? And the people who live on it grow nuts, do they not? If a man or a nation owns the land and has to look after the people who live on it, and protect them from Germans or other barbarians, it is perfectly right that that man or nation should have the first or a better chance of buying the nuts off that land than anybody else." As to the natives, Mr. Molteno stated in the course of the debate that the effect of the new policy had been a fall of the price received by the West African natives, while there had been a rise to the Liverpool merchant of 67 per cent. between June and July, the proposed tax being made known on June 10th. It is clear that the policy applicable to palm kernels from West Africa is applicable to every product of which the British Empire has a monopoly or a considerable preponderance of the supply. The effect of such a policy on the political future of the Empire, on our relations with other Powers, and on the reputation of our country for fairness and justice may be imagined. And there is another point, put thus by Mr. Molteno: "I contend that this despatch is a reversal of the policy that has been consistently pursued towards our Crown colonies and all our colonies ever since

the loss of the American colonies. That policy was never to tax the colonies without employing the taxes for their own good. . . . We are constantly told that the rights of small nationalities have been put on an indefeasible foundation as a result of this war. Here are small nationalities, though great in numbers, for the people affected by this will total some twenty millions of human beings, many in a high state of native civilization, which are completely in our hands. With what conscience can we invade their rights and stand out as the defenders of the rights of small nations?"

The question came up again in the debate of November 8, 1916 (*Hansard*, vol. 87, No. 106, p. 247 *seq.*), when it was proposed that only British-born subjects and British firms should be allowed to compete for the purchase of enemy properties to be sold in the Crown colonies and protectorates. As applied to Nigeria, that, of course, would confirm the monopoly of the ring of British firms, who, as Mr. Steel Maitland was able to show, had depressed the price to the natives from £14 to £9 or £10 and raised it to the British purchaser, the rise in freights accounting for no more than a fraction of this rise. It is creditable to Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Steel Maitland that they resisted, in the interest of the natives, of our allies and of neutrals, a proposition which seems to be a not unnatural corollary of the policy they had sanctioned previously. They were unwilling to affirm to the full the monstrous principle that the products and trade of the British Empire, nearly one-fourth of the surface of the globe, shall be preserved as a monopoly for British subjects. But that principle plainly underlay much of the argument in favour of the proposal, which indeed can hardly be intelligibly defended on any other ground. And it was plainly affirmed that such a monopoly was to be regarded as war-booty and as one of the objects of the war. I append a few illustrations.

Sir Alfred Mond: I should have thought it was the British Empire first, the British trader second, and all other considerations afterwards.

Mr. Molteno: And the native nowhere!

Sir A. Mond: No, not nowhere, but in his right place!

Mr. R. McNeil described the policy of the Government as "Asking aliens to come in and enjoy the fruits of our victory."

Sir E. Carson ended with the following peroration:—

"I do beg and pray of the Government—and if the Government do not listen to it, I beg and pray of this House—in the circum-

stances in which this country is situated at the present moment, *not* to send out a message to our suffering fellow-subjects—aye, and to our soldiers in the trenches—that the war is being waged, not for the British Empire, but equally for neutrals."

It is thus that the war for "liberty" and the "rights of small nations" is interpreted by powerful and representative Englishmen. It is thus that they give colour to the German view that it is a war to destroy by force the trade of rivals whom our merchants and manufacturers cannot meet by fair competition. On the whole, the *Manchester Guardian* seems fully justified in commenting: "Mr. Bonar Law has revived in all its worst features the old colonial system which cost us America and which now, applied at the expense of the most defenceless populace in the King's dominions, bids fair to lose us our honour" (November 4, 1916).

How the export duty will profit British companies is indicated by the following note from *Common Sense*:—

"Sharebrokers are advertising their clients to purchase the shares of the British Oil and Cake Company, Ltd., on the ground that recent legislation has put a duty of £2 per ton on palm kernels exported from West Africa to countries outside the British Empire; and this it is said, no doubt truly, will cause great benefit to accrue to this already very prosperous company. It is not a poor, struggling concern which is to reap the benefit of this new monopoly, but a company which has raised its profits from £111,000 in 1914 to £243,000 in 1915, and its dividend from 5 to 15 per cent."

Special importance is given to the subject-matter of this chapter by the resolutions of the Paris Conference, whereby the Allies propose an economic "war after the war" against the Powers of Central Europe. The resolutions appear to embody all the economic and political fallacies which I have endeavoured to expose in the text. I have dealt with the question specially in a separate pamphlet,[1] where I have illustrated among other things the effect of the resolutions in stiffening our enemies to fight to the end.

The following passage from a lecture given by Professor Brentano is worth quoting, as showing that, even in a country as protectionist

[1] *Economic War after the War*, published by the Union of Democratic Control (37 Norfolk Street, Strand).

as Germany, there are thinkers who see clearly the connexion between war and protectionist policies:—

"'There is only one way to reach a durable peace: namely, to renounce in future all commercial hostilities and all the means that minister to them. . . . History shows that the effort of any economic system to be self-sufficient has always led to war.' . . . The lecturer criticized the folly of the arguments which the advocates of protective tariffs in both camps bring forward in favour of the exclusion of the enemy from the world markets even after the re-establishment of peace. If this tendency should get the upper hand among the nations engaged in the conflict, it will lead to new wars. There is an immanent logic of facts in politics as elsewhere. . . . The assumption of mercantilism that in trade the gain of one is only possible at the cost of the loss of the other, and that the object of trading is to derive from it one-sided advantage, is opposed by the view that trade flourishes best when both parties gain. On that view rests free trade. And just as the organized system of commercial hostility ended in war, so free trade assumes peace and leads to it. It has always been so and must be so in the future, for it lies in the nature of things.

"Finally the lecturer dwelt upon what would be involved for Europe in another war. After describing the sacrifices in men and goods which the present war has laid upon Europe, he concluded with the remark that a recurrence of war would mean the destruction of Europe as the leader of civilization in the world. 'If the European peoples that are now involved in all the horrors of the world war, instead of aiming at the quickest possible recovery from the losses inflicted on them by ordering international trade on the basis of a peaceable division of labour, consult (as at an economic conference which has just been held in Paris) how after the re-establishment of peace the world war may be liquidated by a trade war which must one day produce a new war with all the dangers indicated—if they do this, then for such conduct there is only one word, and that one word madness.'" (See *Züricher Zeitung*, June 15, 1916.)

It is well known that the German Social Democrats have always been Free Traders and apparently still are. A very sound article, from this point of view, dealing both with the Mittel-Europa project and with the resolutions of the Paris Conference appeared in *Vorwärts* for June 26, 1916.

A deputy of the Reichstag, Herr Gustav Hoch, in an article opposing all schemes of annexation, said: "The future struggle for markets must no longer be allowed to be conducted by any other than peaceful methods—by methods of commercial competition" (*Neue Zeit*, January 29, 1916).

PAGE 138.—SOCIALISTIC POLICIES AND COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY.

The point suggested in the text is unfortunately not a mere imagining, unbased on real tendencies. I may cite in illustration an article from the *New York Journal*, giving an interview with Dr. Ludvig Quessel, a leading German Socialist. Dr. Quessel is reported to have said that "The shutting off of foreign supplies of cotton, wool, rubber, oil, fibrous material, and food-stuffs has awakened among the working people a conception of the value of world politics for colonies. It is plain that this conception must continue after the war." After a long account of the monopolistic colonial policy of the Entente Powers (an account which, so far as England is concerned, is unfounded and unjust), he concludes that the "whole of Central Europe, from the simplest worker to the multimillionaire, is made to pay tribute to the Entente," and that the object of the Entente in entering on the war was "the desire to make their colonial monopoly more complete. By appropriating Germany's colonies and partitioning Turkey, the exploitation of colonially disinherited Central Europe was to be reduced as it were to a system."

That this policy was the object of the Entente in going to war is a fantastic illusion. But it is more than unfortunate that the partitioning of Turkey and the seizure of German colonies is *now* their policy, and that prominent politicians and business men in the Entente countries have avowed precisely this ideal of a colonial monopoly directed against Germany. The result, of course, can only be to convert the great Socialist masses of Germany, hitherto Free Traders, to the idea of an aggressive policy to seize colonies by force as a necessary basis of economic life. Such policies in all countries might be made popular by associating the working class with the alleged advantages. We may thus have a series of world wars, accompanied by the militarization of all countries, simply because a false conception of public advantage has been fostered

by individuals who see in it private advantage, has then been exploited by those who desire war to continue, and has been accepted in shortsighted ignorance by masses too little educated to be able to think the matter through for themselves. Mr. Hughes of Australia and Mr. Hodge of England are typical examples of the kind of men who are taken in by these illusions.

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER CAUSES OF WAR

I HAVE now dealt with those causes of war which are sometimes regarded as the result of a natural necessity, against which human ideals and policy must beat in vain; and I have tried to show that they are nothing of the kind; that, in fact, mistaken ideas, wrong policy, and false ambitions here masquerade as Fate.

But there remain some other causes of war on which it will be necessary to touch briefly.

In the preceding chapters I have been dealing with national interests in a simple material form. For it is material interests, misunderstood, that furnish the principal causes of war; and when it suits the militarists, they will frankly admit it. Thus, I find in Naumann's *Central Europe* the following illuminating passage:—

> War is only unavoidable because there is no recognized measure for evaluating the claims that are put forward. If, for example, Japan, Russia, England, America, and other States dispute over the extent of their influence in China, there is no recognized procedure of apportionment according to which their mortgages in China can be measured. The actual discovery of such a procedure would be pacifism. . . . Under these circumstances, what remains but to put it to the test of blood how highly each one who makes a claim is in a position to value it?[1]

[1] *Central Europe*, p. 200, English translation.

This passage, if it means anything, can only mean that every State has a right to all it can take by force; and that if forces could be accurately measured without war, war could be dispensed with. For the distribution of other people's property could then be made by a Court, according to this German principle of justice. As it is, wars must be fought to ascertain where the preponderance of this force, which is also Right, may lie. And the assumption, of course, throughout is, that it is for their material interests that this stealing is necessary to States. Whenever the pacifist puts forward some other purpose than power and wealth as a motive for State policy, he is swept from the stage by the indignant militarist, who says, like Admiral Mahan :—

> It is vain to expect nations to act consistently from any motive other than that of interest . . . and the predatory instinct that he should take who can.[1]

But, on the other hand, so soon as the pacifist himself begins to talk of interest, and urges, with Mr. Norman Angell, that the interest of States is not in fact furthered by war, the militarist turns round in a fury and says that no one but a materialistic pacifist would suppose that States ever go to war for anything so low as their interest! Thus we find the very same Admiral Mahan writing in another place :—

> To regard the world as governed by self-interest is to live in a non-existent world, a world possessed by an idea much less worthy than those which mankind, to do it bare justice, persistently entertains.[2]

The solution of these contradictions I must leave to the militarist. Meantime, as a sober pacifist, I recognize that

[1] Cited by Norman Angell in *Foundations of International Policy*, p. 10.
[2] Ibid. p. 36.

nations do sometimes go to war for other reasons than a miscomprehension of interests. They go to war, for instance, about their "honour." What is this "honour"? No term is more indefinite and none is more abused. But whenever it is employed, it seems to be in reference to some immediate reaction of the corporate personality of a nation either to a supposed insult or to an admitted obligation. To take first the question of an insult. Never, I suppose, has that been the sole cause of war. But it has often been the match to fire the train. Thus, for example, "Jenkins's ear" was an immediate occasion of the Anglo-Spanish War of 1739. But trade rivalry and the Balance of Power were the real causes. Again, the Franco-German War was precipitated by the insult falsely alleged to have been offered by the King of Prussia to the French envoy. But there were other and deeper causes. In fact, those who are determined on war are apt to bring it to birth by causing it to appear, falsely or truly, that the nation has been insulted. They are aware that the notion of an insult works upon a people as it works upon an individual, suppresses all calculation of consequences, and arouses a blind passion for revenge. A common provocative of such passion is the pretence, or the fact, that some member of the nation has been wantonly injured. Immediately all the hot-heads feel that they themselves have suffered vicariously in the person of the injured. Their pride, rather than their humanity, is outraged, and they cry for the humiliation of the offender or for war.

Now, in such cases, no sober judgment would maintain that the insult must be wiped out in blood. We do not think so even in the case of insult to an individual, since we have discredited the duel. But an individual at least is risking only his own life. A statesman is risking the

present and future of a community and the lives of many who are quite indifferent to the alleged affront. Wherever reflexion might see in such cases a justification for war, it would be because of some calculation that the outrage will be followed by substantial aggression unless reparation is exacted. Broadly, no nation ought ever to go to war merely because of an affront. And it is exactly in such cases that delay is all important, to allow passions to cool. The reference of the case of the Dogger Bank outrage to a commission of inquiry at The Hague is a model of how such issues should be handled. Who now regrets that we did not then go to war with Russia? Yet a weaker or more passionate Government might have gone to war, and "public opinion" (that is, the Press) at the first moment would have approved it. In every such case where a supposed insult is the essence of the trouble, inquiry and delay is the remedy that will prevent a precipitate war.

It is different when the point of "honour" is a point of legal or moral obligation. Nations are under an obligation, for instance, to keep their pledged word, though it is one they do not in fact commonly recognize and one which the same people who would go to war about an "insult" are apt to treat with cynical contempt. For those who are most sensitive to insult are not necessarily those most scrupulous of obligation. Since, then, nations ought to keep their word, they should be the more careful how they pledge it, and they should not allow it to be pledged behind their back, nor ambiguously, nor for improper purposes. There arise here questions about the making and sanction of treaties, and the democratic control of policy, which we shall have to discuss presently. Meantime, let us admit that it may sometimes be right and necessary to make war in support of a pledged word;

and that in that sense "honour" may be a good cause of war.

The other kinds of cases out of which war may arise are concerned with what are called "vital interests." And it should be observed, to begin with, that no treaties should be entered upon which it is not a matter of "vital interest," as well as of honour, to maintain. Statesmen, in fact, do not maintain treaties by war, unless they hold that vital interest is concerned, and are often ready to break them when vital interest seems to sanction it. An antagonism between these two kinds of obligation, "honour" and "interest," is very unfortunate, and leads to much hypocrisy and much insincere vituperation. The moral is, Be very careful what kind of treaties you enter upon, and give scope for periodical revision as circumstances change.

Among vital interests, the first is "national independence"; by which I mean independence of the will of another imposed by force, not independence of obligations voluntarily undertaken. Every treaty limits independence by obligations deliberately assumed. But such limitation is a guarantee, not an infringement, of vital interest. Any amount of international agreement, if it be voluntary, is thus compatible with national independence. But no jot or tittle of armed coercion contrary to Right is compatible with it. On the other hand, a nation deliberately recalcitrant to international law and comity may forfeit its right to independence, just as an individual citizen may within the State. Force to back recognized law may become legitimate even against the right of independence. Force without that sanction of law is illegitimate, except to counter illegitimate force applied by another. The general recognition, in theory and practice, of this right of independence, so limited, is essential to an international order. And there can be no international order, and no

salvation from war and ruin, while any powerful State regards force, in and by itself, as either being or creating a Right. If this war is about anything ideal, it is about that issue.

Closely connected with this question of independence is that of oppressed nationalities. For oppression here means the denial by one group to another of some kind of independence. No questions are so difficult of solution as these, and it may be admitted that war may be a necessary step towards the solution of them. On the other hand, war is a very precarious remedy, precarious in its immediate issue and in its remoter effects. Many rebellions have been worse than vain, and many that have been successful have only converted the whilom victims into oppressors. Nothing is more disconcerting to lovers of liberty than the new Imperialism of Italy, or the campaigns of the various Balkan States to oppress one another as soon as they had jointly delivered themselves from the yoke of the Turk. "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword"—perish, it would seem, spiritually as well as physically. There is a better way, the way of justice and agreement, the way which, after centuries of bitter experience, the British have at last been attempting in Ireland. Their difficulties are typical of those which arise in every such case. But that way is the right way. And the more Europe can be induced to follow it, the more carefully and deliberately she can frame machinery for that purpose, the more she can avoid perilous and drastic operations with the knife, the better the chance not only for civilization as a whole, but for the solution of the very problems which war must otherwise be called in to settle.

There remain economic issues, and of these I have already spoken at length. What resulted from our discussion was the need for international agreements to regu-

late commercial and financial competition. We shall return to this point presently.

Finally, all these issues lead up to war, not so much because they are otherwise insoluble, as because they are handled in an anarchic world. It is the absence of adequate machinery to deal with disputes, rather than the insoluble nature of the disputes, that leads to international war. To suggest what steps may be immediately practicable in the constructing of such machinery and what kind of agreements would be best calculated to deal with the issues as they arise is the purpose of the concluding portion of this book.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 153.—National Honour.

The view of "honour" and its obligations which I am challenging is expressed by Treitschke in the following passage:—

"A State must have a very highly developed sense of honour, if it is not to be disloyal to its own nature. The State is not a violet blooming in the shade. Its power must stand forth proud and refulgent, and it must not allow this power to be disputed even in matters of forms and symbols. If the flag of the State is insulted, it is the duty of the State to demand satisfaction, and if satisfaction is not forthcoming, to declare war, however trivial the occasion may appear; for the State must strain every nerve to preserve for itself that respect which it enjoys in the State system."[1]

This passage expresses admirably the real immediate feeling of almost everybody, and it is necessary that this feeling shall be counteracted by reflexion if the most trivial causes are not to lead to world wars. The "honour" of nations no more requires war to safeguard it than the honour of individuals requires the duel. In all such matters the question should be put in cold blood, "Do

[1] *The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke*, by H. W. C. Davies, p. 177.

you think, because somebody has been rude to your representative or your flag, that millions of men ought to die in the prime of life and the whole level of civilization sink to the depths into which every modern war must inevitably plunge it?"

I append other examples of the use of the word "honour."

1. In a speech delivered in the Reichstag in the debate of October 11 and 12, 1916, Naumann, the author of *Mittel-Europa*, is reported to have said that the murder of Serajevo was "in the strictest sense of the word a question of honour, and therefore Austria-Hungary could not leave it to other Powers to say whether and how far she should receive satisfaction for it." Clearly, the question of the murder of Serajevo was one of justice. A crime had been committed, and the first step was to investigate judicially the question of guilt. It was the typical case for an international court. If by the judicial investigation it should have been made clear that the murder had been instigated or connived at by the Serbian Government, an international question would have arisen. But not till then. The refusal of the Austro-Hungarian Government to refer the case to an international commission of inquiry was itself an international crime, and no plea of "honour" can palliate it.

2. "He (Usedom) began by assuring me that as early as 1865 efforts had been made from Florence to induce the Austrians to sell Venice. The envoy, a certain Landau, had, according to him, met with much sympathy at Vienna—in fact, even Count Mensdorff had shown himself not ill-disposed; yet the affair had miscarried owing to the opposition of the Emperor and the military party, who held it incompatible with military honour to surrender Venice without fighting."

Here is a case where a transference of territory which is now generally recognized to be right and proper was refused by way of agreement and had to be carried out at the cost of much bloodshed, because certain individuals had a mistaken idea of "honour." But it is perhaps true that in any State that notion of honour could and would be imposed on the nation by its Press, and any Government that might attempt the humane and reasonable course would be discredited. So great is the empire of words. (See *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, English translation, Heinemann, 1906, vol. i. p. 316.)

3. In his Guildhall speech of 1911, Mr. Lloyd George maintained

that the compensation proposed to be given to Germany by France in Morocco would seriously affect British interests. He then, by a conjuror's trick, identified national interest with national honour: "If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question."

The issue here, according to Mr. George's own statement, was one of interest and prestige. But in order to prevent that question from being examined coolly on its merits, in order to avoid showing clearly by facts and documents exactly what British interests were involved, and on what evidence (points on which we wait for illumination), he brings in the words "humiliation" and "honour," knowing well that they work on a nation like a red rag on a bull, silence all discussion and criticism, and hand over the nation a passive instrument into the hands of any Government, quite apart from the wisdom or justice of that Government's policy.

PART II

INTERNATIONALISM

When it is a question of war, all means should first be tried in the way of award, and only in the last resort should the way of battle be tried.—DANTE.

Mere agreements will not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement, so much greater than the force of any nations now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation or probable combination of nations could face or withstand it.

PRESIDENT WILSON.
Speech to the Senate, January 22, 1917.

In a general way they desire to declare . . . their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a League of Nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognize all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilization from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression.

From the Reply of the Allied Governments to President Wilson's Note, January 11, 1917.

NOTE.

In this Part I refer to the following schemes of international organization, which will shortly be published in a separate volume by Messrs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., under the title "The Framework of a Lasting Peace."

1. A scheme contained in *International Government*, by L. S. Woolf. Published for the Fabian Society by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1916. Referred to as the Fabian scheme.

2. *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars.* By Lord Bryce and others. Referred to as the scheme of the British group. This scheme is separately published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Price one shilling net.

3. A scheme drawn up by a Dutch Committee and published in the first volume of the *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, referred to as the Dutch scheme.

4. The programme of the American "League to Enforce Peace," Secretary, W. H. Short, 70, Fifth Avenue, New York.

5. The programme of the British "League of Nations Society," offices at 1 Central Buildings, Tothill Street, Westminster.

I refer also to the *Recueil des Rapports sur les différents Points du Programme minimum* published by the *Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable* (Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1916). A translation of some of these reports will shortly be published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Since this book was written there has appeared Mr. Brailsford's admirable book *A League of Nations* (Headley Bros.), to which I would refer the reader for a further discussion of some of the points here treated, and especially for the relation of the project of a League of Nations to all the other problems of the peace settlement.

The periodical *War and Peace*, now issued monthly as a supplement to the *Nation*, is devoting itself exclusively to the problems of a League of Nations.

CHAPTER IX

INTERNATIONALISM

LET me now remind the reader where we stand. We have seen what is likely, nay, certain to happen, if war and preparation for war continues. It is a prospect which, I believe, few who can realize it will face without dismay We have seen further that, contrary to our usual way of thinking, war is not "inevitable," but proceeds from definite and removable causes. In other words, salvation is in our own hands. But to realize that fact, and to act accordingly, is no easy matter. So hard a process of intellectual and imaginative conversion is necessary, so long may it take for the simple truths set forth in the preceding pages actually to take hold of and govern the hearts and minds of men. Yet the terrible experience of this war should have broken up the soil of habit and prepared it for the reception of new seeds. I must assume that that process has taken place in my readers. If not, they will hardly feel the force of all that follows. "War leads to hell." "War is not inevitable." The acceptance of those two propositions is the condition of the acceptance of proposals for reconstruction. And a reader who should turn to this part of my book without seriously considering the first part will not be in a position to appreciate the urgency of my contention.

Let me suppose, however, a reader who is so convinced. What will be the first suggestion to occur to him? Not unnaturally he might say, "There is one and only one way out. Scrap your armaments, for these, we have seen, are a principal cause of war, and settle your disputes henceforth by process of law or arbitration." This measure would, I believe, be the most effective that could be adopted. And nothing at bottom prevents its adoption but moral and intellectual inertia in all nations. For, as we have seen, the main cause that embitters the relations of States is fear. Each lives under the dread of what another may be plotting against it; and that other is so plotting only because it fears the first. Read in detail any account of the policy leading up to any war, and the truth of this will become evident. The war is rarely, if ever, produced by the questions at issue. It is produced by the mutual suspicion and fear in which the negotiations are enveloped. The issues may be difficult, irritating, incapable, even, of a solution satisfactory to both parties. But they would, in almost every case, be adjusted nevertheless, if it were not that the parties are armed. True, a nation might conceivably arm in order to enforce a claim. But weapons drive men to conflict much more often than quarrels would drive them to weapons.

And while armaments are thus a principal cause of war, they are also a principal obstacle to international organization. The formation and operation of a League of Nations would be comparatively simple if it were not for the problem of security. But there is only a problem of security because nations are armed. The great obstacle to a League is the fear of the unscrupulous member. But if the unscrupulous member were not armed, he would no longer be a source of fear. He could be coerced, if necessary, then, by other means than force—by a boycott, for example.

And if he set to work to build up armaments, he could be countered at once by precautionary action by the loyal members. Armaments, one might almost say, produce the unscrupulous action, since they alone give the hope that it may be successful. A State armed is formidable, whatever be its intentions. A State unarmed is not formidable, whatever be its intentions. Abolish armaments and you abolish fear; abolish fear and you abolish suspicion; abolish suspicion and you abolish secrecy; abolish secrecy and you have popular control; grant popular control and the people's will to peace becomes effective.

Common sense, then, shows that the complete abolition of armaments[1] is the simplest and surest road to permanent peace. It would also be technically the easiest; easier, for instance, than an all-round reduction, which bristles with notorious difficulties. What stands in the way are the habitual passions and preconceptions of men.

We English, for example, should hardly know ourselves without the "biggest navy in the world," and we have not yet realized that, if navies are to continue, that privilege is not likely to be ours much longer. Similarly, the Germans would not know themselves without "the biggest army in the world." But the fact remains that our navy is only needed because other Powers have navies, and that the German army is only needed because other Powers have armies. And this fact would carry conviction, if it could be allowed to influence men in cold blood. But it will not be. The flag will be waved in every nation. The instinctive passions will be tapped. And the counter-passions of reason, the passions for humanity and for co-operation in peace, will be merged in the flood. Per-

[1] It is hardly necessary, I suppose, to dwell upon the obvious qualifications, such as the necessity of keeping troops upon frontiers threatened by armed and uncivilized tribes.

ceiving this, some hold that we must not rely on reason at all, but on a great religious revival. But nothing would be more precarious in its effects than such a revival, if unenlightened and undirected by political reasoning and political facts. Miracles and miraculous leaders may be possible. But we cannot count on them. Neither can we trust them, even if they should occur, to give us permanent salvation. For moods pass, passions revive, errors recur. Only the slow, gradual, uphill work of learning from experience, formulating its lessons, and embodying them in institutions, accomplishes permanent transformations. We have therefore to carry on, alongside of that moral revolt without which we shall do nothing, a hard and ungrateful process of thinking and inventing, if we are to make a real step forward. To that process I wish to contribute something in what follows. I cannot make what I have to say entertaining, nor yet edifying. I cannot make it correspond to, nor give relief to, the feelings of the reader. I can only address myself to his reason and his practical sense. But that too must be done. A connexion must be made between the mood of aspiration and revolt and that complex of facts and traditions out of which the war has come, and within which the construction of the future must go on, at the hands of men working on the ordinary level of human activity and in the hard dry light of day. Having seen and shuddered at the abyss that lies before us, we have next to devise calmly and in cold blood the means we must and can employ if we are to escape it.

First, then, let me remind the reader that it is only in the political relations of States that sheer anarchy continues. Everywhere else the actual needs of modern society have long been pressing for embodiment in international organization, and, in fact, there exists a whole network of such arrangements, little known to the public, not in themselves

very interesting to most people, but important as showing that it is the internationalists, not the nationalists, that are working on the lines of the true interests and needs of modern men. Some account of these arrangements and agreements will be found in Mr. Woolf's admirable book *International Government*.[1] He shows there in detail how the closer communication effected by modern means of transport has produced a number of new needs and problems, and how these have necessitated a machinery to deal with them—a machinery which had to be international. Not only do the new means of communication require international regulation—the post, the cables, radiotelegraphy, and the like ; but the fact of communication both raises new problems and provides the possibility of solving them. Thus, for example, when travelling becomes general, the spread of infectious disease is facilitated, and measures have to be devised to check it. As international trade becomes more intricate and more extensive, States find themselves more and more unable to solve domestic problems without the co-operation of other States ; the use of white phosphorus for matches, for example, cannot be stopped, nor bounties on sugar abandoned, unless a number of States agree to common action. The translation of books into many languages leads to the need of an international law of copyright. The inconvenience of different systems of currency and weights and measures has led to the Metric Union and the Latin Monetary Union. These are examples among many others of international action by Governments, going so far, in some cases, as an international legislative body and administrative council for the subject-matter concerned. In addition, there are over four hundred private international associations that have grown up in

[1] L. Woolf, *International Government*, published for the Fabian Society by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1916.

response to international needs. Indeed, in peace-time, the political relations of States may reasonably and naturally seem to an observer to be a mere atavistic survival from an age of isolation into an age of communication. Essentially, I believe, that is what they are. But war and the passions of war show that the atavism is very powerful. Moreover, national sentiment, though it has not been able to prevent, has constantly hindered and delayed international organization, even in matters where it might have been thought political passion would not be easily stirred. We cannot, therefore, expect a sudden transformation of interstate relations after the war. On the other hand, we may be sure that, in advocating such transformation, we are on the true line of development. The question of what exactly to propose and how long the first steps may be is rather one of sagacity than of principle. The international spirit is already at work, not only in men's minds but in conditions and events. But it is at work against obstacles in feeling, tradition, and passion which have to be very seriously reckoned with.

CHAPTER X

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

IN examining the various proposals that have been put forward with a view to international organization, it will be convenient to start with the most radical, the idea of a World-State. We may concede to this idea, what its advocates claim for it, that, of political schemes, it is the only one logically complete. And for that reason it is sometimes employed by opponents of internationalism to discredit less drastic and less Utopian proposals. "If you want to stop war," it is urged, "you must have a World-State. You don't think that possible? Well, then, drop the whole idea of peace." But, in fact, even the World-State, supposing it to be established, could not make war impossible; for nothing can. Civil war might occur in such a State, as it occurred, after the federal union, in the United States. Still, the State is the closest and most compact form of political association. And since it implies, within its territory, that force shall be used only to back law, and that there shall be only one force, that of the government, the inclusion of the whole world in a single State would solve completely, so far as form is concerned, that problem of competing policies backed by competing armaments which is the problem of war.

But to say that does not take us very far. A State

can only come into being when certain conditions are fulfilled. A self-governing State requires a considerable measure of agreement in feeling, tradition, ideas, and way of life among its members. This seems to be true even of a federal organization, though no doubt that device enables more diverse peoples to cohere in a free community than could be well comprised in a unitary State. On the other hand, peoples united by no natural or moral tie can be and have been held together in a single State, when the bond has been not free agreement but Empire. But such a bond is usually transitory, often tyrannic, and always based on force. The British Empire comprises a greater number of diverse peoples than perhaps have ever been held together under a single rule; and to keep the peace over so large an area is a notable service to civilization. But the British Empire is not a free Empire, beyond the limits of those self-governing Dominions which comprise but a small minority of its total population. Now, the essential problem of world peace is to bring together nations which are indeed on substantially the same level of civilization, and so far might be capable of being members of the same State, but in which history and tradition have fostered an extravagant sense of political independence. This sense, no doubt, is itself largely a product of war; and, as we have seen, during peace it is always being undermined by international communication. But it will have been reinforced, as between the rival groups, by the present war; and though, on each side, the allies have been brought for the time being into friendly relations, that conjunction is likely to count for little as against the factors making for independence. It is hardly necessary to labour this point. The advocates of a World-State have only to concentrate themselves on Europe, and imagine

themselves standing up before any audience of ordinary Englishmen to recommend that the British Empire and Germany, or even France, shall form one State, to feel the full force of it. A European State, and a fortiori a World-State, even in a form of the loosest federation that could be called a State, is not at present a serious political conception.

But we are not therefore driven back at once upon international anarchy. The problem is to find the greatest measure of organization which the state of feeling and intelligence that will exist after the war will tolerate. I think it clear that they will not tolerate a World-State nor yet a European State. What less than this might they tolerate ?

If States are to remain independent, not united even by a loose federal Constitution, all organized relations between them must be based upon treaty. Every kind of plan that does not fuse them into a single State implies this condition. We are met, therefore, at the outset, with the new scepticism about treaties. What is the use of "scraps of paper" ? the critic contemptuously asks, and dismisses the whole subject as Utopian nonsense. Now, it must be evident that it is not only "pacifist" schemes that are open to this attack. Not a single one of the objects which the Allies have put before them in this war can be achieved by any other means than treaties. Is the independence of small States to be guaranteed ? How ? By treaty ! Are new frontiers to be laid down ? How ? By treaty ! It is impossible to profess a general scepticism about the observation of treaties without reducing to an absurdity the whole programme for which we profess to be fighting. Treaties, it is true, may include provisions instituting a sanction against those who break them, and this question of sanctions we shall presently discuss. But the

application of an agreed sanction depends itself on the States concerned being willing to fulfil their agreement to apply it. There is no escape from this circle. Grant the continued existence of independent States, and they can only organize by treaty. And the fulfilment of the treaty must depend, in the last resort, on their sense of honour or of interest, or of both.

But a treaty that is to guarantee justice and peace must be of a new kind. Its object is not to strengthen some States against others, but to substitute in some way and in some measure (presently to be discussed) peaceable settlement for war. And the first point to be made is, that it belongs to the nature of such a treaty that it should be open to all civilized nations desiring to come in. For to exclude any nation is to announce that between it and the contracting nations war, not peaceable settlement, is to be the rule. On the other hand, a nation refusing to come in would offer a presumption that it intends to continue the way of war. It would announce itself a potential enemy of the others, against which they must continue to guard themselves. And should any State or States announce such a policy, the treaty would in effect constitute a defensive alliance against such State or States.

The application of this remark to a situation that may arise after the war is obvious. If Great Britain and her allies, while entering into the proposed agreement among themselves, should deliberately exclude the Central Powers, they would be perpetuating the armed peace that preceded the war and preparing the way for a new war; for the Central Powers could only regard such an arrangement as directed offensively against themselves, and would of course act accordingly. On the other hand, should the Central Powers be invited to come in, and refuse, suspicion

would legitimately rest upon them, and they must be held responsible for perpetuating the European anarchy. On the action that the Allies and the German Powers respectively may take on this matter may depend the future of civilization. A point of such immense importance clearly ought not to be decided under the influence of war passion, but in the dry light of reason. If it be believed, as it is believed not unnaturally by the present enemies of Germany, that the German will is incurably set upon war for the sake of conquest, the best way of testing that belief is to invite Germany to join a League of which it is the object to rule out such policies. If it be replied that they would only come in in order to wreck the scheme, it must be shown in detail how they can do this. On the face of it, it would be easier to watch their proceedings and to keep track of their armaments if they were inside than if they were outside. And if the fear is that they would detach members of the League, why should they be able to do that more easily from within than from without? A Germany determined to fight rather than await or abide by the decisions of an international Court or Council would be a Germany opposed to the purposes of the league. But equally, whether she were outside or inside. And in either case the only way of meeting her hostile action would be by the joint action of the Powers faithful to the alliance. If Germany were excluded by the Allies, the Allies would lie open to suspicion. If she excluded herself, she would lie open to suspicion. If she were invited to come in, and came in, there would be the same guarantee against her as there would be if she remained outside. For to provide such a guarantee against a Power making aggressive war is precisely the primary object of the League.

The inclusion, then, of all the most powerful States seems

to be the most favourable, if not an essential, condition of success. Otherwise we might get merely two opposed groups, as before the war, and so move again to the same catastrophe. If the Great Powers came in, no doubt the smaller States would be willing to join. And the practical question would then be, not who should be admitted, but who, if any, should be excluded. The only tests to apply here would be that of capacity for deliberative action and that of public honesty. The representatives of no State must be purchasable. What States might be legitimately excluded by such tests as these it will be a difficult and invidious task to determine. It is superfluous and would, indeed, be pedantic to attempt it here. But it must be remarked that a League from which all small States, as such, should be excluded would be viewed by those States with great suspicion. For it might well look like a League for disposing unjustly of their interests. On the other hand, it is certain that in any League that might be formed the great States would predominate. The small States would have perforce to be content with the right to represent their views fairly and effectively.

Assuming the formation of a League of States for the general purpose of guaranteeing international order, how are the objects of such a League to be defined? For they must be defined, and strictly: since we are contemplating an alliance not for any and every purpose the States may conceive to conduce to their interests, but for the guarantee of Right according to some clear rule. For this purpose the pursuit of "righteousness," as suggested by Mr. Roosevelt, is far too vague a formula. The "righteousness" of States is too often that of the wolf to the lamb; and a League with such a roving commission would be a public menace to any State not of it, and constantly at dispute within itself as to what is righteous and what not. Let

us proceed, then, to examine the possible functions of such a League, starting with the essential minimum.

This minimum would seem to be the keeping of the peace. That is the primary function of all government and the one earliest established. If there were a single World-State and a single police force, the peace would, of course, be kept by its government so long as the State subsisted. In a world of independent States the keeping of the peace can only be based on treaty. And such a treaty may be more or less drastic. The very least obligation it could impose, if the purpose were to be at all attained, would be an obligation to refer disputes to peaceable settlement in the first instance, leaving open an ultimate resort to force. Such an arrangement as this may be called the "minimum." For it is the very smallest measure of international organization that could achieve anything. It has already been adopted in a series of treaties drawn up between the United States and other countries. These treaties are bilateral, that is, each is contracted between the United States and one other State. And the essence of them is that all disputes between the contracting parties which diplomacy has been unable to settle should be referred to a permanent Commission for inquiry and report, the parties to abstain meantime from all military action.[1] Our proposal, so far, would be a generalization of such an agreement, all the States jointly binding themselves in that sense.

Such an agreement, it will be observed, leaves it open to the contracting States to have recourse to hostilities after the Commission has made its report, in the case that either or both of them cannot accept the recommendations that may be offered nor come to an understanding on the basis of the facts ascertained.

For the moment I purposely leave aside the question

[1] See Notes to this chapter.

whether any sanction, or what, can be put behind such an agreement. Let us suppose that, either because of a sanction or in the absence of one, the agreement is observed, and the dispute referred for peaceable settlement. What about the interval during which the Commission of inquiry is examining the issue?—an interval which may extend, say, to a year. The case may clearly arise in which a State contemplates making war at the end of the period, in the belief that no satisfactory *modus vivendi* can or will be devised. Such a State might at once begin preparing for war, and by doing so cause its opponents to do the same. A very dangerous situation would at once be created, and one which might precipitate war even before the period of delay is exhausted. It seems evident, therefore, that the agreement should contain a clause prohibiting not only war but "preparation for war" during the period prescribed. That "preparation for war" is a term needing much difficult definition is obvious. Increase of armaments beyond what existed, or were in preparation, before the crisis arose, must of course be regarded as a breach of the treaty. And the proof of this breach would be facilitated if there existed an international agreement defining the extent of armaments to be maintained by the respective States. Further, "mobilization" must be defined and must be prohibited during the prescribed period of delay. A further point arises in connexion with the interval during which the Court is hearing the case or the Council considering it. There must not be, during this interval, a continuance of the act that is the cause of the dispute. This means that the Court or the Council, or both, must have the power of injunction. And if a sanction is to be applied (a point to be discussed presently), there must be a sanction against breach of the injunction.

The case, then, we will assume, has been heard and the decision given, or the recommendation made, by the international authority. It is then, according to the "minimum" plan I am examining, open to the States concerned either to accept the solution thus offered, in which case the matter is ended; or to agree by diplomatic procedure on some modification of what the international authority has proposed or decided; or, failing either of these, to seek a way out by war. But this last step, though it might be taken without breach of treaty or formal penalty, would surely be taken with reluctance and hesitation. For a State making war in defiance of the decision of an international authority would have put itself very wrong with public opinion. It would be unlikely to find allies. It should, indeed, be a provision of the general treaty that obligations incurred under any special treaties of alliance that may continue to exist should cease in a case where public law is being defied.[1] And though the other Powers would not be bound to intervene by force, they would be not unlikely to do so. We may say then, on the whole, that recourse to war in defiance of the international authority, though permissible, would be very hazardous and not lightly attempted.

But it may be suggested, at this point, why not go further? Why should not the treaty include an obligation to abide by the international decision?

In dealing with this question we must advert to an important distinction. There are two kinds of international disputes. One comprises those that are sometimes called "justiciable." They have been defined thus:—

"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a

[1] As in the scheme of the British group; see clause 18.

breach of any international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for any such breach." [1]

Such cases are capable of reference to a purely judicial tribunal and of solution by judicial principles; and there is force in the view that every State ought to bind itself to give effect to the decisions of such a tribunal, just as every suitor is bound to submit to the decisions of his national courts. The English "League of Nations Society" takes that view and embodies it in its programme. So do the proposals of the British group. The question is really how far States and peoples will be ready to go. It may perhaps be apprehended that they will be unwilling to bind themselves beforehand to anything the consequences of which they cannot more or less foresee. They will ask whether the court might not condemn them to some course of action they would regard as detrimental to their "vital interests." This, it is true, is not a very admirable attitude. If, for instance, the question were one of the interpretation of a treaty, say a boundary treaty, a State refusing to accept the decision of a competent court because it would thereby be excluded from the ownership of valuable mineral deposits would be morally in a very discreditable position. Unfortunately, States have been in the habit of accepting such discreditable positions and brazening it out. That they should cease to do so is essential to the maintenance of peace and order. But perhaps they will not do so beforehand by a general act of renunciation. Americans, for instance, put the case, that the decision of a court might and probably would ratify a sale to another European Power of one of the Danish West Indian Islands, and that such a sale

[1] This is the definition of the British group. A more elaborate definition will be found in the Fabian scheme. The decision as to whether a case is justiciable or no might be left to the Court or to whatever other body the contracting States might agree upon.

would be contrary to the "vital interests" embodied in the Monroe doctrine. It is difficult to foresee all possible cases of the kind; and the more difficult because treaties are apt to be vague in their terms—purposely, one is sometimes tempted to think—and because the principles of international law are also vague and there is little case-law to give it certainty and coherence. There may therefore be more reason than at first sight appears in the hesitation of a State to bind itself beforehand to accept the decision of a tribunal in justiciable cases. It is true that, up to the present, no State has refused to accept the award of a Tribunal of arbitration. But then most States have abstained from binding themselves to arbitrate any and every justiciable issue.[1] And that is what the treaty we are contemplating would bind them to do. On the other hand, it may be urged with force that if the decision of a Court should support a State in some action which the other party held to be contrary to its vital interests, the issue would pass into the other class of "non-justiciable" disputes and be dealt with by the method now to be referred to. There would thus still be a procedure of relief for the party aggrieved, even if it lost its case in the Court.

It is this other class of non-justiciable cases that causes most of the trouble; cases, that is, of sheer conflict of interest where no legal issue is involved. These are not capable of judicial decision, for they do not turn on points of law. They are purely political, and hitherto have been capable of no solution except that of diplomacy or of arms. Two points arise here. To what body should they be submitted? And should the States bind themselves to accept the decisions of that body?

As to the first point, the most conservative suggestion

[1] They have commonly (though not always) excluded cases touching their independence, honour, or vital interests.

put forward is that of Dr. Lawrence,[1] that the Concert of the Powers (we must not say of Europe, for we hope non-European States may be included) should be the Body to which such disputes should be referred. This is probably the course diplomatists and statesmen would suggest. It leaves the power in their hands and involves the least possible change in the existing order. But it is open to certain obvious objections. The Concert, hitherto, has been a body of statesmen assembled to measure the existing forces, to balance national egotisms, and to see whether, this time, war is worth while or not, or whether it can be postponed by some kind of temporary compromise. It is a body meeting in secret. It does not publish reports of its proceedings. At most, it records its decisions in protocols and treaties. It is thus removed from all possibility of popular control and from quick response to currents of opinion that may be running strong in the nations. The Concert no doubt has done good service on occasions. It has marked a step towards international organization. But we ought to be able to go a good step farther.

A more radical suggestion has been put forward by the British group, and is implied in the phrase "Council of Conciliation" employed by the American "League to Enforce Peace" and the English "League of Nations Society." The proposal is that the nations who are parties to the treaty should appoint a Council to investigate, and make reports and recommendations on, any "non-justiciable" dispute which diplomacy has not been able to settle. Since this Council is not to have any executive powers, and its recommendations are not to be binding on the governments, it should be made as independent of these as possible. Thus, the appointments should be for fixed periods of time, and should be subject to a veto by the

[1] See the *Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale.*

legislature. Nor should they be made simply from the diplomatic class, but should include representatives of the great social forces and interests. In particular, labour should be represented. Such a Council, composed of members not acting under the instructions of their governments, and not appointed to represent a particular view on the issue in question, should be able to develop, by contact, the "international mind," and to offer suggestions prompted by a genuine desire to further the united interests of civilization, instead of voicing merely a compromise between conflicting national ambitions. The procedure of such a body would have, of course, to be worked out in detail; and there would have to be a rule as to the number of members to be assigned to each State, whether it should be the same for each, or whether account should be taken of relative size and power. It should be observed, however, that this latter question has not the same importance for an advisory body that it would have for an executive.

The Council should have power to call upon the parties to appear before it, and to give decision in default if any party refused to appear. If it could settle the issue by private conferences, well and good. But if this failed, then the essential point is, that it should publish its report on the whole issue, and its recommendations, with a reasoned defence of them, and thus appeal to the public opinion of the world to support a peaceful settlement, worked out by an impartial body, rather than to have recourse to the hazardous arbitrament of war. In many cases it may reasonably be hoped the appeal would be successful. If it were not, then all the proposals to which we have referred leave open resort to war;[1] they do not, that is to

[1] At any rate, in most cases. For details, see the schemes, and also Notes to this chapter.

say, put the contracting States under treaty obligation to oppose with their joint forces a State making war in defiance of the recommendations of the Council. The proposals of the British group provide that, in this case, the States shall meet in concert and consider whether they shall take action and what the action shall be.

But now, it may be asked, why not bind the States beforehand to accept the recommendations of the Council? The question can only be met by another, Would the nations agree so to bind themselves? The cases to be referred to the Council will include all those which are most apt to cause wars—those, that is, where "vital interests" or "honour" are involved. Will the nations consent beforehand to accept in such matters the decision of an international body? Perhaps the time is coming when they will. But the proposals we are considering assume that the time is not yet.

The proposal, then, at which we have arrived so far is as follows: an international agreement to which all civilized States shall be admitted, to refer to peaceable settlement all disputes that they have failed to settle by diplomacy; the reference to be either, if the disputes are "justiciable," to an international Tribunal, or, if they are non-justiciable, to a Council of Conciliation. We have noted further, that it may be held with some reason that the contracting States should bind themselves also to give effect to the judgment of the Tribunal; but that it does not seem reasonable to ask them, at the present stage, to bind themselves to give effect to the recommendations of the Council.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 176.—The American Treaties.

The following are the essential clauses of the Anglo-American Treaty of September 15, 1914:—

"The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, other than disputes the settlement of which is provided for and, in fact, achieved under existing agreements between the High Contracting Parties, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a Permanent International Commission to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is published.

"The International Commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows:—

"One member shall be chosen from each country by the Government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each Government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two Governments, it being understood that he shall not be a citizen of either country."

The other treaties (there are now twenty-nine) follow the same general lines.

Page 179.—The Court of International Justice.

The present Hague Tribunal ("Permanent Court of Arbitration") is not really a permanent Court. The arrangement is that each of the States that have acceded to the Convention nominates four judges who must be "of known competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of arbitrators." The appointment is for six years. When a dispute arises, the parties appoint the judges from this panel. Failing some other arrangement made between the parties, the procedure laid down is that each party nominates two judges to form the tribunal, and these appoint an umpire. If the judges cannot agree upon the umpire, the choice is handed over to a third Power, agreed upon by the States that are parties to the dispute. Or, if they cannot agree upon such a Power, each selects one

Power, and these two Powers make the appointment. There is also an alternative arrangement for "summary procedure."

An arrangement of this kind shows that, as things are, States have regarded their own nominees as likely to favour their own side and the nominees of the other party as likely to favour its side. In other words, impartiality is hardly expected, and perhaps is not commonly desired. The effect is, that the decision will often rest with the umpire. So that really the tendency of the arrangement is to leave the dispute to be decided by one man, without appeal. As an American writer puts it, "The result is almost inevitable that, in a close case, each nation has an equal number of advocates and there is but one real judge in the court, the umpire, who has been selected by the other judges." He comments, "It would be unsatisfactory for private individuals to submit trifling disputes of their own to the decision of one man, especially if they did not know in advance who he would be, and with the understanding that there would be no appeal; it is very doubtful whether many individuals would agree to submit all their disputes to such a person." [1]

It may be remarked on this that, in fact, important disputes between capital and labour are submitted to such a tribunal. Still, the procedure is plainly unsatisfactory. And the nature of the court may be one of the reasons that have deterred nations from submitting important disputes to arbitration.

Clearly, however, the main reason is that most important disputes are not "justiciable"; and that nations are naturally unwilling to accept beforehand a decision given by people whose impartiality they do not trust on matters which they consider to be of vital importance to them, and as to which there are no recognized principles of law that are applicable. The transference of all such cases to a different body, with a different procedure (the proposed "Council of Conciliation") would open the way to improving the constitution of the court, which would then become truly a court of justice administering law. The improvement in question would naturally aim at a permanent court of impartial judges. The institution of such a court was, in fact, part of the labours of the Hague Conference of 1907. The immediate difficulty was the method of appointing the judges. In the case of national judges,

[1] T. R. White in the *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. i. p. 311.

there is a national Executive to whom that function can be, and usually is, entrusted. But there is no international Executive. It is interesting to note that the same problem arose when the Constitution of the United States was being discussed. It was proposed in the Convention that the judges who were to decide disputes between the States of the proposed Union should be appointed by the States. But this idea was abandoned and the appointment entrusted to the President. In our case, however, there is no President, and the Hague Conference could only fall back on appointment by the States. But then there were forty-four States, and a court of forty-four was too big. Finally, a very elaborate scheme was devised, whereby a court of fifteen permanent judges would be set up, of whom each of the Great Powers would always appoint one, while the other States would divide the rest among them according to an elaborate system of rotation. This scheme, however, failed to secure the assent of the smaller States, and remains a project. Various other attempts have been made to solve the problem. An account of some of them will be found in the *Proceedings of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (1912).[1] Among recent suggestions the following may be referred to:—

The Fabian scheme proposes that each State that is a party to the treaty shall nominate one candidate; that the International Council which they propose shall be created shall select from these the fifteen judges, who shall comprise the eight candidates selected by the Great Powers, the remaining seven being balloted for from among the remaining candidates.[2]

The Dutch scheme[3] would retain the existing "panel" system, whereby the tribunal for any particular issue is selected from among judges previously appointed by the States. But in this project, instead of the judges for a given issue being nominated for the occasion by the parties concerned, the court would be made up of the two judges originally nominated (for a fixed period of years) by the States that are parties in the case, or, in case they be more than two, by the two senior of such nominees, and of a President agreed upon by the States that are parties, or, failing their agreement, nominated by the Presidential Bureau of the full court.

Mr. T. R. White[4] suggests that each nation shall nominate one

[1] Washington, D.C. [2] See clause 12 of the scheme.

[3] *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. i. p. 241. [4] Ibid.

judge and one deputy judge; that the Hague Conference shall confirm or reject the nominations; that if the number of candidates confirmed shall exceed seventeen, the Conference shall by ballot elect an "appellate division" of the court, consisting of not less than nine or more than fifteen judges; and that this division, besides its appellate jurisdiction, shall also have original jurisdiction of disputes between sovereign States. The appellate division shall divide the remaining judges into divisions of not less than five judges, who shall have jurisdiction in all suits by a citizen of one nation against another nation, and of such disputes between sovereign Powers as may be submitted to them by treaty.

Once the functions of the Court were explicitly limited to "justiciable" cases, it seems probable that the difficulties of appointing the judges would be solved in some way or other.

But there is a further point of difficulty.

By the treaty proposed, States would agree to submit to the Court all "justiciable" cases, without excepting cases dealing with "independence, honour, and vital interests." The question, therefore, of what cases are to be held "justiciable" becomes one of the first importance.

It may be presumed that the treaty would contain a general definition of "justiciable" cases.[1] But it might often be matter of doubt and dispute whether any particular case fell under the definition. And the matter would be the more important if States had bound themselves to abide by the judgment of the Court. States may therefore be expected to consider this point with some anxiety. The scheme of the British group, and also the Fabian scheme, would leave the question whether the case be "justiciable" or no to the Court; which seems to be reasonable, since the question is a judicial one. On the other hand, it is objected that this would give too much power to the Court, which would tend to draw all cases into its jurisdiction. This objection has been taken, for example, by Mr. Elihu Root. To meet the not unreasonable susceptibilities of States, in the early stages of a new arrangement, various devices have been suggested. Thus, the Fabian scheme suggests that an appeal might lie to the International Council in the case of a dispute adjudged by the Court to be justiciable, whereby either party might ask that a treaty under which the case falls shall be

[1] See the draft of the British group, clause 4; the Fabian scheme, clause 14; the Dutch scheme, art. 16.

abrogated, or the law modified or further defined (see clauses 16*a*, 16*b*). By the Dutch scheme the States are permitted the alternative of bringing their dispute before the Council of Conciliation, except in certain defined cases. (See section 3 of the *Exposé des motifs* of this scheme.)

Page 181.—The Council of Conciliation.

There is a pretty general agreement, among those who have put forward proposals for international organization, that a Council should be created whose function should be to inquire into and make recommendations upon "non-justiciable" disputes. Naturally many points of difficulty arise as to the appointment of the members of such a Council, their relation to their governments, and the organization of the procedure. One or two of the more important points may be touched upon here.

1. In the first place, if (as proposed in the text) the Council is only to inquire and recommend, and neither has itself executive power nor can engage governments to use their executive power, or to act on its recommendations, its members need not be and, in my judgment, should not be mere agents of their governments, acting under instructions. The Council should be a permanent body; that is, its members should be appointed for a fixed period of years, not *ad hoc* for a particular issue, as to which they may be supposed to take a particular view agreeable to their government; and they should deliberate freely and decide freely. Only so could the Council be expected to acquire an international mind and to arrive at conclusions which should not be a mere temporary compromise between competing national ambitions and claims, but should rest on a principle of equity and a desire to find a permanent solution favourable to the general interests of civilization.

2. As to the method of appointment, the States who were parties to the agreement would appoint each so many members. And it must be left to each State to decide how it will appoint. In autocratic States, the appointment would naturally be by the governments. Democratic States might try other and more popular methods. At the very least, they might give a veto to their representative organ upon the nomination by governments, with a view to securing the appointment of people likely to be in sympathy with popular aspirations. A Council recruited from among diplo-

mats of the old school and tradition could hardly be expected to operate in the spirit of a new internationalism. If a State had the right to appoint several members, as would probably be desirable, it could select, as well as an international statesman, representatives of those great interests that are commonly ignored in international affairs, especially a representative of Labour. It should be recognized that international questions do not constitute the subject of a "science," to be handled only by experts in that science; but are to a great extent questions of common sense and decent feeling. On the other hand, experience in dealing with men and a competent knowledge of international history and relations would be requisite.

3. Ought each nation to have equality of representation? Or should representation be proportional to actual power? This question would be one of the first importance, if we were constituting an international Legislature with authority to bind the States. It is of subordinate importance for an advisory body, which can neither take action itself nor impose it on governments, and the members of which ought not to vote, as a mere matter of course, in the interest of their own State. Probably, for such a Council, equality of votes might be accepted; or some rather simple compromise might be adopted, such as that which would give three members to each of the Great Powers and one to each of the others. (See the Dutch scheme, art. 109.) An attempt to find out a satisfactory basis of apportionment, taking account of all the positive factors in which States differ in importance—e.g. wealth, population, and military or naval power—would meet with difficulties which might be insuperable at an early stage in international organization. The problem, however, was tackled by the Hague Conference, and with success, in drafting a constitution for the International Prize Court, and also in planning a Court of International Justice, though in the latter case the scheme devised failed to secure general agreement. All these difficulties will be superable as soon as people want to solve them. But probably, in the constitution of the Council of Conciliation, this one could be evaded, for the reasons given. An interesting attempt to solve the problem, and a full discussion of it, will be found in the Fabian scheme (see note to art. 7 thereof).

4. If, as would probably be advisable, each State, or some of he States, appointed several members, we have to contemplate a Council of, say a hundred members. Such a large body would have

to work mainly through committees. The Dutch scheme works out a possible procedure as follows: When a dispute arises between States, and is referred to the Council, it will go before a committee composed of the two members already appointed as permanent members of the Council by each of the States that are parties to the dispute or (if each has more than two members) by the two senior members so appointed. So far, the committee is formed automatically. The President is to be appointed by agreement between the States concerned, or, in case they fail to agree within a month, by the Presidential Bureau of the Council. The committee will come to its decisions by majority vote, but the majority must contain at least one representative of each of the States concerned. A decision thus arrived at is binding on the parties. If the committee fails to arrive in this way at an agreement, the matter will be referred back to the whole Council. The Council will then adopt a recommendation, which, however, will not be binding on the States.

This ingenious project, then, makes it possible for the Council (through the committee) to give an obligatory decision, but only if at least one of the representatives of each of the States at issue concur. Otherwise, the whole Council can proceed (presumably on the report of a committee) to make a non-binding recommendation.

It may be noted here that there are two distinct functions which may be attributed to the Council: (1) to mediate and effect a compromise between disputants; (2) to make a full inquiry and offer a scheme of radical settlement on some principle which may later be used in dealing with analogous cases; as, for example, in a question of the "Open Door," or of the rights of nationalities. Which of these procedures may be required will depend, of course, on the particular case. But it has been suggested that they could not be appropriately entrusted to the same Body. I am not convinced by this argument, which will be found ably set forth in *War and Peace* for March 1917. This number contains an examination of the various problems involved in the machinery of a League of Nations under the title "The Framework of Peace."

I have adverted to these points to show that those who have concerned themselves with this idea have not shirked the labour of working out details. At the same time, it must be recognized that it may be pedantic to do much in this direction, before we have any guarantee that the general idea will secure acceptance.

CHAPTER XI

THE QUESTION OF A SANCTION TO THE TREATY

I PASS on to the question which no doubt has long been in the reader's mind. Will this treaty be a mere "scrap of paper"? Or can we, and should we, put a sanction behind it?

This question is closely connected with another. Will the nations after the war continue to arm? It will seem to many readers rather naïve even to ask such a question. But there are some who believe that, if civilization is to be saved, the nations must disarm, and that economic exhaustion, if nothing else, will compel them to do so. Thus we read in an article in the *Nineteenth Century*: "That something in the nature of a general disarmament should take place after the war is not merely desirable: it is absolutely necessary, in order to permit of the financial recuperation of the world."[1]

Who wrote that sentence? "A pacifist, of course." Not at all! None other than Lord Cromer! Let those militarists who desire to pour contempt on the idea seek out the proconsul, not the pacifist! If there were in Europe statesmen of genius who understood and cared about what is important for mankind; if there were among the peoples

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, July 1916, p. 31.

a profound revulsion from war, accompanied by a comprehension of its causes ; then a general all-round disarmament would appear to be an obvious piece of common sense. Not that disarmament would be an infallible safeguard against war ; for there might still arise between nations disputes which they could not, or would not, adjust peaceably, and they might then begin once more to create and equip armies—as happened, for example, in the case of the American Civil War. Still, as we have sufficiently shown, the existence of armaments is a principal cause of war ; just as in civil life there would be more quarrels, as well as more deadly ones, if every one carried a sword or a pistol. The project of disarmament is not absurd. On the contrary, it is the most simple, direct, and natural means to that prevention of war which so many people profess to have in view. Nor is it necessarily impracticable. Given a lead by an imaginative statesman, and organized support by the Press, the Churches, and the moral and intellectual forces of all countries, and the thing would be done. It is therefore worth while to consider more closely what is meant by disarmament.

Is it meant that no public force at all would be maintained ? Not necessarily, and not probably. A police force is, after all, an armed force ; and police forces are approved by all except those who think, with Tolstoi, that no force of any kind should ever be used. Further, on the frontiers of ordered States, a force analogous to a police force would be required as a protection against uncivilized tribes living in a state of chronic war. This would be the case, for example, on the frontiers of Egypt, or Algeria, or India. What disarmament means is the scrapping of the enormous and constantly increasing forces which civilized nations maintain with a view to war against one another.

But next, in the event of disarmament, so interpreted, would it be necessary, or possible, to create a common force, supplied and controlled by all the nations jointly, to overawe any one of their number who might commit an offence against public international law and treaties? For we must not, of course, assume that, because there are no armies, there will be no offences. Such an international force would be the equivalent of the national police force, and its object would be solely to maintain public law. It must, however, be admitted that the creation and organization of such a force would be very difficult, because we are not dealing with a World-State, but with a number of independent States endeavouring to organize their mutual relations. And perhaps an international force would be too difficult to organize until these States have acquired the habit of acting together politically. I leave the matter there, because the question of an international force, entirely under international control, and not at all under national, will not come over the horizon of serious discussion unless and until the nations have agreed to scrap their national armaments. And I do not wish to put too great a strain upon the reader's imagination.

I will now proceed to what appears to me the more likely alternative. The nations, we will suppose, will not disarm, though they may and should reduce their armaments by agreement. I return to that point later. The nations remain armed. Then comes the question, ought they to agree to support by their national armaments the treaty which we are advocating?

On this point there is difference of opinion. The American "League to Enforce Peace," which has on this point the support of the Allied Governments as well as that of President Wilson,[1] proposes that the States enter-

[1] See the quotations at the beginning of this Part.

ing into the treaty should use their national forces jointly against any member of the League that should have recourse to arms before referring the dispute to the machinery of arbitration and conciliation. The clause in the American programme is very drastic :—

> The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

The "League of Nations Society" would further bind the signatories to use force against a State, not a member of the League, that should attack a member without first referring the dispute to arbitration or conciliation. The project of the British group adopts the same position.

The arguments in favour of this course are fairly obvious. The first objection apt to be taken to such a treaty as we are proposing is that it would not be observed. Well, here is the sanction : "Observe the treaty, or face the world in arms." Those who believe, as many people seem to do, that Germany would not have made war in 1914 if she had been sure that England would come in, must believe with even more conviction that she would not have made it had all other States been under treaty obligation to fight her if she did. As political reasoning goes (of all reasoning the most hazardous), this conclusion seems beyond dispute. Of course, it may always be urged by the sceptical that a State desiring to make aggressive war might intrigue with members of the League, making sure beforehand that some, perhaps the chief of them, would, in fact, not fulfil their treaty obligations, and might then risk war with comparative security. And, no doubt, this is possible. It would mean that the treaty had broken down. But is that a reason for

not entering into the treaty? If it be, then the same reason holds against any and every treaty, including, for instance, such as may be entered into after the war to guarantee the security of small States. If our treaty broke down, we should be back in the international anarchy. But the possibility of failure can be no reason for not making the attempt. I suggest, then, that a treaty with this sanction behind it has at least a very good chance of being observed.

On the other hand, strong objections are taken to the imposition of a sanction. They are taken, in the first place, by those who think that all and every use of force is wrong. I do not here argue against that view, which perhaps lies beyond argument. I take, myself, the common view, that the employment of force is legitimate when the force is used against a law-breaker.

But there are also objections of a less radical kind. They will be found ably set forth in a pamphlet by Mr. Ponsonby entitled *The Basis of International Authority*.[1] He argues first that the obligation to support the treaty by armaments would furnish a motive to States for continuing armed. This is true. And if armaments can be abolished, I certainly should not argue for their maintenance merely in order to provide a sanction for our treaty. For the sanction, if required, might be provided, in that case, by an international force. On the other hand, if national armaments are to be maintained (which is my present assumption, and also Mr. Ponsonby's), then national armaments constitute a clear temptation to a State to attack another State, in defiance of the agreement; and it seems necessary to provide against this contingency. Secondly, Mr. Ponsonby thinks that States will be less ready to enter into the agreement if it involves the eventual use of force.

[1] Published by the League of Peace and Freedom, 180 St. Stephen's House, Westminster.

But the Allied Governments, as well as President Wilson, have now given their support to the scheme that proposes the sanction,[1] so that this objection falls.

Thirdly, Mr. Ponsonby argues that "a serious and dangerous dispute between nations will now become a world war, not possibly, but certainly." But this is hardly accurate. A world war could only arise, as a result of the treaty, if one State made war on another in breach of the agreement. And, as I have already argued, this contingency is not likely to occur, unless the agreement has already been undermined in preparation for a world war. Small quarrels between small States would certainly be obviated by the mere threat of armed intervention by the Great Powers; and a single Great Power, acting alone, or even a combination of two such, would hardly take the risk of facing the rest in arms. A combination of forces to defy the League equal to those ready to maintain it would no doubt take the risk; but that would imply a state of things pregnant in any case with world war, quite apart from this question of obligation to intervene in support of the treaty. Mr. Ponsonby's further point, that the small States would be under the tutelage of the great, is no doubt true; but they are and must be so in any case. Finally, his statement that to put force behind the treaty is to fall back into the fallacy *Si vis pacem para bellum* seems to be very questionable. Competing national armaments do provoke war. But an agreement to use those armaments to enforce resort to peaceable settlement might prevent it. While national armaments subsist, the danger of war subsists. But the danger, I submit, will be diminished, not enhanced, by the arrangement suggested.

Further, force, when used by the League to support

[1] See the quotations at the beginning of this Part.

the agreement, will have changed its nature. It will have become, by definition, force to suppress aggression. And the aggressor, for the first time in history, will be clearly defined as a State making war without first having recourse to the international machinery for peaceable settlement. This is a perfectly clear definition.[1] And no State making war of that kind could pretend, even to its own subjects, that it was on its defence against aggression. In other words, from such a State is taken the plea whereby governments always claim the support of their people, that they are waging a "war of defence." Any government would be loath to make war under such circumstances. But if it did, then the forces used against it would be used, beyond dispute, in the cause of right and law. They would have, therefore, a moral justification which is unique. They could claim to be "righteous" by a quite definite test. When that happens, the nature of force is transformed. It is regrettable to have to employ it. But is it not better to do so than still to have force, but to have it employed only for the purposes of national aggrandizement? Mr. Ponsonby's proposal seems either to leave it open to any nation to make an aggressive attack upon another; or else to rely on the other nations coming in, although they have no agreement to do so. But would not the agreement make the contingency calling for intervention much less likely to arise?

We have been considering, hitherto, the case where one or more members of the League make or threaten an armed attack on another member, in breach of the agreement to refer the dispute to peaceable settlement. Such

[1] A pamphlet entitled *The Community of Nations*, published by the St. Clement's Press, argues to the contrary. But I do not find the argument cogent.

acts of force can only be met by force; and the sanction, if there is to be one, must therefore be the sanction of arms. But now, should a sanction also be put behind the decisions of the International Court of Justice? This point I leave doubtful. But if it be decided to constitute a sanction, then perhaps the sanction need not be that of armed force. It would be possible to apply an economic boycott. Such a boycott might involve some, or all, of a whole series of measures:[1] an embargo on the trade of the offender, a refusal of loans, an interruption of postal, telegraphic, telephonic and wireless communications, a prohibition of all payments to the recalcitrant State, and of all passenger traffic to or from the same; in short, the whole set of measures which are applied, when possible, in war, except the use of armed force. There can be no doubt that such a weapon, systematically applied by all States against one, would be very powerful, and that the mere threat of it would often bring the offender to reason. It is to be hoped, perhaps expected, that this form of coercion, in lieu of armed force, will be effectively developed in the future. But there are obvious difficulties connected with it, of which the principal is, that all the States inflicting the penalty must suffer themselves by it. This, it is true, is the case to a greater degree in actual war. But then war, unfortunately, carries with it a condition of emotional excitement which would hardly be aroused by a boycott, and governments attempting to impose the latter would probably be met by strong opposition from all the parties that would suffer economically. Further, although there are some States—notably the United Kingdom—that could be quickly reduced by such measures, there are others, like Russia and the Powers of Central Europe, that are far less vulnerable. Such States, more-

[1] See the Fabian scheme, § 17.

over, would probably strike out with armed force against their nearest neighbours; so that, in the case of a strong and determined State, economic pressure would be likely to lead on to armed force.

These difficulties must be recognized, but they are not conclusive against the policy suggested. And it will probably be agreed that, if a sanction is to be put behind the decisions of the Court, it should be, in the first place, economic. If, later, the recalcitrant State should meet the boycott by force, the other States must meet force by force.

The economic sanction could also be the one applied to a breach of an injunction by the Court, or to a refusal to submit a dispute to the Court or the Council.

A sanction behind the recommendations of the Council of Conciliation has not been suggested in most of the schemes put forward. If such a sanction were contemplated, it would presumably be, in the first place, economic.

I turn now to a very difficult and controversial question. We have contemplated as the most likely, though not the most desirable contingency, the continuation of national armaments. We have contemplated also—I might almost say therefore—the contingency of war, if not in breach of the treaty, yet on the failure of pacific settlement. The possibility of war thus remaining, the motive for the rivalry in armaments will remain. Must we not then expect a recurrence of the vicious circle, preparation for war engendering war?

I have no desire to minimize this difficulty. And, for that reason, it seems to me almost essential,[1] if the League is to have a reasonable chance of fulfilling its purpose, that the treaty should comprise a clause limiting armaments.

[1] See the letter by Sir Edward Fry quoted in the Notes to this chapter.

I am well aware of the difficulties in the way. The most obvious is that of proportion. It would be easy to limit or reduce armaments, once the relative military and naval strength of the different Powers had been agreed upon. But if every Power intends to become relatively stronger than it is at the moment, of course all attempts at agreement fail. Thus, the Germans, before the war, refused to limit their naval armaments on the basis of the then measure of British preponderance. And similarly, Russia no doubt would have refused to accept the then proportion of either her military or naval armaments to those of Germany. Will this difficulty continue to be insuperable? If it does, then it will be because the "will to war" is still so strong and "the will to peace" so weak among the nations, even after this war, that any treaty arrangement of the kind we are contemplating will be impossible. That may be. I am not arguing that there must inevitably be a movement towards peace. I am arguing only that, if there is not, we are faced with the prospect indicated in the first chapter. But if the conditions are such that the treaty is possible, then an agreement about armaments should also be possible.

Some pressure in that direction will be exercised by the financial situation. I have already quoted[1] Lord Cromer's remark—

> That something in the nature of a general disarmament should take place after the war is not merely desirable; it is absolutely necessary in order to permit of the financial recuperation of the world.

Unfortunately, however, the war has shown in some, if not all, States unexpected financial strength. And so far as the money is concerned, nations are quite capable of starving every other side of life—education, sanitation,

[1] P. 191.

housing, public health, everything that contributes to life, physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, in order to maintain their armaments. We must rely rather on a change of outlook than on financial pressure. We must rely on a new "will to peace." Granting that, the difficulty that was insuperable in 1899 (largely because nobody really wanted to overcome it) would prove superable now. A proportion would be worked out on the basis of all the relevant factors —population, geographical position, trade, and the like— and on that basis a low maximum limit would be fixed for both military and naval armaments. This agreement about armaments would be part of the general treaty, and an infringement of it by any Power would constitute a case for joint action by the League. The agreement would be for a term of years, and, on renewal, would be adjusted to any change in the relevant factors on which it was originally based. After the discussion at the Hague Conference of 1899, it will probably be found that the best way to establish the minimum will be to limit the amount to be expended on armaments, military and naval, by each State, leaving the States free to spend the money in detail as they think fit. Of course, this would give a greater relative strength to those who made the best use of their funds. But that is inevitable. No agreement can neutralize superior ability.

It should be noticed that the formation of the League would itself facilitate the agreement about armaments. For, since the contracting States are to contemplate the possibility of joint action, they must know what resources each and all have to rely upon. In other words, the arming must be open and aboveboard. Further, the States being guaranteed against sudden aggressive attack, a main motive for continually increasing armaments will be removed. States will come to think of their armaments more and

more as a joint police force, less and less as weapons of national aggression, or even national defence. Further, once the competition were arrested—as it would be by an agreement—armaments would serve far less than they have in the past as a provocative of war. We should have turned the corner of our principal difficulty. And here I must return once more to a point made earlier. This happy effect of an agreement to limit armaments could only be realized if all the great States were members of the proposed League. Otherwise the League would become a League against the States left out; it, as a whole, would continue to arm competitively against them as a whole; and we should be back in the old vicious circle.

The reader will not expect me to go further into the highly technical questions involved in an all-round reduction of armaments. These will be solved, if there is a will to solve them, and they can only be solved by experts. I am concerned here only with those moral and political considerations to which all technical questions should be subordinate. But there is one point I may be expected to deal with. What about British security at sea?

I will answer that question briefly, but, I hope, in a way satisfactory to the reader. Any proportion that may be fixed by agreement for reduction of armaments, taking account of all the relevant factors, would leave the British navy preponderant. And I agree that we could not as yet accept any other arrangement. Unless and until it is possible to substitute an international for national forces, that cardinal principle of British policy cannot be abandoned. So long as the chance of war must be reckoned with, or until there is an international navy, the naval preponderance of this country is essential to us. And I believe that all States, in coming to an agreement about armaments, would recognize that. Similarly, in determining

the proportion of German military armaments, her position in Central Europe, with three fronts to defend, must be taken into account. Everything possible must be done, in constructing an agreement about armaments, to avoid laying any one Power at the mercy of another in the event of war. That is the condition of any agreement being reached.

There is one further point which, though it is mainly technical, has an important political aspect. It is often urged, with force, that one of the causes making for war has been the pressure of the armament firms. The secrecy in which this matter is involved makes it difficult to deal with. But there are certain notorious facts which deserve very serious attention. In the first place, the armament firms of all nations are closely knit up into international trusts, so that the shareholders of each nation profit by the armaments that are being supplied to their enemies. There is something, to say the least, repulsive about this.

In the second place, the pecuniary interests embodied in the armament firms are created and maintained by war and rumours of war. There is a huge vested interest against peace. To what extent the armament firms actually promote panics and alarms in order to stimulate orders for guns and battleships is a matter on which we are too little informed. But at least one clear case has been revealed,[1] and it is but reasonable to suspect others.

Similarly, the relations between the military and naval departments of governments and the agents of armament firms give rise to much legitimate suspicion. When officials of the Admiralty or the War Office accept high salaries to transfer their services to armament firms (as is the case in this country), it is not unreasonable to suspect that the latter expect to profit by the connexion of their new

[1] See Notes to this chapter.

employees with members of the Government and of the permanent official staffs. And in one case at least (that of the scandals in Japan) we have full proof of the bribery of military and naval officers by the representatives of armament firms.[1] This whole unsavoury business, wherein hundreds and thousands of men and women, some holding high political, military, and naval positions, have a direct pocket interest in that very competition of armaments which is a main root of war, deserves, and should receive after the war, the fullest publicity. And it may well prove that there are strong political grounds for nationalizing the production of armaments, and that these grounds outweigh the grounds of technical efficiency which may be advanced in favour of the other plan. I attempt no pronouncement on this subject. But I was unwilling to pass over in silence a matter of such importance.

Lastly, an agreement to take, in certain contingencies, joint military and naval action will involve, I presume, some kind of international general staff, and may involve some international body with power to summon the states of the League to make war or to take such measures of commercial boycott as may be suitable to the occasion. I make no attempt to work out these institutions. They will follow from the logic of the arrangement. I will content myself with quoting from Sir Frederick Pollock :—

> All the machinery required to put the power of the League in motion would be an executive council small enough for prompt action and an international general staff to summon the Powers to give aid as the sheriff summoned the power of the county before there was a standing police, and to direct any necessary operation, whether in the nature of military expedition, blockade, embargo, or otherwise.[2]

[1] See Notes to this chapter. [2] *Manchester Guardian*, August 1916.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 193.—An International Force.

The most obvious difficulty in the way of an international force is that the contingents supplied by the various nations can hardly be supposed to be willing to serve against their own country; and, in case of coercive action being required, some contingent or other might be called upon to do so. Lord Cromer dwells upon this point in the article referred to in the text (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1916, p. 33). But since, in the event of an international force being constituted, national forces would have been reduced to quite negligible proportions, it should be possible for the international force to act effectively without employing the contingent from the offending country, and there might be a provision in the treaty to that effect. Other questions, such as the amount of the contingent to be supplied by various nations, the constitution of the general staff, the training and discipline, would present difficulties, but none that would be insuperable, granted a general will to carry out the plan. On the other hand, every difficulty would be insuperable so long as the present exaggerated sense of national importance, and inadequate sense of international obligation, continue to characterize all the great nations. The purely political problems would become capable of solution in proportion as the preliminary moral and intellectual conversion took place.

Page 198.—The Economic Boycott.

An interesting paper on the use of the economic sanction will be found in the *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. ii. An account is there given of the successful boycott applied spontaneously by peoples (not Governments): (1) by the Chinese against America in 1905, as reprisals against the treatment of Chinese immigrants into the United States; (2) by the Chinese against the Japanese in 1908, as reprisals for the high-handed action of Japan in connexion with the arrest by the Chinese authorities of a Japanese ship which was carrying arms (as the Chinese alleged) to Chinese revolutionaries; (3) by the Turks against the Austrians in 1908, after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The result of this boycott was that Austria-Hungary paid fifty-four million francs as indemnity for her seizure of the provinces. Even a boycott by a single nation is thus effective. It is to be noticed, however, that in all these cases the boycott was spontaneously imposed by the people of Oriental States. Such action is much less likely, I conceive, in the case of Western States. Thus the Paris resolutions, and all the talk of excluding German trade by tariffs, imply that trade will in fact be resumed with Germany after the war (in spite of the moral excommunication with which she is threatened) unless Governmental measures are taken to prevent it.

The Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace have interpreted their third article as follows:—

"The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or Council of Conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation, if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory without first submitting or offering to submit its grievance to the Court or Council aforesaid and awaiting its conclusion."

Page 202.—British Naval Supremacy.

I have purposely omitted a discussion of the whole question of the "freedom of the seas." I have treated the subject briefly in *War and Peace* (December 1915), and have there called attention to the position taken up by Lord Grey, both in the Hague Conference of 1907 and in his letter to the Press of August 1915, that British concessions on this point would be conditional on counter-concessions from the great military Powers as to reduction of armaments and organization for peace. The question is bound to assume great importance in the immediate future, and to handle it fully would require a separate treatise. It is ably discussed by Mr. Brailsford in *A League of Nations*. See also *War and Peace* for April 1917.

Page 202.—Reduction of Armaments.[1]

In connexion with the possibility of an agreed reduction, it is interesting to note that the Act passed in the United States for an

[1] See also below, p. 209.

increase of the Navy (1916) contains a clause authorizing the President, on the conclusion of the war, to invite the Powers to confer upon the question of general disarmament and providing that, if the Conference makes real progress towards the limiting of armies and navies, the President shall cancel the naval programme in so far as it proves itself to be inconsistent with the decisions arrived at by the Conference.

The clause is as follows:—

"Upon the conclusion of the war in Europe, or as soon as it may be done, the President of the United States is authorized to invite all the great Governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of suggesting an organization, a court of arbitration or other body, to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for adjudication and peaceful settlement, and to consider the question of disarmament and submit their recommendations to their respective Governments for approval. The President is hereby authorized to appoint nine citizens of the United States, who, in his judgment, shall be qualified for such duty, to be representatives of the United States in such a conference. . . . The President is authorized to fix the compensation of the Commissioners. . . . A sum of $200,000 is appropriated to carry into effect this provision. . . .

"If at any time before the appropriations authorized by this Act shall have been contracted for there shall have been established, with the co-operation of the United States of America, an international tribunal or tribunals, competent to secure peaceful determination of all international disputes, and which shall render unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments, then and in that case such naval expenditures as may be inconsistent with the engagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals may be suspended when so ordered by the President of the United States."

Page 203.—Armament Firms.

Some of the facts as to the interlocking of armament firms will be found in *The War Traders*, by G. H. Perris, and in a pamphlet by Mr. J. T. Newbold, *The War Trust Exposed*, published by the National Labour Press. See also the *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. ii. p. 315. The case referred to in the text is the following: The Directors of the

Deutsche Waffen und Munitions Fabrik addressed to their agent in Paris the following letter :—

"I have just telegraphed to you, 'Pray wait at Paris for our letter of to-day.' The reason of this telegram is, that we want you to have inserted in one of the most widely read newspapers in Paris, if possible the *Figaro*, an article to the following effect: 'The French War Office has decided to accelerate considerably the construction of the mitrailleuses destined for the Army and to order twice as many as it had originally intended.' Please do your best to get such an article accepted."

See Delaisi, "Le Patriotisme des plaques blindées," in *La Paix par le Droit*, 1913, p. 370. The case is cited in the second volume of the *Recueil des Rapports*.

The other case to which I refer is the bribery of Japanese naval and military officers by the representatives of the German firm of Messrs. Siemens-Schückert and also by those of Messrs. Vickers and other British armament firms. The facts were brought out in a public trial and reported fully in the Japan *Weekly Chronicle* of June and July 1914. I have read through these reports, and can therefore speak with some confidence of this particular case. The judgments given in the trial are too long to cite here. But briefly it was proved to the satisfaction of the court that a Japanese naval admiral had received bribes from the British firms of Vickers, Arrol, and Weir, and that the directors and the technical adviser of a Japanese firm acting as agents of Vickers in Japan had bribed naval officers and forged the cheques with which they paid the bribes. It is further interesting that every effort was made by the German Consulate and by the British Embassy in Tokio to prevent the facts from coming to light.

Armament firms, under the circumstances, can hardly be expected to be very patriotic. At an address given to the British Association in 1916, the President of the Engineering Section is reported to have said (referring to the need that combinations of employers should take a "wide" view of their responsibilities) :—

"If the armament ring in this country had taken such a view when it was found what an enormous supply of munitions was required, it is doubtful if there would have been such a shortage as there has been. Hundreds of firms were willing and anxious to help in the production of munitions, but when they offered their services they were met in many cases with a blank refusal, and in all cases with little encouragement. And when, under pressure from the

Government, the ring accepted outside help, in many cases the conditions imposed on the sub-contractors were unfair in the extreme, the whole idea of the ring apparently being to make all the profit they could out of the troubles of the Empire. It had been just as difficult to persuade the armament ring to give up what they thought was their monopoly, and to bring in outside works to help in the production of munitions, as it had been to persuade the trade unions to forgó trade customs and to enable outside sources of labour to be employed, such as women and other unskilled labour. But both have had to do it."

Page 204.—An International Executive.

In the *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. ii., will be found a project for an international executive by Dr. Ödön Makai, of Hungary.

He proposes that the "Conseil administratif permanent" constituted at The Hague in 1907, and composed of the diplomatic representatives of the Powers there, should be entitled the "Permanent International Administrative and Executive Council." For this purpose, there should be added to it a military, naval, and financial delegate from each State; the military delegates to form the Military Committee, the naval delegates the Naval Committee, and the financial delegates the Financial Committee. Each State would contribute in case of need a part of its naval or military forces, or both, to be fixed beforehand by these committees.

It would be the function of the Council, when the occasion should arise under the treaty, to order the mobilization of the contingents thus set apart, and the operations would be directed by the military and naval committees. In this project force is to be used, if necessary, to compel a State to appear before the Court or Council.

The idea of a Permanent Executive Council is supported also, in the same volume, by the Belgian, M. Paul Otlet. See also his book, *Les Problèmes internationaux et la Guerre* (Paris, Ronnen et Cie.).

Limitation of Armaments.

In connexion with the argument of this chapter, I append a letter by Sir Edward Fry, the British representative at The Hague in 1907. Writing in the *Nation* of November 1915, he said:—

"Some of those who have written on the settlement of Europe

after the war have passed in silence over the subject of the limitation of armaments; others have proposed that the subject should be left for discussion by the nations at a later date. But to me it seems that this limitation should be dealt with in the first instance as a matter of primary importance, and that it is in fact the very corner-stone of any peace other than an armed one. If the nations should be left at large on this point, some one or other of them would begin at once to increase his armaments, and a single nation would set the pace for the whole world. How difficult —or impossible—it would be to stop the race if once begun, we know from cruel past experience.

"The subject is beset with difficulties, and that is perhaps in part the reason why it has received less attention than it deserves. For the purpose of the present discussion, I will venture to suggest a scheme for the limitation of armaments and the maintenance of peace establishments throughout Europe.

"It is almost needless to observe that recent events have shown that treaties by themselves cannot be relied upon as affording real security, and that we must seek for some more valid guarantee.

"Almost every one who looks forward to a secure peace in future regards some form of federation as an essential part of the scheme, and the American statesmen and thinkers who have interested themselves in the probable future of Europe have pointed with great force to their own history, as furnishing a precedent which may give some light to the formation of a federation of all the great States of Europe, if not of the world. The institution therefore of some federal council is the first plank in my platform.

"Next, I suggest that the Congress which settles the terms of peace of Europe should determine the maximum of naval and military forces which each of the Powers, whether conquering or conquered or neutral, is to be allowed to maintain; that it should constitute a body of International Commissioners, charged with the duty of keeping watch and ward that the limitation be never exceeded, for which purpose they must be armed with powers of inspection and investigation of the most plenary kind; that in the case of transgression of the limits there should be a power to call upon the federated nations to enforce the observance of the arrangement.

"There is no doubt that this appointment of an international commission will have to be supported by other provisions of the peace settlement, such as the suppression of some of the docks and fortresses now in existence, the extinction of private firms for manufacturing munitions of war in all countries, and the institution of an effective system of international arbitration. Powers should also be given either to the Federal Council or to the International Commission to determine what materials and methods of war are permissible.

"If a plan of the kind indicated above were to be adopted, no indignity would be placed upon the conquered nations. They would only be called upon to bear the same limitations of their sovereign rights as their most successful neighbours, a fact which, it may well be hoped, would tend to produce a spirit of acquiescence in those nations, and check the desire for future retaliation. Furthermore, this scheme would operate to prevent the recrudescence of the military system, not only in Germany, but in all the nations of Europe.

"I venture to think that this plan is conceived in that spirit of equity and fairness towards our friends and foes alike, which, if followed, will furnish a securer basis for peace than any humiliation of one nation and exaltation of another—a basis without which no peace could be expected to be lasting.

"One of the chief difficulties to be encountered would be the determination of the maximum limit of armaments. I conceive that it should be made after a careful consideration of the extent and geographical position of each country, of its population, its commerce, and all the circumstances which could possibly affect the case. It should aim at allowing every nation a sufficient force for the performance of all its police duties, and should leave it capable of defending itself against the limited forces of its neighbours, but not sufficiently armed to encourage or even permit aggression.

"I again confess to the difficulties inherent in my scheme; but if the proposition be once conceded, that without limitation of armaments no satisfactory peace can be obtained, some machinery must be found to give effect to that object more powerful than treaties; and I earnestly invite the attention of thoughtful lovers of peace to the solution of this important question,

"Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum."

With regard to this question of reduction of armaments, the following references may be useful :—

Interparliamentary Union : Publication No. 5, "La Limitation conventionelle des Armements"; No. 3, "Armements navals" and "Limitation des Armements," ed. Hans Wehberg.

De Martens : "La Question de Désarmement," in *Revue de Droit international et de Législation comparée*, vol. 26, p. 573.

Desjardins : "Le Désarmement," in *Revue de Deux Mondes*, 1898, p. 670.

Pedoza : La Conférence de La Haye, chap. 4.

There is also a paper on the subject in the second volume of the *Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable.*

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION

OUR proposed League, so far, has for its function to secure the reference of disputes to peaceable settlement and (more doubtfully) to enforce the judgment of a court in the case of "justiciable" issues. It would be necessary, further, that the States should covenant to offer mutual aid against an attack by an outside Power not a member of the League, if that Power should refuse resort to the machinery for peaceable settlement. In that case, the machinery must be available for States other than members of the League, and provision must be made for that contingency in the constitution of the Court and of the Council.

Should the League have any functions other than the above? First, it should be noticed that we have not given it the right to intervene in the internal affairs of States. It is not therefore open to the objection that it will be a revival of the Holy Alliance and will break down as that broke down. The Holy Alliance proposed to keep order not only between, but within nations; and so became, in effect, an association for putting down popular insurrections. Our League must avoid that pitfall.

But here there is a difficulty. One of the most

dangerous sources of international friction arises from what is primarily a matter of internal policy—the treatment of a subject nationality. Such friction will arise when there is an independent State passionately affected by the oppression within another State of people akin to itself. This is the situation in the case of the Southern Slavs; and it was that situation that led immediately to the present war. Now it has been suggested that international guarantees might be given, securing to alien nationalities within a State certain minimum rights. But should that involve a duty on the part of outside States to interfere in precisely that point of internal administration about which States are most sensitive? Suppose, for example, that the administration of Ireland were put under such an international guarantee? How would Englishmen, and probably Irishmen, feel? I do not ask how they ought to feel, but how they would. Well, Austrians and Hungarians would feel in the same way about their Slavs, and Russians about their Finns. Is the proposal practical policy? I gravely doubt it.

We must, however, fear that questions of nationality are likely again to trouble the peace of Europe, unless the statesmen of Europe, sitting round a table after this war, have the power and the foresight to provide for these vexed questions such a settlement as only good will and sound principle can achieve. Suppose that, in the future, a dispute should arise between Austria-Hungary and Serbia similar to that which led to this war; it would then be imperative for the Council of Conciliation to give advice which might include recommendations of a far-reaching kind as to the way in which Austria-Hungary should treat its Slav population. Were these recommendations equivalent to commands, and were the Powers bound to enforce them, war might follow to impose upon the Dual Monarchy a change

in its system of government. That might well seem a very dangerous precedent. But, under the arrangement we have thought most practicable, this intervention by force is not obligatory, and the action of the Council is advisory, not imperative. Now, advice may be taken when threats will be disregarded. And that, perhaps, is the most that can be said on this thorny subject. The main condition of a settlement of the nationality question is a change of feeling issuing in a change of policy. That is likely to be a slow and difficult process, as we see to our cost in the case of Ireland. And the attempt to get a heroic solution by war holds out little enough prospect of success. For, cut about territory as you may, you cannot eliminate national minorities.

One other objection with which it is necessary to deal is not unconnected with this. People are afraid, if war is ruled out, that an essentially unsatisfactory arrangement of the world might be stereotyped. On this point Imperialist jingoes and champions of liberty meet. "What!" says the Russian, or German, or British jingo, "no more territory for us! The strong to be kept for ever out of the inheritance of the weak!" "What!" says the champion of subject nationalities, "so many Slavs to remain under Austria, so many Poles under Prussia or Russia, so many Irish under England! No! Rather war!" Well, in fact, the scheme we have put forward does permit war, if everything else has failed. Only—and this is the important point—it makes it obligatory first to attempt the required readjustments by agreement. If, indeed, imperialistic ambition and the lust for power continue to animate nations, then an agreement will not be reached, and war will result. If, again, the determination to dominate and oppress a subject nationality continues, war will result, and so will all the consequences of war which we have drawn out.

But what our proposed agreement does is to offer every opportunity to avoid war by reason, humanity, and common sense. If that fails, it fails; and with it fails civilization. But our treaty does not stereotype iniquity. On the contrary, it offers an opportunity to remedy it by justice in peace, and, failing that, admits, in the last resort the alternative of war.

The members of the League, then, will not be bound to interfere by force in the internal affairs of any State, nor to stereotype a bad order. These are restrictions of function. Should there be any extension thereof in other directions?

No doubt there should. The prevention of war, important though it be, is a negative act. And for the very purpose of prevention some kind of positive activity will be essential. The States must more and more develop machinery of joint action in matters that concern them all. They must learn to legislate and administer in common. For that purpose they will naturally take as a starting-point such legislative and administrative machinery as already exists.

Taking first the question of legislation, we have the precedent of the Hague Conferences. As the reader will remember, two of these have been held, the first in 1899, representing twenty-six States, the second in 1907, representing forty-four.[1]

In thinking of the future development of international law it is natural to start with this body (the Hague Conference), and to urge that its meetings should be regular and periodical, instead of dependent on a special summons of the Powers; and that there should be created a perma-

[1] In 1907 all States were represented except Costa Rica, Honduras, Morocco, Liberia, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Thibet, Nepaul (not all of which are full "sovereign"), and the little States of Lichtenstein, Monaco, and Andorra, which have populations of less than 20,000.

nent Commission to prepare the agenda for the successive meetings, collect information and reports, and perform any other appropriate functions that may be assigned to it. Most continental and American internationalists appear to look forward to such a development as this. And very likely they may be right. At the same time there are certain difficulties in the constitution of the Hague Conferences which may possibly militate against their developing into the organ of international legislation. The first difficulty is the number and diversity of the States included; the second is the rule that no decision is binding unless it is unanimously agreed to; the third is the legal tradition of the "equality" of States, interpreted as meaning equality of voting power. It is evident that these conditions, if they persist, may make it impossible for the Hague Conferences to develop into an effective legislature. The condition of unanimity will render progress too slow and difficult. It recalls the Polish *liberum veto.* But, on the other hand, if the voices of all States are to be equal, no great State will consent to be bound by a majority vote. For example (to take an extreme case), it is inconceivable that the eight "Great" Powers, acting together, would consent to be overruled by any combination of small States. On the other hand, small States are equally reluctant to be outvoted by great ones. It will be remembered that the project of an International Court of Justice was defeated in 1907 because no agreement could be reached as to the proportion in which the different States should be represented in it.

A very interesting attempt to meet this difficulty and mediate between the theory of the equality of States before the law and the fact of their inequality in power will be found in the scheme of the Fabian Society.[1] The scheme is necessarily complicated, but it is well worth study by

[1] Clause 7 and note thereto.

those who are interested in this very important question. It may be noted, in passing, that by this plan the Council of Conciliation which we have proposed would be a standing committee of the "Supernational Legislature."

It is possible, then, and it is, I think, generally desired by internationalists, that the Hague Conferences may develop into a permanent international or "supernational" Legislature. But this process may be arrested by the difficulties to which I have referred. On the other hand, a Legislature might arise in a different way out of the League of Nations which we have discussed above. Very likely such a League might not, at the beginning, include all States. It is, indeed, essential, in my judgment, that it should be open to all the Great Powers, or it will be only an alliance confronted by a counter-alliance. But these Powers might judge that the purpose of keeping the peace could be more easily fulfilled if they did not associate with themselves all the smaller States, whose adhesion would necessarily complicate the working of the League. It was that consideration, in part, that led the British group to suggest that the original members of the League should be the eight Great Powers and the other States of Europe, thus excluding the South American Republics. There is, of course, something arbitrary about all such exclusions, and they are not easy to defend on principle. But as it is pretty certain that other considerations than the principle of the legal equality of States will determine what is actually done, we may contemplate the probability of a limited League. In that case, it might be very desirable that the members of the League should make for themselves rules of international law. And this is definitely contemplated in the programme of the League to Enforce Peace. Such a group of States might accept a procedure which would not be accepted at The Hague, and adopt rules which it would

be impossible to adopt there, while the existing procedure is in force. The rules adopted by the League could, however, be submitted to The Hague, and would then have a prestige that might lead to their acceptance. There would, in fact, in that case, be two legislative Bodies, one representing the narrower group, the other representing all States. But there need be no great inconvenience in this, and there might be advantages.[1]

Given a legislative body, what kind of rules should it make? On this point some general remarks may be made.

In the first place, the main business of an international Legislature should not be (as was unfortunately the case at the Hague Conferences) the formulation of the law of war. It is for a very different purpose that an international Legislature is required. Its business would be to lay down rules for the peaceful intercourse of nations, in order to prevent the growth of the friction which leads to war. It would take us too far to specify here even the headings under which such legislation would fall. But one subject of obvious importance may be referred to.

We have seen that, under certain conditions, economic competition is a cause of the friction leading to war. These conditions result, not from the nature of trade, but from the attempt, backed by governmental policy, to secure for this or that nation differential advantages or a complete monopoly. This cause of friction should be removed by international agreement. The nations should recognize the broad and obvious truth that trade benefits all the parties concerned; should remove, as far as possible, and as quickly as possible, the artificial hindrances intro-

[1] Professor Schücking has argued strongly against the substitution of the representatives of a limited number of States for the Hague Conferences as a legislative organ. (See *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. i.)

duced by false conceptions of national interest; should provide, so far as that can be done by regulation, against trading methods generally recognized as "unfair"; and should do all this by international arrangements which should be absolutely impartial as between different nations.

The complete application of this policy would be general free trade, with guarantees against unfair competition. The arguments for free trade, economic and political, have never been answered, for they are unanswerable. The strength of the case for protection resides in no consideration of public interest, but in the mutual support of a number of interests standing to gain by inflicting loss on the rest of the community. It is by a direct appeal to what looks like the immediate interest of various sections of the community, while ignoring the remoter results whereby the injury will come in, that protectionists make and maintain their converts. They rely, in fact, upon the incapacity and reluctance of men to follow out a train of reasoning. And their confidence is justified by results. So long as this combination of cynical self-interest with ignorance and thoughtlessness continues, we cannot hope that the truth will prevail. At any rate, the general introduction of free trade after the war seems to lie outside all reasonable expectation. But some steps might be taken, and must be taken, if the nations really intend a settlement which shall be durable. Of these, the principal should be the abolition of preferential trading. Whatever tariffs are maintained should be applied equally to all. No restrictions should be imposed upon the movement into any country of foreign capital and foreign traders. And any restrictions imposed upon the immigration of foreign labour should be based solely on such considerations as the standard of living or the unassimilability (if such there be) of the would-be immigrants. In no case

should the laws be framed in the form of special discrimination against the citizens of any country.

The principle underlying these suggestions may be summed up as the principle of the "open door." And that principle should further be applied by all countries in those dependencies of which they control the economic policy.[1]

Not only access for goods, but opportunities for obtaining contracts and concessions, for making loans, and the like, should be equal for all countries, without preference for the Mother Country. And any restrictions it may be necessary to introduce, as, for example, to protect the interests of native races, or in the way of tariffs for revenue, should be applied equally to all nations. In other words, the whole conception that a colony or a dependency exists to benefit the material interests of the people who "own" it should be definitely abandoned as unworthy of civilized nations. The nation that administers such territory does so as the trustee for civilization. Only on that ground has the government of "backward" by "advanced" peoples any justification. The recognition of equal rights to citizens of all nations, subject only to the well-being of native races, is a principle which is capable of immediate application, if there be really any will to peace in the world. It is a cardinal point in any genuine policy of peace.

To this "open door" policy all States should be parties, including those that are as yet industrially undeveloped, like China or Turkey or Persia. Only it should be open to these latter to adopt what measures they think fit to protect themselves against forms of exploitation which

[1] This excludes the self-governing dominions of the British Empire, which should, however, themselves apply the principle in their own territories.

are predatory and unjust or incompatible with the principles of their social order. But whatever restrictions they introduce should apply equally to all nations. And, similarly, the nations competing to develop the resources of the country in question should make international agreements as to the conditions they will jointly observe with regard to loans, concessions, methods of trade, and the like. Such agreements have, in fact, been made with regard to certain regions; for example, the treaties guaranteeing the "open door" in China and the treaty of Algeciras.

Another point of fundamental importance is that of free routes for trade across the territory of independent States. One of the principal causes of the economic friction that lies behind war is the fear of countries that have no ports, or none convenient, lest a neighbouring country, through which their export and import trade has to pass, should hamper and interrupt the transit. It is this fear that makes States covet the ownership of ports and of the territory giving access to them; that makes Germany, for instance, uneasy because she does not possess the mouths of the Rhine; Serbia, because she has no port on the Adriatic; Russia, because she does not own Constantinople. These fears may often be exaggerated or feigned, for the free movement of trade is commonly ensured by mutual self-interest. Thus, for example, the Dutch do not put any hindrance in the way of German trade passing by the Rhine, and have no motive to do so. Still, if a tariff war occurs, countries in this position of dependence on a route through another country may suffer injury from that country; and, in any case, they dislike the feeling of dependence. The only way of solving this problem, consistent with that guarantee to all States of territorial integrity which is essential to peace, is an international guarantee of free routes across the territories and free use

of the ports in question. There is no insuperable difficulty about this, if people want peace, not war. It is to the mutual advantage of everybody concerned; and it would take away the only reason that could even seem legitimate for appropriating other people's territory.

Lastly, there is the question of "unfair" trading. What is wanted here is, first, a definition agreed to by all the parties concerned; then common measures for dealing with the matter. Is dumping "unfair"? And always? And for every one? Or sometimes? And, if so, when? If "unfair," is every one ready to abandon it? These are the sort of questions to be raised and answered in an International Congress.

Again, is it "unfair" to "penetrate" a country with your trade? To "capture key industries" and the like? Or is it in some way dangerous to any independence which a nation ought to cherish? It is international discussion of that point that is wanted; and discussion with a view to and on the hypothesis of peace, not with a view to and on the hypothesis of war. I have little doubt that a discussion in this spirit would show it to be true that if the nationals of one country "capture" an industry in another it is because they are more efficient; and that the proper way to meet the competition is to imitate the methods of the invader, unless those methods are "unfair," and recognized so to be by international agreement. Nothing can evade the broad truth that every kind of discrimination is a protection of the incompetent against the competent, with the result that the motive to become competent is taken away.

Another point may be touched on here. Treaties are part of international law, and their observance is a cardinal condition of any international order. All nations admit this in theory, but none have been over-scrupulous

in practice. There is, however, some excuse for their negligence or criminality. Treaties are apt to be drawn up in terms so vague that it is easy to dispute what may have been held originally to be their plain meaning. I need only call in evidence the ambiguities which attach to the treaties guaranteeing Belgium and Luxemburg, and especially the fact that the latter treaty, almost before the ink was dry on it, was expounded by a British Minister in a sense quite other than that which had been attached to it by Bismarck.[1] It is therefore not superfluous to lay it down that the parties to treaties should all mean the same thing, should know what they mean, and should say it.

Further—and this point is even more important—no treaties in a changing world can be permanently satisfactory. For instance, by the Treaty of Paris the Powers, including Great Britain, formally guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire. By that treaty we were bound to resist the liberation of Bulgaria and of Roumania. What would the British nation have thought if we had gone to war for that purpose? The reservation, *rebus sic stantibus*, though it is a cloak for every kind of Machiavellianism, is also a recognition of the nature of things. The moral is, not that it should be open to any one party to declare a treaty a "scrap of paper"; but that either all treaties be limited in time, or that there should be a formal provision in them that any one of the parties concerned may bring them up for denunciation or revision before an international authority, and get a decision as to whether circumstances have so changed that the maintenance of the treaty in its original form is unjust or prejudicial to the public peace and order.[2]

[1] See *England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg*, by C. P. Sanger and H. T. J. Norton (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1915).

[2] Cf. clause 16*a* of the Fabian scheme.

It should also be laid down that no secret treaty is binding on either party or will obtain recognition before any international authority. With this object there should be opened an international register of treaties and those only be recognized which are inscribed in it.[1]

This is a matter which concerns the domestic policy of every country. It should be made, wherever possible, part of the State constitution that no secret treaties are binding. We should then be delivered from such public scandals as the secret treaties, in which this country participated, looking to the partition of Morocco, or the fact that nobody knows precisely the complete terms of the treaties that constituted the Triple Alliance or of the Franco-Russian agreement; on which treaties in 1914 the peace of Europe hinged.

But what, I shall be asked, are international rules without an international sanction? I think there should be a sanction, and I think the proper sanction is economic. If the members of the League guaranteed to one another the "Open Door," and the other advantages which have been suggested above, then breaches of such agreements would be appropriately punished by withdrawal of the privileges. States would thus have a strong motive, of matter of fact interest, both to enter the League and to observe its regulations; and the guarantee would be as effective as that of armed force, and otherwise far more satisfactory.[2]

International legislation will require to be supplemented by international administration. The latter does, in fact, already exist, to an extent not generally appreciated. Thus, for instance, there is the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union, which "collects, publishes, and

[1] Cf. clause 15 of the Fabian scheme.

[2] This point is elaborated by Mr. Brailsford in *A League of Nations*, chap. ix.

distributes information, circulates proposals, and notifies alterations adopted, publishes a journal in three languages, acts as a clearing house for the settlement of accounts, arranges for the manufacture and supply of reply coupons, and gives an opinion upon questions in dispute at the request of the parties concerned."[1] There is a similar bureau for the International Telegraphic Union. There is an Administrative Bureau for international transport by railway, which has, among other functions, that of arbitrating in disputes between railways, and makes detailed regulations as to packing, transport, recovery and payment of charges and settlement of accounts between railways. There is an International Commission to deal with the navigation of the Danube. There are International Sanitary Commissions at Constantinople, Alexandria, Teheran, and Tangier. There is a permanent Sugar Commission to deal with bounty-fed sugar, whereby "the power of the State over its own tariff and its right to export its own produce is subjected to international government."

Thus, the principle of creating international administration for certain special matters is well established in practice. It requires extension into the kind of matter about which there is risk of war gathering. The most obvious case is that of undeveloped countries under weak governments where the Powers are competing for concessions and influence. I have already suggested the necessity of international rules to regulate this kind of situation, and have shown that in fact such rules have been embodied in special treaties, for instance that of Algeciras.[2] What is required further is the creation of Administrative Commissions to watch over the execution of these treaties. The important

[1] See Woolf, *International Government*, p. 122. The facts of this section are taken from that book.

[2] See notes to this chapter.

point in connexion with such Commissions would be that every complaint concerning a breach of the principles of the treaty governing the case, or of regulations framed under it by the Commission, should go before the Commission, not before the governments, and that the governments should bind themselves not to entertain such complaints. This should put an end to that intriguing of concession-hunters and financiers and traders with their governments which has in fact brought to nought the treaties guaranteeing the open door in China.

It is impossible to forecast what further developments of international administration may become possible and desirable. But it seems clear that legislation and administration will go hand in hand, and that events will constantly be giving occasion for some new application of internationalism, once the initial inertia has been overcome.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 213.—The League and Outside States.

With regard to the relation of the League to outside States, the attitude of the United States is likely to be different from that of the European States. A League of European States is conceivable, which, though formed on the basis discussed in the text, should leave outside one or more of the great European States. Such a League would have to be ready for joint defence against the States left out. It would be, in effect, a defensive alliance. But it is pretty certain that the United States would not join such a League, for they would not desire to be involved in a war which might be nothing but one of the old wars for power. If any of the Great Powers were left out, the United States, we may be pretty sure, would not come in, except under a limited obligation which did not involve the possibility of war against the States that were not members of the League. On the other hand, if all the Great Powers were included, the United States might accept the unlimited obligation of defence against outside attack. But in that case the obligation would be superfluous.

Page 222.—Treaty of Algeciras.

The treaty of Algeciras provides for the application of the "principle of economic liberty without inequality," and in particular that if recourse shall be had by the Shereefian Government to foreign capital or industries for the working of public services or the execution of public works, the concessions for such purposes shall be "subject to the principle of public awards on tenders without respect of nationality."—See Chapter VI of the treaty.

By the treaty the diplomatic representatives of the Powers were entrusted with the task of superintending the working of the articles which stipulated that tenders for public works should be assigned to the person making the most advantageous offer, regardless of nationality. The following are the relevant articles:—

"108. As soon as it shall have been decided to proceed to the execution of particular public works by calling for tenders, the Shereefian Government shall notify such decision to the Diplomatic Body, to which it shall in due course communicate plans, specifications, and all documents annexed to the call for tenders, so that the nationals of all the signatory Powers may obtain information respecting the projected works and be in a position to compete for them. A sufficient time-limit shall be fixed for this purpose in the call for tenders.

"110. The contracts shall be made in the form and according to the general conditions prescribed by regulations to be drawn by the Shereefian Government with the assistance of the Diplomatic Body."

Page 223.—Treaties.

By the Norwegian Constitution of 1911 all treaties and agreements with foreign Powers have to be communicated to Parliament for inquiry by a Special Committee. If the Government thinks it necessary, or has agreed, to keep some treaty or article of a treaty secret, these have to be communicated secretly to the Parliamentary Committee concerned; but any member of the committee has the right of bringing the whole matter before Parliament (which of course may discuss it with closed doors).

As is well known, the Senate of the United States is, along with the President, the treaty-making organ.

The French Constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1848 required the

sanctioning of every treaty by the Legislative Assembly. (See *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, tom. ii. p. 146.)

With regard to the treaties constituting the Triple Alliance, Bernstein writes (ibid., p. 220) that Bismarck left instructions that the complete treaties were never to be published, even in the case of the dissolution of the Alliance. It would be difficult to find a clearer proof of the sinister nature of these secret international agreements. Here was one, it would seem, which could never bear the light! And because of it (among other things) we have the world war. Bernstein goes on to quote from the historian Helmholtz, writing in the *Revue Politique Internationale* for April 1914, to the effect that the full text of the treaties is known only to the Minister President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that only their successors, from time to time, may see it. The diplomats are only informed verbally, under pledge of secrecy, of what it is necessary for them to know.

It is hardly necessary to refer once more to the secret clauses of the Morocco treaty, negotiated between this country and France in 1904, and kept secret all through the negotiations at Algeciras. We wait for further light on this episode.

The following article on the treaties of Austria-Hungary with Italy and with Roumania appeared in the *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Vienna) of September 5, 1916:—

"Austria-Hungary was allied with two States, and when she found herself in danger and misery, they did not help her, but declared war upon her. It is to be noted that the treaty with Italy and with Roumania was a treaty for war; it was concluded for war, made in view of the possibility of war, and in war it was to prove its utility. But neither Italy nor Roumania came to the rescue when the war the treaties envisaged actually broke out. After having kept neutral for a considerable time, they declared war upon their allies. How was this possible? We, of course, know that these alliances were somewhat curious: lip-service to love, hatred and wrath in the heart. In Italy as well as in Roumania, there existed the deepest longing to claim the 'unredeemed brothers' of Austria-Hungary. . . . For a long time each of these allies made the secret reservation not to keep these treaties. Once Austria-Hungary got into difficulties, difficulties that gave the best opportunity, a pretext for breaking the treaty would readily present itself. . . .

"The question arises, how a whole people, first the Italian, then the Roumanian, could deny a solemn obligation and join right away in the war against the ally. That a monarch or a statesman denies his word may not be surprising; but peoples in their totality have a strong feeling of honour—and it would be difficult to find such a denial of indubitable obligation in history. But did the peoples in both these cases realize that they had entered into obligations and concluded a treaty and given their word? The treaty with Italy became public only after the war broke out. And as to Roumania: nobody in Austria-Hungary knew of the existence of a treaty; everybody was greatly surprised when Count Tisza spoke in the Hungarian House of the Roumanians as allies. It is only now that we learn that a regular treaty was concluded in 1883 and renewed in 1888 up to 1920; nobody knew of this in Austria-Hungary and, except perhaps for the ministers, nobody in Roumania. We do not want to enter into the question that alliances concluded by governments only, or worse, by monarchs only, can hardly command binding force in countries with parliamentary rule; but how is the obligation contained in the treaty to impress the mind of the people if the people know nothing about it and thus derive no sense of breach of loyalty from repudiation of the alliance? Governments change, kings die, peoples remain. Could the game with the alliance of the present Italian and Roumanian rulers have succeeded, could it have been possible, if the treaty had been concluded in full publicity, if Parliament had discussed it and registered it as a law? . . . We see here glaring examples of the worthlessness of secret treaties; examples which make it possible to speak of the *débâcle* of diplomacy, which imagines to have built for eternity, when it has really built on the sand.

"If secret treaties between the governments were abolished, the chief element of insecurity in the relations of nations would vanish. . . . Only treaties made between peoples, to which the peoples agree through their Parliaments—only such treaties can gain binding power and will be acknowledged and understood as obligations by the nations. Clearness and truth would put them on a basis which would be shaken in vain by intrigue and cunning" (cited *Cambridge Magazine*, October 28, 1916).

I cite the statements of fact in this extract with reserves. It seems difficult at present to get certain information about the alleged treaty between Austria and Roumania.

The author of *Nationalism and War in the Far East* suggests (p. 380) that popular interest in foreign politics had the effect, in the Balkans, of weakening the moral obligation of treaties. He means that popular feeling is more impatient than diplomacy would be of obligations that do not correspond to present equity. That may sometimes be true. The remedy he suggests is, that every country should publish annually a list of the treaties it considers to be "alive." But clearly a nation must not be allowed to repudiate at any moment by a one-sided act any treaty with which it is discontented. The periodical revision of treaties before an international authority, as suggested in the text, appears to be the right solution.

CHAPTER XIII

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY

THE whole of the preceding proposals towards international organization depend for their realization upon a good will to put them into effect. Does that good will exist ?

Naturally, I cannot answer that question. I can only try, as I am doing here, to create the good will. But I may point out that two distinct questions are involved. One is the state of mind of governments and nations when the peace settlement is made. It is that that will determine, in the main, the fate of civilization. Make a wrong peace, one that involves the perpetuation of the European anarchy and a preparation even more intense for an even more terrible war in the near future, and nothing that may be done or attempted later will be able to effect salvation. Make a right peace, and the turn will have been taken in a direction along which watchfulness and wisdom may lead civilization to security. But there is little opportunity allowed, during the stress of war, to guide opinion towards a sane and wise outlook, and little willingness in opinion to be so guided. So that, after all, we shall have to rely largely on the wisdom and foresight of statesmen at the peace conference, and can only hope that they may possess those qualities, and that public opinion may permit them to exercise them fruitfully.

Supposing, however, that a right settlement is made, or one not too irredeemably wrong, will it be a condition of evolution towards internationalism and peace that foreign policy should be subjected to democratic control?

This is a question which has been much discussed, and with a good deal of heat. It is urged on the one hand that democratic control is the only way to prevent diplomacy from plunging the world into war; on the other hand, that the people are more passionate and ignorant and less careful for peace than the statesmen and diplomats. What is the truth?

One thing, of course, is clear. The individual members of all social classes have the same human nature; the same instincts of pugnacity, pride, cupidity; the same response to the same corporate egotism; the same capacity for sacrificing to this the narrower egotism of their own individuality. Their motives when they go to fight are of the same character, ranging from a simple sense of patriotism and duty through all the gradations of vanity, love of excitement and adventure, down to purely economic considerations. But once the war spirit is let loose, the response is equal from all classes. A financier or merchant will be as sentimental and irrational as an artisan, and a dock-labourer as disinterestedly patriotic as a duke.

It should be noticed, however, that it is not these passions that make wars, though they are the condition of wars being waged. The passions do not awake until the war is on the horizon or actually present; and they can be aroused without any knowledge or comprehension of the causes and issues involved. To most men it is enough that their country is at war for them to give it their wholehearted support. But this natural, almost instinctive response is commonly further stimulated by appeals which are irrelevant or simply mendacious.

Thus, to take some obvious examples, the Franco-Prussian War was precipitated by the famous telegram in which Bismarck gave a deliberately misleading account of what had happened between the French Ambassador and the King of Prussia. In 1877 "false telegrams about the entry of the Russian Army into Constantinople were sent home to disturb and paralyse and reverse the deliberations of Parliament."[1] Our second war with Afghanistan was provoked by an exaggerated if not false statement that the Ameer "had refused to receive a British mission with insult and with outrage, and that insult and outrage were represented as at once enlisting our honour and reputation in the case, making it necessary to administer immediate chastisement. . . . That intelligence was sent—we were never undeceived about it until we were completely committed to the war and until our troops were in the country. The Parliament met: after long and most unjustifiable delays the papers were produced and carefully examined; we found there was not a shred of foundation for that outrageous statement, and that the temper and pride of the people of this country had been wrought up and the spirit of wrath fomented and kindled in their bosoms by intelligence that was false intelligence, and that somebody or other having access to high quarters, if not dwelling in them, had invented, had fabricated for the evil purpose of carrying us into bloody strife."[2] Lastly, to take an example that will be fresher in the reader's mind, the German people were induced wholeheartedly to support the present war by statements that it was a war of aggression against Germany, and that before Germany had taken any military action the Cossacks had invaded East Prussia and the French dropped bombs on Nuremberg and crossed the frontier in Alsace and Belgium, statements which have since

[1] See Gladstone's speech of April 2, 1880. [2] Ibid.

been admitted to be fabrications by the Germans themselves.[1] This fabrication of false news in order to arouse the latent patriotism of the people is part of that "device" of the "just cause" to which I have referred above,[2] and it is recommended in the books of those who advocate, in theory and in practice, the militarist philosophy and ethics. For the other side of the gospel of force is the gospel of lies. And the people, since they are not spontaneously aggressive, since they do not naturally desire to kill and be killed, must be duped into the requisite state of passion.

This passion, however, as I have said, though it is a necessary condition of war, is not a direct cause of it. The cause is policy. And in the direction of policy the people have no part. Policy is dominated by statesmen, and statesmen are apt to be influenced by cliques and perverted by theories. I have already dwelt at length on that theory of Power for the sake of Power and Expansion for the sake of Expansion which lies behind international policy. But that is not a theory of the people, it is a theory of the governing and educated classes. It is professors and publicists (not only German) that formulate and defend it, and politicians that practise it. The mass of the people, who have to wage the wars to which it gives rise, have no knowledge of it and no interest in it. If their support is to be had for a war, the fact that it is a war for power and territory must be carefully concealed from them, as in fact it always is. They must be told, as they always are, that it is a war for self-defence or liberty, for something that appeals either to the instinct of national self-preserva-

[1] I find this admission in German writers. See, e.g., *Die Friedenswarte*, August–September 1916, article on "Das Deutsche Volk und der Militarismus," by Hermann Fernau.

[2] P. 10

tion or to those idealistic emotions which it is so easy to arouse and so easy to mislead.

And as the theory of power and expansion is not a theory of the people, so the interests that use it as a cloak are not their interests. The operations of international finance, and all that lies behind it, are a real menace to peace. I am aware of all that can be said on the other side. I am aware that normally, and in the great bulk of their operations, financiers and traders desire and promote peace. But the exceptional cases exist and are important. The competition of international finance in undeveloped countries is a real cause of war. China, Persia, Asia Minor, Morocco, Mexico, are the danger centres. And in such countries the ambitions of governments coalesce with the interests of finance and trade to create situations that are pregnant with war.

At bottom this question, like all political questions, depends for its solution on a comprehension of cause and effect. To risk war for the sake of profit would seem monstrous, even to the gamblers, if they realized the series of events they were putting in motion; if they perceived clearly that one reason why at this moment thousands of young men are dying in agony on the field of battle is that some innocent old lady in an English village wanted a good investment, and that an accumulation of such demands gave the opportunity to financiers to "penetrate" some unhappy country, not in order to benefit it, but in order to make profit out of it; at the risk, in the existing condition of anarchy, first of war to subdue that country, then of a European war arising largely out of the chagrin of the nations left out against the nations that have profited. Some democrats are so much impressed by this financial vampirism that they hold it idle even to attempt any improvement of international relations while the propertied classes continue to direct the

policy of States.[1] This is perhaps to err as much in one direction as Mr. Hartley Withers[2] (in my judgment) does in another. Short of a complete revolution in every country which would take the investment of capital out of the hands of private owners, there is much to be hoped for from publicity and from an extension of real knowledge about the facts of international life. But meantime we have to note, what is so little understood or so adroitly concealed in this country, that the Socialist case is a true case; that war is in fact largely fostered by the competition of capital for lucrative investment in countries where the government is feeble and the natural resources large and undeveloped, and by the backing given by governments to their own nationals. It cannot be too often and too plainly said that all profit made in that way, at the cost of war, is blood-money.

Now, in its broadest sense, what democratic control means is publicity and consequent free and open discussion and criticism. It may be admitted that in the state of international anarchy in which we live there are good as well as bad reasons for secrecy. A public statement of the real facts about an existing tension might precipitate the catastrophe that is dreaded. And it may be reasonably held, for example, that Lord Grey was justified in refusing a frank and full account of the European situation during the years preceding the war, on the ground that he might thus have actually provoked a crisis which he hoped to avoid. I do not here suggest that the motives for the secrecy of statesmen are always bad, nor that secrecy may not sometimes have averted a war which publicity might have precipitated. But the other side of the matter must

[1] See, e.g., Fred C. Howe, *Why War?* (Scribners, New York, 1916).

[2] In *International Finance* (Smith, Elder & Co., 1916).

be looked at. The secrecy of our Government before the war is, in fact, generally condemned, both by militarists and by pacifists. The militarists say: "You ought to have come forward, said that the war was imminent, and prepared for it." The pacifists say: "You ought to have come forward, told us into what a catastrophe your policy was drifting, and taken us into your counsel as to how we could alter it, by substituting for the Entente a common understanding between all the nations." It must indeed be admitted that secrecy precipitates war at least as much as it prevents it. For instance, the secret negotiations and treaties about Morocco were a contributory cause of the present outbreak. And, more generally, secrecy maintains that attitude of universal suspicion which is bound to end in a catastrophe. No meeting of sovereigns or foreign secretaries can take place without a swarm of rumours and conjectures immediately buzzing about it. Take, for example, the curious continental myth (I assume it to be a myth) that King Edward, of his personal initiative, originated in Europe a deliberate plot to isolate Germany by a ring of hostile Powers. Secrecy enabled that myth to gain currency; and it is notorious how largely the belief in it affected German opinion and policy. The interview of King Edward with the Czar at Reval, the interview of the Kaiser with the Czar at Potsdam, sent shivers through the nerves of statesmen and journalists. The despatches of ambassadors to their governments are filled with rumours and conjectures. And on these, decisive acts of international policy may be founded. One result is that even if a minister tells the truth he is not believed. The relations between Germany and Great Britain had been worked up into such a condition by fear and suspicion flourishing in an atmosphere of secrecy, that the genuine

attempt at an understanding made in 1912 was foredoomed to failure. The risks of publicity may be great. But there is no security in secrecy.

In an article to which I have already referred,[1] Hermann Fernau writes :—

> Let us suppose that in the last days of July 1914 people like Rohrbach, Harden, Reventlow, Chamberlain, Keim, Bernhardi, etc., had come before the German people and said, what they had previously been saying only too loudly, "We are strangling. We need more land. We need a place in the sun. We are the strongest, we have the highest culture, and we have therefore a sacred right to wage a war of conquest," is there a single man who would so insult the German nation as to assert that it would have assented with enthusiasm to this war programme? No! The immense majority of the German people stood then, as always, on the side of Bebel and his degenerate successors. That is to say, they did not become enthusiastic for the war until it had been made clear to them that Germany had been treacherously attacked and must defend herself.

What the people in fact were told was false, as this author admits. The point is, that it was necessary to lie to them to get their support for the war. And let not the English people suppose, because it was not necessary to lie to them this time, that it never has been and never will be necessary. As I have illustrated, wars have been started in England in the past, and are likely to be started in the future, unless we change our temper and our methods, by lies as deliberate and calculated as those which brought the German people on to the side of their Government in 1914. Many wars that have been fought in Europe could never have been fought if governments had told the people truly for what reasons or causes they proposed to fight them. Imagine, for

[1] See above, p. 235.

example, that a minister were to come down to the House of Commons and say something like this: "We are giving support to such and such an enterprise in Morocco or Persia or Turkey. We expect, by that means, to assist British capital in securing a good investment, and further to gain a political influence and prestige which will open to Britishers in future further lucrative concessions and loans. In doing this, we shall probably be led to intervene by force in the internal affairs of the country concerned, and we may also find ourselves involved in trouble with one or other of the Great Powers; but we think it worth while to take those risks for the sake of the profits to the British groups involved"—if any Government came down to the House of Commons and said that, what sort of reception would they get? But the approach is made, and the policy entered upon, behind the scenes. Presently, when the situation "develops," there begin to appear in the Press articles paid for, one way or another, by the interests involved. The writer, very likely, is a shareholder or a director in the company that has been formed. The Imperialists perceive that the enterprise in question may lead to the "expansion" of which they dream. They probably combine financial profit with patriotic ambition. The whole sorry business goes on in a kind of twilight—ministers, if challenged, refusing information on the ground of public policy—till, when it is too late, an international "crisis" arises. And even then the essential facts are concealed from the public, who are told that some other Power has unwarrantably interfered in what does not concern it, and that nothing but a full assertion of our strength, with the patriotic support of all parties, can suffice to save our "honour" or secure our "vital interests." It is thus that rumours of wars and wars come about. And they come about thus because of the

secrecy which envelops all the initial stages of the transaction.

In considering the question of democratic control of foreign policy, these are the kinds of facts that must be attended to. The people may be pugnacious and unreflecting, but it is not their pugnacity and their lack of reflection that prepares war. War is prepared by a few and sprung upon the many. As Mr. Churchill well put the matter, in speaking of that deliberate fostering of hostility between the Germans and the English which led up to the present conflict :—

> If a serious antagonism is gradually created between the two peoples, it will not be because of the workings of any natural or impersonal forces, but through the vicious activity of a comparatively small number of individuals in both countries and the culpable credulity of larger classes.[1]

This is the common course of events. Wars are not made because of the passions of the many, but because of the intrigues of the few; and those intrigues are possible because they are pursued in the dark. Democratic control, then, means publicity. It has its risks, in foreign as in domestic affairs. But since secrecy has not only its risks, but its demonstrated catastrophic failure, there can be no reason for preferring secrecy.

Indeed, if democratic principle be accepted at all, there is, on the face of it, something preposterous about exempting from it foreign policy. An Insurance Bill, a Shop Hours Bill, an Education Bill, a Land Bill, are canvassed eagerly and passionately in Parliament and the country. The whole Press is set in motion; public meetings are held, deputations are arranged, ministries

[1] April 14, 1909. Letter to the Chairman of the Liberal Association at Dundee.

rise and fall. But where hundreds of millions of money and hundreds of thousands of lives are concerned; where the very existence of the country is at stake; where the decision to be taken involves not an extra tax, or a tentative experiment in social legislation, easily to be recalled or modified if it does not succeed, but the immediate summoning of the whole manhood of the country to kill and be killed in ways of unimaginable horror; when, in short, that very thing to the fostering and development of which every act of man, private and public, is rightly and exclusively directed, when life itself is to be destroyed wholesale, that decision, the most terrible any nation can be called upon to take, is precipitated by the fiat of half a dozen men, working in the dark, without discussion, without criticism, without a "by your leave" or "with your leave"; and those who are to sacrifice, in pursuance of it, everything which hitherto they have created and cherished, have no other choice than to accept the decision and pay the intolerable price. Surely only a god should have such power over men! And we give it to an emperor or a secretary of state!

That, in brief, is the general case for democratic control of foreign affairs. And to any one who believes at all in the root principle of democracy, the control by men of their own lives and their own affairs, it must seem a strong one. There are, however, real difficulties felt in accepting it even among men otherwise democratically minded. And these difficulties must be fairly considered.

It seems to be thought by many that there is something about foreign policy peculiarly difficult to understand; that it is a thing of mysteries and special faculties, so that, although the methods of representative government may be trusted to conduct us safely through all the in-

tricacies of our home affairs, though the people, roughly and in the last resort, are fit to decide about free trade and tariff reform, contributory or non-contributory insurance, the nearer or remoter effects of this or that method of taxation, and all the innumerable questions, difficult even to experts, that are raised by almost any of the legislative measures adopted year by year in progressive countries; yet the same people are specially and peculiarly unfit to judge about international relations.

This contention appears to me mistaken. Foreign questions, I suggest, are commonly simpler and more comprehensible than domestic ones. The difficulties connected with the former are rather moral than intellectual. The hard thing is not to see what would be the right thing, but to get the right thing done, where, on every side, there is suspicion, fear, jealousy, and bad will.

Let me illustrate from some contemporary issues. Take the case of Morocco. Essentially, what was it? The French wanted to annex Morocco. The Germans were opposed to this, partly because they were interested in the trade and resources of the country; partly, perhaps, because they themselves wished to annex territory there. The British were willing to consent to a French annexation, so long as the strip of coast opposite Gibraltar did not fall into the hands of the French or of any strong Power. Nothing can be simpler than all this. It is not an intellectual problem at all. It is a contention for power and influence and wealth. Compare it, for difficulty of an intellectual kind, with the question of the ultimate effects on employment, wages, and prices of a protective tariff. Yet it never occurs to any one to withdraw this latter question from the ultimate control of the people.

Take again the Balkan question. It is, of course, intricate. It requires for its solution knowledge of a

number of facts about races, boundaries, and the like. But so far as questions of general policy are concerned—questions that alone could be laid before a Parliament—the matter is simplicity itself. Is Austria to eat up those peoples? Is Russia to eat them up? Or are they to eat up one another? Or is such an arrangement to be promoted as will separate out the nationalities, so far as may be practicable, and permit each to develop freely in its own way? The difficulty here is to get people to do the right thing, not to see what the right thing is. And so far as the Balkan question concerns this country, I conceive Parliament to be as competent to decide what attitude we should adopt toward it as it is to decide upon the desirability of fixing by law the wages of agricultural labourers.

Or take the question between Mexico and the United States. It is complicated, of course. But the main difficulty for the ordinary citizen in forming an opinion about it is that he is kept ignorant of essential facts, such as the operations of the American and British oil or railroad interests, and their influence on the political situation. But if the facts were sufficiently made known, it seems clear that the decision of American policy would turn upon the answer to be given to certain questions which are exactly of the kind that ought to be submitted to the people, as: Ought we to recognize any government that can keep order in Mexico, or only such a government as stands for the interests of the Mexican people? Does American honour require us to go to war because the American flag has been insulted, or because American citizens have been murdered on the frontier? Is the Mexican anarchy so serious and incurable that the United States have an interest and a duty to end it at the cost of a long and bloody war?

These are not easy questions to answer, even when the relevant facts are known. They will be answered differently by different temperaments. But they are not—like tariff questions, for example—questions for experts. There can be no experts in such matters. The problems are moral—for what issues will we take what risks and make what sacrifices? And it is exactly such questions that a democracy exists to answer.

It may be urged, in reply, that the objection to democratic control of foreign affairs is not that the questions are too complicated, but that they are too important for popular decision. Their importance is, I think, often misrepresented by those who concern themselves with international relations. They are apt to assume that the real business of a State is its foreign policy, and that domestic policy is a kind of sordid game, dividing a nation and weakening it in the pursuit of its true purposes. Whereas a just estimate would show that the contrary is the case: that, for example, the domestic questions that have been rightly preoccupying England and France during the last decade touch vitally those real needs of men and women which it is difficult to bring into any relation at all to the issues that led up to the war. Still, foreign policy is very important, if only because it may produce war. But then, what reason is there to suppose that, for this reason, the people, if properly informed, would be unfit to deal with it?

In fact, two opposite charges are brought against them, either of which might be true at one time or another. It is supposed that they would not be ready to face the test of war, when it was vital to the nation's interest that they should. And it is supposed that they would rush into war when their wise counsellors would have kept them out of it.

Either of these things might certainly happen. But what happens now? What has been happening for centuries? Let us take the present war. What are all Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians saying? Are they not accusing the German Government of precipitating upon Europe a monstrous and unnecessary war? Are they not urging that the only way to prevent such a catastrophe in the future is the democratization of the German Constitution? That is, precisely, the calling in of the people to put an end to aggressive jingoism! Perhaps that method might be unsuccessful. My point is, that the other method has also been unsuccessful. Or look at Austria. These diplomats who sent the ultimatum to Serbia, who refused to extend the time-limit, who rejected recourse to arbitration, who rejected diplomatic mediation—could the Parliament of a democratic country have done worse? Is it not practically certain that it would have done otherwise and better? Or turn to the case of Italy. The Italian Government, we are told, was forced into the war by popular enthusiasm. I do not know whether this is true. But, if it be, for those who believe in the cause of the Allies it is an example of the sound instinct of the people defeating the erroneous calculations of statesmen.

It is true that upon foreign policy issues of life and death hang more immediately and perilously than upon domestic. It is true that Parliaments and peoples cannot be trusted to decide with infallibly right judgment. But that is true also of statesmen and diplomats. There is nothing special about foreign policy which makes democratic principles less applicable there than in other departments of national life. Broadly, almost every question of foreign policy is one of power, or of the prestige which is a guarantee of power. And it is pre-

cisely on these questions of power that the people ought to pronounce, since it is their blood that has to purchase or maintain the power. What bearing has this "power" on the good life of men, our own or that of others for whom we may be rightly responsible? There is the most general problem of foreign policy, put as it ought to be put. How the people would answer it I do not take upon myself to say. I think they would answer it otherwise than the diplomats have done. But, in any case, it is for them to answer it, if it is for them to answer anything at all. I doubt whether any one will deny this who at all accepts the principle of Democracy.

There is then, I would urge, on the face of the facts, the same reason for subjecting to public control the issues of foreign policy that there is for so subjecting any other issue. This does not imply the dispensing with training and knowledge. It implies the putting of that training and knowledge at the disposal of the nation for its instruction, and the acceptance of the verdict of the nation thus instructed. We, in England, require a Salisbury, a Lansdowne, a Grey. Americans require a Root or a Lansing. But in a democracy these men are required, not to direct a passive nation, but to take it into their confidence and then leave to it the decision. Now it is clear that, in Europe, at any rate, the people have no control over foreign policy, even in countries otherwise democratic. This war certainly was sprung upon the British nation. True, after it had been so sprung, the nation endorsed it. But it was in the years preceding that the control ought to have been exercised. How the control would have operated must be matter of conjecture. But it is clear that, from a democratic point of view, the nation ought to have known what policy was being pursued and what the risks were. It could then have

decided whether it would pursue a policy that might land it at any moment in a European war (in which case, presumably, it would have made the requisite preparations), or whether it would alter the whole direction of its policy, by proceeding, for example, on the lines indicated by Sir Edward Grey in his often-quoted despatch.[1] Or if it should have become evident, in attempting that change, that Germany was bent upon war, it would have been all the better that the fact should be known and the requisite measures taken. The result of not taking the nation into the confidence of the Government was about as bad as anything could be—a policy drifting into war without making any adequate preparations for war.

That the peoples of Europe have, in fact, even in countries otherwise democratic, no control over foreign policy will hardly be disputed. But the question remains, how does this come about? In detail, the answer will be different in different countries, according to the details of constitutional machinery and parliamentary procedure. But one fundamental fact applies generally. The people in no country have cared to know or control. In England, and no doubt in other countries, it is plainly true that the advent of democracy has meant, so far, not more but less interest in foreign policy. The new classes admitted to the franchise have, naturally enough, concentrated their interest on the domestic legislation that bears directly on the conditions of their life. This legislation, more and more, has taken up the time and attention of Parliament. The front benches have profited by the situation to with-

[1] "And I will say this: if the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves jointly or separately" (British White Paper, No. 101).

draw foreign policy from the arena of party controversy. And this withdrawal has meant that discussion has been discouraged, and that the Foreign Secretary has been able to evade requests for information, with the full approval of the bulk of members in the House. It is thus that the almost incredible thing has occurred, that the whole of our foreign policy has received a new direction, that Great Britain has moved away from her old friend Germany, and toward her old enemies France and Russia, that she has abandoned the policy of isolation and adopted that of alliances, and that Englishmen have made themselves liable to be involved in a European war on a gigantic scale and to be converted, contrary to the whole tradition of their liberties, into a military and conscript nation, almost without notice being taken in the country of this tremendous transformation, carried out by the Foreign Secretary and a handful of officials at the Foreign Office, without ever becoming, even in a subordinate way, an issue at a general election.

Now, it would hardly be honest to put the blame for all this on the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office. They prefer, no doubt, to conduct foreign affairs autocratically, and are sceptical of the new point of view that an instructed democracy might bring to bear upon them. But, after all, in the English system any matter can be made public and brought under control, if the people are determined to do it. And in England it must be admitted that, if this has not been done, it is because the people have not cared to do it. A Foreign Secretary would have had to give information, if it had been made clear that otherwise there would be a vote of censure. And improvements in the machinery of our parliamentary government, useful and necessary as they may be, will not ensure democratic control unless the people are

determined to have it. Will they be determined? I cannot say. But after the experience of this war, it does not seem likely that they will revert to the illusion that foreign policy does not concern them.

The popular control of foreign policy will become possible, then, in democratic States, if, and only if, the people care enough about it to insist upon having it. But not all States are democratic, or likely to become so in the immediate future.[1] And it is urged that democratic diplomacy must be at a disadvantage when it has to deal with an autocracy. But this is not self-evident. Has autocratic diplomacy, in fact, shown itself to be so intelligent and effective? German diplomacy certainly has not. It has led Germany into a war in which she is faced by a coalition unexampled since that which combined against Napoleon; and no one is more critical of German diplomacy than the German people.

Autocracy is no guarantee of good diplomacy. Nor, of course, is democracy. There can be no such guarantee. The advantage of democracy is that it puts responsibility for failure where it should reside, with the people who have to take the consequences. And to those who urge that the people, in fact, would be less careful of the national interest, and less willing to make sacrifices for it than professional diplomats, it must be replied, first, that there is no evidence of this; secondly, that if it were true it would still be no argument.

The time has gone by for entrusting the destinies of nations to the supposed wisdom of experts. Experts, if indeed they exist, should advise, they should not control. The decision must rest with the nation, that is, with the total result of all the forces, material, moral and intellectual, progressive and regressive, pacifist and militarist, which

[1] This was written before the Russian revolution.

combine in it and contend for mastery. To desire to withdraw foreign affairs from the control of this growing life, to keep them as a mystery for a profession, or a clique, or a class, is to attempt to fasten upon the present and the future the stamp of the past, to assume in this one department of life unchanging facts and principles and a finished science. People who so think have too narrow a conception of democracy. Democracy is the whole sum of the arrangements whereby all the faculties of a nation are brought to bear upon its public life; and the representative system—itself, no doubt, capable of and requiring much improvement—is the machinery by which the decisions thus reached are translated into action. Our present conduct of foreign affairs, even in countries otherwise democratic, is a survival from a different order; one where a nation was regarded as mere passive stuff from which a few men, with credentials held to be divine, should shape what figure they might choose. That order has passed away, with the conceptions on which it rested. A new order is struggling into life. And from the principles of the new order no department of life can claim to be exempt.

Supposing democratic control to be established, what would be its effect on peace and war? I am one of those who think it would make for peace. Not that I suppose the mass of men to be less pugnacious and bellicose than the class that has hitherto conducted foreign policy. Once let a war be on the near horizon, and the people will lose their heads just as much as any one else. But it is in the process of getting the war on to the horizon that I should expect a change. The governing classes have been influenced in their foreign policy partly by the abstract idea of power, partly by class interests. They have been appealed to by the pride of being a "dominant race"; by a sporting feeling about

war; by an instinct that war puts them back into the position of ascendancy to which they feel that they have a natural right. These are the "aristocratic" motives, plainly very strong in Germany, and not without considerable influence in England. To these must be added the more modern motives of plutocracy: the intrigues with governments of financiers and traders to push their particular interests; that whole competition between the capitalists of different nations which, directly or indirectly, has been the cause lying behind recent wars. These motives democratic control would set aside. It would insist upon putting the plain question that has hardly begun to influence governments in their conduct of foreign affairs, though it is the only relevant question: How does your policy bear upon the life of the people? A radical transformation was begun in the whole direction of domestic policy when the much-maligned utilitarians brought that question forward in a way in which it could no longer be evaded. But the question has never yet been put effectively, and so that it cannot be evaded, to the directors of foreign policy. Democratic control would mean that it would be put; and the consequences, I believe, would be all favourable to peace. And that, not because the people are, as individuals, all pacific, nor because they are idealists, but because their general interest and outlook is favourable to peace.[1]

Granting that the people in the different States should have an effective will to control foreign affairs, the machinery of constitutional government will have to be adapted to this purpose. The method of doing this must be worked out in each case by those who are conversant with the constitutional theory and practice of the countries

[1] That is, to international peace. I am not here discussing the causes or possibility of civil war.

concerned. It is, however, important to insist that there must be international as well as national publicity. All nations must have an opportunity, in the case of an acute dispute, of knowing the position and claims of all other nations. This can be done only through a full inquiry by an international authority such as has been advocated in the preceding pages.

There is no magic means of conjuring war. The passions, the cupidities, possibly even the convictions of nations may provoke it in the future, as they have done in the past. But at least it should be possible to secure that, if there is to be war, it should be the people themselves that choose it with their eyes open; and that, if whole generations of young men are to be destroyed, at least they should see the catastrophe coming and be able to affirm with full knowledge that so it had to be and that to them no choice was given. Εν δὲ φάει καὶ ὄλεσσον. "Destroy us, if it must be so. But let it be in the light."

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 232.—Democratic Control.

The question of democratic control of foreign policy has been mooted, since the war, in all countries. (See, e.g., notes from the foreign Press in the *Cambridge Magazine* for August 19 and October 28, 1916.) It is to be noted that the demand for democratic control comes as much from the Militarist as from the Liberal or Socialist Press; the truth being that every one feels that public opinion can never again be as passive to the issues of war and peace as it has been in the past, and that each party hopes to capture public opinion for its own policies. This is as it must be, and should be. It is the determination to have control that is the first and essential point in getting control. The rest is machinery.

Of this machinery there has been some discussion. I may refer, so far as England is concerned, to Mr. Ponsonby's book, *Democracy and Diplomacy* (Methuen, 1915); and, for the general question, to the articles on the subject contained in the second volume of the *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*, especially to that of Bernstein. Bernstein, it may be noted, throws doubt, from his experience in the German Reichstag, on the efficacy of a Parliamentary Committee to secure Parliamentary control of policy.

PAGE 234.—HOW WARS ARE BROUGHT ABOUT.

Gladstone's view about the reception of the mission by the Ameer is endorsed in more cautious language by the writer of the chapter dealing with this period in the *Cambridge Modern History*, who says that Lord Lytton "described the arrest of the mission with undoubted exaggeration as a forcible repulse, and clamoured for permission from the Home Government to launch across the frontiers the troops that were already massed at the entrance to the passes." Those patriots who imagine that British policy is invariably fair and just may be recommended to read the history of the events that led up to the second Afghan War. (*C.M.H.*, vol. 12, chap. 16.)

From *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, by "Diplomaticus" (p. 177), I cite the following further examples.

At the origin of the Balkan War of 1912, the author says—

"The supposed massacre of Serbs at Sienitza, the reported massacre of Montenegrins at Berane, and the provoked massacre of some hundreds of Bulgars at Kochana, were in the circumstances likely to be as decisive as 'the formal declaration of war.'"

And he adds the following note:—

"The Sienitza incident, first announced as a massacre of thousands of Serbs, reduced itself to the murder of one—but only after the required effect on public opinion had been produced. Whether the bomb-throwing at Kochana, which provoked the killing of Bulgar peasants there, was a Macedo-Bulgar incitement to massacre or a Young Turk intrigue to excite war, matters little to the argument here, which only asserts that it was one or the other."

Again he says (ibid., p. 230, note):—

"In the winter of 1912 the Viennese militarists wanted to stir

up war with Serbia. M. Prochaska, Austrian Consul at Prisrend, had associated himself with Albanian opposition to the Serbian occupation. The Serbian Government having complained of him and other Consuls, and the Austrian Government having failed to get into communication with him, stories were spread of his having been maltreated, and later that he and others had been murdered. The report of a commission of inquiry, which showed these tales to be tendentious inventions, confirmed Austrian public opinion in its opposition to a policy of adventure."

Of the same episode Fernau says (*Because I am a German*, p. 144) that the reports of the massacre were circulated by the Austrian Foreign Office, which knew all the time that they were false.

No sooner is a war well on the horizon than it is the cue of governments and the Press to pretend that there is immense popular enthusiasm behind it. The process of lying, which is the regular and necessary accompaniment of every war, begins at that point, and people soon even cease to know what they really do feel, in the flood of talk about what they are supposed to be feeling. Any one then can get up popular demonstrations, as any one can write inflammatory articles in the Press. What was really the value of the alleged popular demonstrations which are said to have compelled the Italian Government to go to war? I do not pretend to know. But I am exceedingly sceptical about these "popular" demonstrations. In an interesting article which appeared in the *Westminster Gazette* at the beginning of the war, Mr. Arthur Ransome describes what looks like the truth about the mobilization in Russia. I cite the following:—

"Stefan Stefanovitch was sitting alone on a seat in a corner of the garden. He had been in Petersburg the night before, and had only come down to the country that afternoon.

"He shook me by both hands.

"'It is war,' he said; 'and I hate war. We all hate war. And now I have got to go and kill people I never saw before in my life.' He laughed, but went on to tell how the porter at his rooms in town had also received the paper ordering him to join the colours; how he had seen that there was a similar paper for his master; and how he had brought the letter in, with the tears running down his face. . . .

"The most remarkable thing during the days that followed the

mobilization order was the silence. The men were silent, or very quiet. The place seemed at first stunned, and then too serious to shout. Such shouting as there was came, I believe, from the throats of hooligans, except in a few instances of sudden and explicable enthusiasm.

"Down the Nevsky Prospect a group of Reservists trudged in their working clothes, coloured shirts, broad belts, high boots, rope-shoes, or even with rags wound about their feet. They carried their belongings in little boxes, or handkerchiefs, or string bags. Some of them had brought their own kettles with them. A number of women, many with little children, walked with them. The tears were running down the faces of some. They marched quite silently, except when people on the pavement cheered them, and then they cheered back, dreadfully, like men only partly awakened from a dream. . . .

"These last few days the streets have been filled with processions called manifestations of popular enthusiasm, but really of a very different origin. Small groups of hooligans, the worst blackguards of the town, start through the streets with flags. They begin a hymn and are soon joined by people of genuine enthusiasm. Every one they meet is compelled to take his hat off. By accident I fell among the leaders of one of these manifestations. A rough crowd of vicious-faced, undersized men and boys, stinking horribly! Nothing could be a better comment than the sight of the men who are going to fight trudging seriously along and turning down a side street in order to get out of their way."

I will here cite, as illustrating the uncertainty that reigns on the question of whether a war is popular, the following passages from Mr. Oliver's *Ordeal by Battle* :—

(1) "This is a people's war surely enough, but *just as surely the* (German) *people had no hand in bringing it about.*"

(2) "To regard it as a Kaiser's war or a bureaucrats' war is merely to deceive ourselves. It is a people's war if ever there was one." (Cited in *The Future of Militarism*, by "Roland," p. 126.)

The following passage from *Vingt et un propos d'Alain*, written in 1912, gives a good picture of the kind of elements in society that are always pushing for war :—

"Et qu'est que c'est que ces terribles gens? Des hommes du métier, qui voudraient essayer leurs armes: et cette opinion est naturelle. Mais à côté de cela, beaucoup d'hommes d'âge, ce qui

est assez choquant : car celui qui n'offrira pas sa poitrine aux coups ne doit point faire le guerrier : c'est un peu trop facile. Aussi, bon nombre de femmes élégantes, que je suppose conduites par une passion aveugle contre la liberté, et par l'espérance de quelques tyrannie victorieuse. Mais enfin comment une femme peut elle pousser à la guerre ? Comptons aussi tous les ennemis du peuple, qui souhaitent confusément on ne sait quelle catastrophe où l'on risquerait tout, avec la consolation d'y écraser sûrement la république. Mais derrière ce petit bataillon d'aristocrates, qui par eux-mêmes ne peuvent rien, je vois une masse de gens qui répétent ce que l'on dit et qui crient comme les autres, sans s'interroger eux-mêmes sérieusement. C'est cette abandon de soi qui est rédoubtable, chez l'étranger comme chez nous. Il faudrait réveiller tous ces dormeurs, qui ont peur de tout excepté d'une guerre atroce et ruineuse ; il faudrait leur montrer de belles choses à faire et assez difficiles déjà, contre l'ignorance, contre la misère, contre la maladie, contre le crime. Ils ne sont qu'endormis. C'est pourquoi je crois que la paix et le progrès en Europe dépendent du bon sens, de l'éloquence, du courage de dix hommes peut-être dans chaque pays."

In illustration of the necessity of overcoming by some device the natural reluctance of the people to make war for the sort of reasons for which wars in fact are made, I may cite the following passage from *Nationalism and the War in the Far East.* Speaking of the preparation of the Italian war on Tripoli, the author writes :—

"The Abyssinian adventure had left so deep an impression on Italy that the war-party, consisting of the Southern townsmen, especially in Sicily and Rome, and of clerical, financial, and military interests had no easy task in prevailing over the commercial, Liberal, and labour interests of the better educated Lombards, Piedmontese, and Venetians."

Again, summing up the causes which led Turkey into the first Balkan War, the same author writes :—

"So once again an organized and obstinate minority forced an unorganized and obedient majority to fight for the privileges of the minority ; once again Imperialism forced an Empire to fight against its true Imperial interest."

In the case of the United States and Mexico we have the remarkable, and, so far as I know, the unique fact that the head of

a government has publicly accused financial interests of working for war with a view to their own profit. After sending his expedition into Mexico to capture Villa, President Wilson warned the nation "that there are persons all along the border who are actively engaged in originating and giving as wide currency as they can to rumours of the most sensational and disturbing sort, which are wholly unjustified by the facts." "The object of this traffic in falsehood," he concluded, "is obvious. It is to create intolerable friction between the Government of the United States and the *de facto* Government of Mexico, for the purpose of bringing about intervention, in the interest of certain American owners of Mexican properties. This object cannot be obtained so long as honourable men are in control of this Government, but very serious conditions may be created, unnecessary bloodshed may result, and the relations between the two Republics may be very much embarrassed. The people of the United States should know the sinister and unscrupulous influences that are afoot, and be on their guard against crediting any story coming from the border." (See a statement made from Washington, March 25, 1916.)

If there had been in office in the United States a man less courageous, humane, and honourable than Mr. Wilson, it is pretty certain that war would have resulted. But it is not often in history that a man of Mr. Wilson's calibre has controlled foreign policy in any State.

In the same connexion the following passage is worth quoting. It is written by Mr. Gulick, the well-known authority on Japan and her relations to the United States.

"In this connexion, I wish to speak of the grave injury that is being done to both Japan and America by the irresponsible statements in the Press regarding the motives and actions of each country. Every evil suspicion and surmise apparently is voiced as assured news. Only last Wednesday two senators were quoted by the *Washington Post* as saying that they had positive information that the Japanese Government were aiding the Mexican Government with arms in order to embarrass our Government. This statement was positively denied by President Wilson a couple of days later, but the story served to do its share of the work in making both countries suspicious of each other. I regard as one of the most serious dangers to the right relations of Japan and America the irresponsible and apparently maliciously fabricated

'news' that finds such ready utterance in so many of our papers" ("Two Addresses" by Professor Sidney L. Gulick, p. 32).

A special study of the activities of the Press in inflaming international relations, and of the motives dictating its action, would be of extraordinary interest and importance. But it would be difficult to penetrate the secrecy in which the whole matter is involved. As an example of the kind of thing I mean, I may refer the reader to some letters by Mr. E. D. Morel which appeared in the *Daily News* during October 1911. Mr. Morel there contends that certain articles in the *Temps* dealing with Franco-German relations were dictated by the financial interests of the N'Goko Sangha Company in the French Congo. And he is able to quote from the report of the Budget Committee of the French Chamber for 1911 the following passage:—

"It is necessary that it should be henceforth known that articles in *Le Temps* dealing with foreign affairs are not solely inspired by the Government; that they are, on the contrary, sometimes directed against the Government, to compel the Government to embark upon financial enterprises which every one can appreciate. No greater service can be rendered to the foreign policy of our country than to demonstrate the necessity of accepting the policy of the foreign editorials of *Le Temps* with the greatest circumspection."

Further, Mr. Morel cites from the same report the following remark made to a French Colonial Minister in his own office by the director of the N'Goko Sangha Company:—

"You will not give us satisfaction to which we are entitled. Very well, we shall obtain it without you, for I have behind me the whole Press and two hundred members of Parliament."

I have verified these citations. (See *Chambre des Députés*, No. 376, session de 1910.)

On the subject of secret diplomacy, the following passage from Jaurès is worth quoting:—

"The adversaries of Socialism," he says, "forget, or pretend to forget, that even in democratic countries war can be unchained without the consent of the people, without its knowledge, against its will. They forget that, in the mystery with which diplomacy is still surrounded, foreign policy too often escapes from the control of the nations; that an imprudence, a fatuity, an imbecile provocation, or the iniquitous cupidity of certain financial groups, can unchain sudden conflicts; that it is still in the power of a

minority, of a tiny coterie, of a systematic and infatuated man, to involve the nation, to create the irreparable, and that war and peace still move outside the law of democracy. . . .

"The vast personal combinations of M. Hanotaux conducted France to the verge of war with England. The vast personal combinations of M. Delcassé conducted France to the verge of war with Germany. . . . The antagonism of French and German financiers put the peace of Europe in peril" (Jaurès, *L'Armee nouvelle*, p. 459).

CHAPTER XIV

THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT

In the preceding chapters I have indicated the kind of international reorganization which will be required if we are to escape universal militarism. I must now ask those readers who have followed me so far to go yet one stage further, and to consider how the policy of a League of Nations must affect, if it is to be adopted, all the other conditions of the settlement after the war. This aspect of the matter has been fully and ably discussed by Mr. Brailsford in his book *A League of Nations.*[1] I am in substantial agreement with his conclusions, to which I would refer the reader. And I will confine myself here to a few of the more obvious points.

The Allies have defined their war-aims as "Restitution, Reparation, and Security." The two former I need not here discuss. I take it for granted that any peace the Allies could accept, short of their defeat, will include the restoration of the territory occupied by the Central Powers and compensation for injuries inflicted. Security is the problem I am concerned with. And I argue for the security a League of Nations might give, as against the security that may be hoped from a crushing defeat of the enemy, followed by the attempt to hold him down. Neither

[1] Headley Bros., 1917.

security can be absolute, as every candid man will recognize. My contention is that the League of Nations plan is much more hopeful than the other.

What is the other plan? The traditional one of crushing the enemy, so that he can't begin again, and leaving the matter there. To men who have little knowledge of history, strong passions, and a desire to win for the sake of winning, this plan seems to be beyond question the only one. The position, as they see it, is very simple. "Germany made the war, gratuitously and unprovoked. Put it out of her power to do it again, and there will not be another war." But this simple view leaves out almost the whole of the facts. In the first place, Germany did not make the war gratuitously and unprovoked. It was not a peaceful Europe upon which she sprang it; it was the Europe of armed anarchy on which I have dwelt. That is the essential fact. The relative responsibility of different States, during the ten years of diplomacy preceding the war, though not unimportant, is secondary. I cannot here digress into the question of how that responsibility should be distributed. I have discussed it at length in another place.[1] But if we remember that there were wars before Germany was united, wars in which no German State took part, wars in which the British fought on the side of German States, wars in which the menace of "domination" came not from Germans, but from Frenchmen or Russians, we shall see at once that the causes of war go far deeper and are far more complex than the ambition of any particular State. It follows that the cure for war must go deeper than the reduction of one State to impotence.

Further, even if it were true that the present war had been caused exclusively by German aggression, it would not follow that by crushing Germany we should obtain a per-

[1] *The European Anarchy* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1916).

manent security against her. Let us turn to history. For twenty years Europe fought France, as the Power menacing the liberties of all other States. France, in fact, did succeed, as Germany has not, in conquering and incorporating with herself a great part of Europe. The force she developed, relatively to that of her enemies, was incomparably greater than that which Germany has shown. After almost continuous war for twenty years she was beaten, beaten to her knees, and her capital occupied in triumph. Did she thereafter cease to be a menace? On the contrary. During a great part of the nineteenth century the ambition of France was still the bugbear of Europe, and especially of England. Every internal revolution in her government was expected to unchain a war either of liberty or of domination. She was the firebrand of the world, or so believed to be; and was so far from being reduced to impotence by all she had suffered that she could still think herself, even up to 1870, invincible. 1871 appeared to have annihilated her. Did it? Look at her now!

Again. After Jena, Prussia was "crushed" with a completeness that seemed to leave nothing more to be desired. Half her territory was taken from her. She was disarmed, and bound by treaty never to have on foot a larger army than 42,000 men. A few years later, she was beside the English crushing Napoleon at Waterloo. I infer from these examples that no military victory can reduce to permanent or even to long enduring impotence a nation which is capable, numerous, tenacious, and proud. A military defeat of Germany, however complete it might be, would be no guarantee against her doing again what she did in 1914, if she had the will, or the need, to do it. It may be replied that the resurrection of Prussia after Jena and of France after 1815 and 1871 were possible because the balance of forces changed in Europe, and the once defeated Powers

found new allies. No doubt. And what is going to prevent that in future? Nothing, unless it be such a change of international outlook and policy as I have been advocating. The members of the present alliance against the Central Powers have no common interest to hold them permanently together unless they make a common interest of the peace of the world. Short of that, the causes that have always disrupted alliances will disrupt this one, namely, the competing ambitions of the States allied. Look once more at history. In 1814, immediately after the defeat of France, while the negotiations for peace were still proceeding, war almost broke out again, not between the Allies and France, but between England and Austria ranged on the side of France against Prussia and Russia. In the Crimean War, England and France fought Russia. In 1859, Italy and France fought Austria. In 1866, Prussia fought Austria. In 1870, Germany fought France. In 1877, Russia fought Turkey. In 1904, Russia fought Japan. Finally, in 1917 England, the secular enemy of France and of Russia, is fighting on their side. Germany, who fought Austria in 1866, is fighting on her side. Russia, who fought Japan in 1904, is fighting on her side. Turkey, who fought on England's side in 1854, is fighting against her. Bulgaria, who fought on Russia's side in 1877, is fighting against her; and both Italy and Roumania are fighting States to which they were actually bound, at the outbreak of the war, by treaties of alliance. This mere summary is sufficient to show that we can no more rely on alliances than on military victory to secure permanent peace, unless alliances are to have a different object from any they have had in the past. An alliance that is to be effective for the purpose must be a league to keep the peace and support public law.

If that be granted, then the question of Germany comes up in a new form. Is the best security against future

aggression on her part her exclusion from the League or her inclusion in it? I have already argued in favour of her inclusion. But as the point is very important I will recur to it here.

First, if we exclude Germany, we make our League a league against her. We revert, that is, to that division of Europe into two armed camps which led up to the present war. It will be urged that an alliance as strong as that which now confronts the Central Powers would be strong enough, if it held together, to prevent Germany from risking another war, especially if she were prevented from consummating the dreaded "Mittel Europa." That may be true. But there are other points to be considered. In the first place, Germany and her allies would regard such a League as a constant menace to themselves. Outlawed from the comity of Europe, they would never trust the League not to abuse its preponderant power. They could not reasonably do so; for preponderant power has always been abused. The outlook of Europe therefore would not be international. There would be two rival groups of nations, each pursuing aims of power at the cost of the other. It follows that there would be competitive arming and counter-arming, as before 1914. The Allies indeed might, it they secured a crushing victory, impose a temporary disarmament on the Central Powers. But how could they maintain it, short of a permanent occupation of German territory? There could never be a good will to disarmament in Germany unless all States disarmed. And a Germany determined to arm, and indeed compelled to arm, would find the means to arm.

Further, Germany excluded would be Germany intriguing to break up the League. She might or might not succeed. But that would and must be her effort. Rejected from the new order, she would be unable to be loyal to it. She would

have far more motive to intrigue against it than she could have if she were included in it, and she would have as good opportunity to do so. Germany, beyond reasonable doubt, would be a greater menace to peace outside than inside the League.

Lastly, and most important of all, if the German Powers were excluded, the United States would not come in. I think this may be said with confidence. The United States may enter a League to guarantee peace on a basis of equal rights and equal opportunities for all. They will not enter an alliance of some European Powers against others, with the chance of being dragged into a conflict which might not be one of Right at all, and which, so far as America is concerned, would not even be one of interest. The American proposal is for a new order, not for a perpetuation of the old one in new combinations.[1] But the guarantee of the United States is the most important condition of the coming into being and the effective working of a League of Nations. And if for no other reason than to ensure American support, the German Powers must be admitted.

These arguments are very strong. Two objections, however, may be brought forward, either of which, if true, would be conclusive. The first is, that the feeling among the allied nations will be such that they would not enter into any treaty with Germany. But in fact they must enter into a treaty, or they can make no peace at all. It is merely a question what the form of the treaty shall be. And I venture to believe that war passion is not so strong as to override, in the belligerent nations, the desire for a durable peace. In any case, their leaders in Church and State should make every effort to prevent such a catastrophe.

Next, it is urged that Germany would never enter into

[1] This was stated explicitly and in detail by President Wilson in his speech to the Senate in January 1917. See Notes to this chapter.

such a League. That is speculation. The German Chancellor has expressed officially the willingness of his country to come in, and important organs of the German Press urge the same course.[1] The reader, of course, has the right, if he choose, to discount that. The event, and that only, can decide. Meantime, my argument is that Germany should be invited to come in. If she refuses, the consequences to herself and to Europe will be on her head.

Further, if, as I argue, it is essential for the success of the League that the Powers of Central Europe come in, then all the other conditions of the settlement must be such that it shall be possible for them to come in. We must aim not at crushing and holding down the enemy States, but at removing from all States the apprehensions and hindrances which led up to the war. The only possible basis of a successful League is the guarantee of equal Right to existence and peaceful development for all the States concerned. To that end, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, any changes of political allegiance made at the settlement must be dictated solely by the needs and desires of the populations it is proposed to transfer, and not by ambition for aggrandizement on the part of the States to whom they may be transferred. There must be no conquests for the sake of conquest; and whatever conquest may have taken place must be used merely to satisfy national aspirations.

Secondly, there must be no attempt to hamper and restrict the economic development of any State. The Paris Resolutions point straight to the wrong kind of peace; to one that cannot be durable, but must be a prelude to another war. The passage in the Allies' Note to the United States where they say that they recognize and propose to

[1] See Notes to this chapter.

establish "the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development" appears to be a definite repudiation of those Resolutions. But it is plain that in all countries, not excluding England, there are powerful parties and interests working for a predatory and imperialistic settlement. If we intend a League of Nations, those ambitions must be sacrificed.

Thirdly, where any State needs an outlet for its commerce by routes and ports not comprised in its own territory, the satisfaction should be given not by annexations, but by international guarantees of free transit for peaceful traffic. The problems of the Dardanelles, of Trieste, of Fiume, of Dantzig, and other such, could and should be settled so. Roads closed to armies but open to trade is what a peaceful world needs. And by the application of that policy claims might be fairly satisfied which otherwise either could not be met at all, or met only at the cost of annexation, leaving behind new causes of war.

All these questions I purposely leave unelaborated here. But I could not conclude without making clear to the reader that the policy of a League of Nations is not one for *after the war* (as the Governments and the Press seem to assume), but, if intended at all, must be intended here and now, so that all other war aims may be correlated with it.

I am aware that to many readers the solution here suggested will seem Utopian. I do not know whether it be or no, for that depends upon the temper of nations and of their Governments. But I do know that, if this be Utopia, then Reality will be hell. For the alternative to a League of Nations is universal militarism, as outlined in the first chapter of this book. Either, at the close of the war, the Nations will perform a great act of faith in themselves and

in one another, or they will succumb to an era of new wars, which then they will regard as a fate, but which will be, in fact, their own bad will writ large.

Is the will, then, really bad? I do not think so. What finds expression, now, in the Press and in Parliament is bad. But this does not utter the soul of men, nor their intellect; it reflects and distorts their surface passions. The men who are fighting this war are not fighting it for punishment or revenge, for territory or power. They are fighting it for a better world. They do not know how to achieve their object. They will have no voice in the settlement. But those who will have the voice will betray the living and the dead, if they offer them nothing better than a new handicap in the old race to ruin. If England is to give these men what they have fought for, she must be content to take nothing for herself. When she has vindicated Liberty and Right, she must lay those gifts on the altar of mankind, and retire with hands clean because they are empty. Only a nation thus disinterested can be trusted. And of the temple we have to build, trust is the corner stone.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE 266.—THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The following passage from President Wilson's speech to the Senate of January 22, 1917, states clearly the point made in the text:—

"No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Government, elements consistent with the political faith and the practical convictions which the

peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

"I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure.

"It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

"The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."

The whole speech should be carefully studied; it is perhaps the most important international document of all history. And it bears in the most direct way on the kind of peace that is possible and desirable after the war. The reader may be referred to an article on this subject in *War and Peace* for April 1917.

Page 267.—The German Chancellor and the German Press on a League of Nations.

The following message, reproducing the Chancellor's remarks in the Reichstag, was transmitted by Bernstorff to the American League to Enforce Peace at their banquet on November 24, 1916:—

"We have never concealed our doubts with regard to the question whether peace could be permanently guaranteed by such

international organizations as arbitration courts. I shall, however, at this place, not discuss the theoretical aspects of the problem but we must now, and at the time of the conclusion of peace, from the point of view of facts, define our position with regard to this question. When, at and after the end of the war, the world will become fully conscious of its horrifying destruction of life and property, then through the whole of mankind will ring a cry for peaceful arrangements and understandings which, as far as lies in human power, shall avoid the return of such a monstrous catastrophe. This cry will be so powerful and so justified that it must lead to some result. Germany will honestly co-operate in the examination of every endeavour to find a practical solution of the question, and will collaborate to make its realization possible. This all the more if the war, as we expect and trust, will create political conditions which do full justice to the free development of all nations, the small ones as well as the great nations. Then it will be possible to realize the principles of justice and free development on land and of the freedom of the seas. The first condition for evolution of international relations by way of arbitration and peaceful compromise of conflicting interests should be that no more aggressive coalitions are formed in future. Germany will at all times be ready to enter a league for the purpose of restraining the disturbers of peace."

In the original speech in the Reichstag (November 9, 1916) the Chancellor used the phrase, which gave offence in England, that Germany would "put herself at the head" of such a League. He officially stated later that he meant to imply by this phrase no hegemony of Germany, but merely her readiness to take the lead, rather than hold back, in such a movement.

The following remarks attributed to Count Karolyi are worth citing in the same connexion, though they do not explicitly refer to the League of Nations. Speaking of Naumann's *Mittel Europa*, he is reported to have said :—

"We feel shy of the economic dangers of an economic *bloc* of the whole of Middle Europe, as we should by it perpetuate the economic war between the two groups of States. Such a state of affairs after the war we cannot possibly wish for. On the contrary, we must work for an enduring peace, both political and economic, with the other group."

As to the German Press, the following passages from the *Berliner*

Tageblatt (anything but a "pacifist" organ) are worth citing. The article is dealing with Lord Grey's speech in favour of a League of Nations:—

"The lesson of this war for all the nations which have taken part in it will be the necessity of doing everything in the future to prevent the repetition of such a terrible misfortune. When once the war spirit has passed away the nations will be able to reflect calmly on the human as well as the material losses which this war has caused. They will be burdened for generations with the payment of the interest and sinking funds of the war loans, with the pensions for the war invalids and the dependants of the fallen, and all these burdens will have to be borne by a smaller number of producers, so that the desire for a peaceful understanding will become so strong in every nation that ideas of war will be very slow to appear.

"Among the German people, who by an enormous majority regard this war as a war for their existence (and they regard it still more so after the resolutions of the Paris Conference and the speeches of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George), there is an intense desire to see this war ended by a durable peace in which they can pursue their culture quietly and peacefully. We are not striving for dominion; we do not wish to destroy or oppress any nation. We should very much like to see differences of opinion and causes of strife between nations settled by an international court of arbitration. And if that is also England's peace aim the war need not be continued, ten thousand men need not be slaughtered or maimed every day, and Europe need no longer be morally and materially ruined.

"Also with Grey's last demand, the demand for an international agreement on the methods of conducting war, we could declare ourselves in thorough and willing agreement, as well as with the warnings that would make it clear to every nation that departed from these agreements that it would be regarded as the common enemy of the human race by the whole world. . . .

"According to the repeated declarations of the Chancellor, we are ready for a peace which has the guarantee of permanence, and which secures for us the possibilities of development. If the durability of peace can be guaranteed by an international organization, our support may certainly be counted on" (cited in the *Westminster Gazette* of November 18, 1916).

The very able *Welt am Montag*, another Berlin organ enjoying, I am told, a large circulation, printed several articles warmly supporting the American League to Enforce Peace. Similar articles, of course, are common in the Socialist Press.

On the other hand, such jingo organs as the *Tageszeitung* are as sceptical of and hostile to the whole idea as our own *Morning Post*. Militarists everywhere see in the idea of a League of Nations the deathblow to their ambitions and hopes.

Page 268.—International Routes.

The "internationalization" of rivers has long been a recognized fact. "In 1815 the Congress of Vienna decided that the great rivers of Western Europe should for the future be open to navigation, and that the tolls to be levied on each of them should be settled by common accord among the riverian Powers. In pursuance of this agreement, the Rhine, the Elbe, and other rivers were at various times after 1815 opened to free navigation, on payment of such moderate dues as were sufficient to recoup the territorial Powers for their expenditure upon the waterway. The Danube was freed by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and a European Commission was charged with the duty of executing the necessary engineering works at its mouths, and permitted to levy tolls sufficient to pay their cost."[1] Similarly the navigation of the British portion of the St. Lawrence was thrown open "for ever" (by the treaty of Washington of 1871) to American citizens. What is plainly required, and may naturally follow this precedent, is a right to transmit goods in bond by railway across foreign territory, or to ship them through certain sea-channels analogous to rivers. However the Dardanelles be disposed of, it should be forbidden by international law to close them to trade, even in time of war. The Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are already (by treaty) open to war ships, as well as merchant ships, in war-time as well as in peace.

Page 269.—The Soldiers' Aim in the War.

I do not suppose that most of the soldiers formulate their purpose or have the knowledge either to accept or reject any

[1] Lawrence, *International Law*, p. 187.

particular terms of settlement. But, from all I can learn by inquiry, I should conclude that their deepest wish is that such a war may never occur again. The following passage from a letter from a British soldier probably gives a view widely held :—

"We must finish this job, and this is going to be the last war. Don't you make no mistake about it—no more of this b——y rot for the kids—and chance it!"[1]

Here are two explicit statements from educated youths at the front. The first is from an Austrian :—

"We go to battle for freedom and justice—and our struggle is for a lasting peace. . . . If this lasting peace is really attained, then I shall not have yielded up my young life in vain. For when you read this letter I shall be resting under the sod. My spur to endurance was the thought of the world peace which is to follow on this world war. I left this world unwillingly. . . . Do not forget what I lived for—what in the end I died for—the building up of a better order which shall create happier men" (*Arbeiter Zeitung*, December 19, 1915).

The other is from a young Cambridge man personally known to me, one of the many whose promise has been cut off by this war :—

"The younger generation, both of officers and men, is fighting not for England only, but for Germany and the World as well. It is convinced that militarism is a curse : and that a sane democracy, however dimly realizable, would be a blessing. It sees that if, after this war, Europe becomes a camp more completely armed than ever, the sacrifice will have been in vain. It sees that Germany alone can cure her own disease ; that she alone can crush her military caste ; and that reform, to be more than outward, must come from within."

Further statements of soldiers at the front will be found cited in the *Cambridge Magazine* for July 8, 15, and 29, 1916.

[1] Cited by C. R. Ashbee in *The American League to Enforce Peace*, p. 88 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1917).

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